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PREFACE 
NO one can understand the history of Kentucky without appre- 
ciating the place of the county in her constitutional, political, 
and social development. In the nineteenth century Kentuckians 
exhibited a particular proficiency in the art of creating counties, 
carving out  100 by 1850 and adding twenty more in the next 
sixty-two years. Today Kentucky ranks third in the nation in 
total number of  counties and second in number of counties per 
square mile. Although statistics themselves are sometimes mis- 
leading, in the case of nineteenth-century Kentucky, her 
counties constituted a significance directly proportional to  their 
number. 
In an earlier book I examined Kentucky's county courts, in 
many ways the nucleus of county government. In concentrating 
on the period of  the first and second state constitutions, 1792 
to 1850, I made only very general observations about the era 
that followed. The great influence of  the county courts in the 
daily life of  antebellum Kentuckians represented the principal 
thesis of my endeavor. In this study, I take a broader stance, 
examining the county in Kentucky during the period of the 
third constitution, viewing not only the county courts but also 
officers, internal improvements, crime control, court day, poli- 
tics, finances, special legislation, and constitutional convulsion 
and confrontation during the Civil War and Reconstruction. 
In 1851 Kentuckians implemented their third constitution, 
which had been in part brought about because of the deficien- 
cies of the county courts. Its principal reform injected elective 
... 
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politics into that system of government. Antebellum reformers 
complained that county government operated inefficiently, in- 
effectively, and in some ways corruptly. But with all the debate 
and revision, the questions remained: Had the revisers cured the 
constitutional illness? What impact would the democratic 
process have on the local constitution? Would the great influ- 
ence of Kentucky's counties recede or increase during the 
period of the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Industrial 
Revolution? What part would her counties play as Kentucky 
struggled to cope with the Civil War and the violence that 
followed i t?  What would be the relationship of the counties to  
Kentucky's railroad binge of the last half of the nineteenth 
century? These are some of the questions I attempt to answer in 
this study. 
Many people assisted me in the completion of this book. I 
would like to thank particularly my former colleague Dr. 
Thomas D. Clark and my colleague Steven A. Channing, who 
read the manuscript and offered many valuable suggestions. A 
grant from the American Bar Foundation expedited the re- 
search. 
Librarians and archivists facilitate historical research and in 
my case the following helped greatly: Jacqueline Bull and 
Alexander Gilchrist of King Library, University of Kentucky; 
Lewis Bellardo of the Kentucky Division of Archives and Rec- 
ords; Arthur Lawson and Michael G. Snyder of the Lexington 
Public Library; and Thomas L. Owen of the University of 
Louisville Archives. I would also like to thank the staffs of the 
University of Kentucky Law Library, the Kentucky Historical 
Society, the Louisville Public Library, the Covington Public 
Library, the Filson Club, and the National Archives and Rec- 
ords Service, Civil Archives Division, Legislative, Judicial, and 
Fiscal Branch. 
Burton Milward of the Papers of Henry Clay Project, Univer- 
sity of Kentucky, and Professor Kenneth Vanlandingham of the 
Political Science Department, University of Kentucky, shared 
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with me their special knowledge of local history and county 
government of Kentucky. 
My wife, Sandra Boyd Ireland, typed the manuscript and 
prevented me from establishing the international comma error 
record. I dedicate this book to  her. 
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1. 
LITTLE KINGDOMS 
Theoretically only an arm of state government, Kentucky's 
counties in reality took on characteristics of  semi-sovereignties. 
Once created, they refused to  be abolished, fought with neigh- 
boring counties over boundaries, resisted encroachment on their 
own territories, engaged in internecine struggles over county 
seats, and besieged the legislature with requests that their own 
particular problems be ameliorated by special legislation. Such 
activity not only tended to  distract the attention of legislators 
from the more general needs of the Commonwealth but  also 
- 
contributed to  its prevailing condition of localism. 
Already possessed of 100 counties by 1850, Kentucky added 
nineteen more in the next forty years, making it the second 
. . 
most constitutionally subdivided state in the Union per square 
mile. Kentuckians demanded the creation of  new counties for a 
variety of reasons ranging from the legitimate to the absurd. 
Perhaps the primary reason was t o  make the county seat more 
accessible. A county seat remote from one's residence often 
made it difficult t o  transact commercial as well as governmental 
and legal business. 
- 
Most rural Kentuckians depended on horses and roads for 
transportation, and while horses generally performed well, roads 
often represented little more than mudbaths. Since county seats 
usually constituted the commercial and social, as well as govern- 
mental, center of a county, the closeness of  a rural resident to  
these communities often bore a direct relationship t o  his eco- 
nomic and political standing In 1856, for example, the General 
Assembly formed Rowan County out of Morgan and Fleming 
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counties to  make the county seat more accessible to  larger 
numbers of citizens.' 
Politics and land speculation also motivated those who 
petitioned for the creation of new counties. More counties 
meant additional offices for the politically ambitious. A new 
county might also represent a gerrymandering to  further the 
designs of a political party. There were always those, too,  who 
wished to honor the memory of a deceased statesman by 
naming a county after him. The land speculator sought to 
augment the value of his holdings by making them the center of 
a new county seat. One such adventurer promised to  build a 
courthouse and dispensed large quantities of whiskey in order 
to create Carlisle County out  of Ballard County in 1886 and 
thereby increase the worth of  his extensive landholdings. Osten- 
sibly seeking to  honor his daughter Henrietta, a certain Mr. 
Egner of Trigg County sought to  create a county out of parts of 
Trigg and Marshall counties only to  have his efforts defeated at  
the polls in 1867 and in the legislature two years later. Oppo- 
nents accused Egner of trying t o  convert his largely infertile 
farm into a county seat and thus sell off town lots a t  inflated 
prices. Furthermore, they noted, the proposed county would 
consist of mostly worthless land and only 400 voters.' 
Others promoted the establishment of new counties in 
attempts to escape the policies of existing counties. In one 
instance, disgruntled farmers from Bourbon, Montgomery, 
Bath, and Nicholas counties, distressed about the mounting 
railroad indebtedness of their local governments, unsuccessfully 
campaigned in 1870 for the creation of the county of Richland. 
In some cases townspeople sought to  make their communities 
county seats through the creation of new counties. Some living 
in and about the town of Berea unsuccessfully attempted such a 
maneuver in 1878.3 
The proliferation of Kentucky's counties produced problems, 
many of them economic. Usually legislators took care to 
provide that the citizens of newly created counties would re- 
main liable for their share of  any indebtedness existing in their 
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parent county, although such precaution did not always elim- 
inate further controversy. For example, the Court of  Appeals 
ruled in 1892 that Menifee County continued t o  be liable for 
part of the Montgomery County railroad debt even though new 
bonds had been issued in a refunding And in a previous case, 
the high tribunal upheld a provision in Robertson County's 
enabling statute which imposed an annual tax of $500 for four 
years on its citizens for their share of burdens assumed by 
parent Bracken County during the Civil War. Other settlements 
involved the partitioning of land. In 1842 the legislature pro- 
vided that half of 6,000 acres given by the Commonwealth to 
Calloway County in 1834 should go to  Marshall County, wholly 
created out of  the former. Calloway County subsequently sold 
3,920 acres for her own benefit and refused t o  transfer any of 
the remaining land to  Marshall. The Court of  Appeals ruled that 
Marshall County could recover at least half of the acreage 
uns01d.~ 
To  most critics, Kentucky's excessive number of counties 
meant that many were little better than paupers constituting a 
drain on more stable counties and the state treasury. In this 
context, a pauper county was one that received more state 
revenue than it produced. At first such a description fit counties 
mostly in eastern and southeastern Kentucky, but by  1890 it 
applied to  nearly two-thirds of  the state's counties. In marked 
contrast, the Bluegrass and urban counties of  Fayette, Bourbon, 
Scott, Shelby, Woodford, Jefferson, Kenton, Campbell, and 
Mason paid 80 percent of the net revenue which went into the 
state treasury ." 
Many observers saw a direct relationship between the number 
of Kentucky counties and county poverty. The abundance of 
counties with small populations meant there were often few 
qualified public officials, produced the need for more local 
juries, contributed to the state's high crime rate, and caused 
many regions to  go without needed internal improvements. 
Shortages of competent county officials led t o  inadequate tax 
assessment and collection and incompetent fiscal management. 
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Vast numbers of small counties further meant that many were 
nothing more than "little centers from which radiate antago- 
nisms" leading t o  feuds and other forms of violent crime neces- 
sitating continuous jury selection and criminal prosecution, the 
expense of which was largely borne by the state. Because 
government aid t o  transportation involved local government 
much more than state, an overabundance of small counties 
meant inadequate tax bases and lack of central planning. Resi- 
dents of southeastern and eastern Kentucky themselves lament- 
ed that their county patterns made it more difficult t o  exploit 
the region's vast mineral and timber wealth because most coun- 
ties had no funds to create efficient forms of t r a n ~ ~ o r t a t i o n . ~  
Not every observer accepted the argument that local poverty 
and strains on the state treasury were caused by an over- 
abundance of counties. Some noted that most of the state 
assistance to counties constituted funds for education which 
would be unaffected by the number of counties, while others 
argued that smaller counties rendered law enforcement and 
criminal prosecution more efficient rather than less. A few even 
advocated the creation of more counties as a means of more 
accessible justice, civil as well as criminal. But these voices were 
definitely in the minority. By 1890 most people favored a 
constitutional limitation on the number of new counties which 
could be ~ r e a t e d . ~  
Contests over the location of county seats within established 
counties closely resembled those over the creation of new 
counties. Although county seats were not usually moved in an 
established county, efforts to change those centers were not 
uncommon. Legislatures not infrequently let commissioners or 
even the voters determine county seat locations where new 
counties were being established, and in such cases conflicts 
could be intense. The commissioners appointed to  establish Lee 
County were unable to  agree on the location of a county seat 
and left the question t o  the voters, who supported the town of 
Beattyville over Proctor by a margin of nearly three t o  one. 
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Furious over defeat, Proctorites at first tried to secure the 
repeal of the statute creating Lee County and then unsuccess- 
fully sought legislative removal of the seat of government to 
their community. On another occasion, the burning of the 
courthouse in Blandville occasioned an attempt by citizens in 
Wickliffe to become the Ballard County seat. After a heated 
campaign that involved alleged vote-buying and fraud, Wickliffe 
prevailed in a special election authorized by the legislature. 
Distraught Blandvillians challenged the outcome before the 
Court of Appeals, only to lose, even though it was proved that 
Wickliffe merchants had promised voters they would underwrite 
the cost of a new county courthouse. During the litigation, 
Ballard County's jail remained in Blandville while the new 
courthouse resided in Wickliffe.' 
Kentuckians near a county border who were unhappy about 
residing in a particular county did not have to petition for the 
creation of a new county in order to gain relief; they could 
simply secure special legislation redrawing the county line. This 
happened at least two hundred times during the period of the 
third constitution and for a variety of reasons. Although almost 
- 
always pleading that the seat of government in the next county 
was closer, petitioners for county-line changes sometimes 
actually desired to obtain lower tax rates or to  run for office in 
their new counties. Usually such endeavors involved only a few 
acres and were successful, but occasionally proposed county- 
line redefinitions were more ambitious and sparked heated 
controversy. In 1877 the western border area around Knoxville 
in Pendleton County wanted to join Grant County on the 
pretense that most of its inhabitants worked in Williamstown, 
but Pendletonians resisted the attempt because too much terri- 
tory would be lost (thirty-five square miles); they also claimed 
that the maneuver was simply a Republican gerrymander. In the 
end the effort failed.g 
Sometimes county-line changes seemingly minor in nature 
became major alterations upon closer inspection and plunged 
neighboring counties into prolonged and bitter litigation. In 
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1890 the legislature redefined the boundary between Estill and 
Powell counties ostensibly because of uncertainty as to the 
proper line. When new surveys revealed that the redefinition 
had  transferred 160 voters and taxable property worth 
$175,000 to  Powell County, Estill County officials declared the 
statute invalid because of fraud and attempted t o  collect taxes 
from residents in the disputed territory. Faced with the pros- 
pect of double taxation, the residents successfully challenged 
Estill County's right to  tax, the Court of Appeals refusing to  
look behind the statute for evidence of fraud. A similar dispute 
occurred between Shelby and Oldham counties in 1852. After 
the legislature transferred part of Shelby County to  Oldham, 
officials of the former claimed it was impossible to establish the 
new county line from the statutory description and continued 
to  assess residents in the affected area. In upholding the bound- 
ary alteration, the Court of Appeals ruled that vague statutory 
language and the failure to  designate who should fix the new 
line did not render the legislation invalid.'' 
The presence of large numbers of so-called pauper counties, 
plus the added aggravation of county-seat and county-line dis- 
putes, prompted some critics to  call for the abolition of certain 
numbers of counties. Seldom did such proposals reach the 
legislature and when they did, they usually languished in com- 
mittee. But on one occasion the General Assembly seriously 
considered the question of abolition and very nearly agreed to 
such a proposition. In 1888 the General Assembly only nar- 
rowly defeated an effort to abolish Rowan County after a 
bloody feud had reduced the citizens of the area to  near 
anarchy. Cynics suggested that the prospect of undermining 
Fleming County's Democratic posture by adding to  it a Repub- 
lican part of Rowan County influenced the Democratic legis- 
lature as much as the question of law and order." 
Most of the calls for consolidation of counties came from 
newspapers. In 1871 the Maysville Bulletin published one of the 
most searching analyses of the problem, calling for the abolition 
of all counties created since 1845 or at the least a permanent 
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stop to the creation of new counties. In many of the smaller 
counties, the newspaper submitted, there were too few intelli- 
gent and competent men to  run local affairs and government 
was "a ridiculous farce" with record-keeping "a muddle." In 
one instance, the paper reported, a healthy county with splen- 
did turnpikes and bridges had given birth to several new coun- 
ties whose smaller tax bases could not support macadamized 
roads and required state subsidy for routine expenditures. Five 
years later, the Lexington Kentucky Gazette offered still an- 
other formula for dealing with surplus counties. "Each and 
every county that has through a course of years proven itself 
incapable of supporting itself ought to be consolidated with 
another county," the Gazette boldly suggested, "and, if the new 
county still proves unable to  take care of itself, let consolida- 
tion go on until they do become self sustaining."12 
Even though county-abolition movements failed during the 
period of the third constitution, many people desired to  incor- 
porate restrictions against the creation of new counties in the 
fourth constitution. Some delegates claimed that the vast major- 
ity of people favored such restrictions, as well as some reduc- 
tion in the number of counties, while others denied this, as- 
serting that many localities were looking forward to the time 
when they could form themselves into new counties. While 
most legislators during the debates over the proposed abolition 
of Rowan County had presumed the right of the General 
Assembly to abolish a county, delegates to the constitutional 
convention three years later sharply divided over the question. 
Despite the virtual unanimity of opinion from such scholars as 
Thomas McIntyre Cooley, Joseph Story, and John F. Dillon 
that states could abolish their counties, surprising numbers of 
delegates argued to  the contrary, evidence of the stature these 
local entities had attained during their first 100 years of exis- 
tence. Some argued that whenever a legislature established a 
county and allowed its people to  invest money in buildings, 
bridges, roads, and other capital assets, it implied a contract not 
to abolish it, a few even contending that the Dartmouth College 
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case prevented abolition. One delegate went so far as to  argue 
that counties had the same immunity from destruction as the 
states of the Union. Such argument failed to  persuade a major- 
ity of delegates, who voted forty-eight to  thirty-three to include 
a specific provision acknowledging the right of future legis- 
latures to  abolish counties. The convention overwhelmingly 
approved a general article prohibiting the creation of new coun- 
ties of less than 400 square miles or whose proposed boundary 
line would run less than ten miles from a county seat.13 
During the period of the third constitution, as before, coun- 
ties did not perform duties not clearly prescribed by the consti- 
tution or statute without seeking legislative authorization or 
ratification. As the nineteenth century matured and society 
became more complex, the needs of county government and 
governors multiplied and the tendency to  secure legislative 
authorization increased. By 1890, from 150 to  250 statutes of 
each legislative session normally concerned some aspect of 
county government. 
County courts found it necessary to  secure special legislation 
for a variety of matters. Bills were considered authorizing in- 
vestment in internal improvements (usually conditioned upon 
voter approval), levying special taxes for the construction of 
buildings and other capital improvements, adopting special road 
laws, permitting claims payments not authorized under general 
laws, or selling public buildings such as poorhouses. Normally, 
too, the local tribunals needed t o  secure legislative ratification 
of delinquent levies, appointments to  office made without quo- 
rums, questionable subscriptions to  various internal improve- 
ment projects, and orders, judgments, and minutes not regularly 
read or signed. ~iscellaneous statutes included permission to  
individual counties to  establish additional magisterial districts or 
voting places. 
County officers secured a wide variety of measures granting 
special jurisdiction. By virtue of such legislation the judge of the 
Boone County Court had jurisdiction after 1879 to  try all 
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complaints against surveyors of public roads; Madison's county 
judge was permitted after 1877 to  practice law in any case 
involving the settlement of an estate when the fiduciary had not 
settled his accounts in the Madison County Court; the judges of 
the county courts of Warren, Scott, and Pendleton counties, if 
lawyers, were permitted to form partnerships with licensed 
lawyers to practice law in any court except their own; the judge 
of the Butler County Court was exempted from the general 
prohibition of county judges from bringing suits to settle the 
estates of deceased persons; and the county judges as presiding 
judges of the county quarterly courts were given a wide variety 
of jurisdictional limitations ranging from $100 to $500.14 
Many of the statutes affecting justices of the peace consti- 
tuted special legislation because they applied to the magistrates 
in certain counties only; this was especially true of legislation 
establishing limits to civil jurisdiction. Other special laws con- 
cerning county officers included those requiring certain county 
court clerks to index and cross-index their records, requiring 
certain officers to purchase certain books, benefiting certain 
- 
officers such as sheriffs and constables by (for example) ex- 
tending the time periods in which to collect fee bills and 
granting certain officers special powers. 
The tendency of the legislature to  exempt counties from the 
operation of general laws drew criticism from newspapers and 
other commentators. The Maysvi~le Bulletin branded the prac- 
tice "an evil one" and cited laws regulating the jurisdiction of 
justices of the peace as particularly offensive. "The justices in 
one half of the counties have jurisdiction in civil causes to  the 
amount of fifty dollars, while in the other half they have 
jurisdiction to  the amount of one hundred." Submitting that 
"uniformity in the operation of general laws is a fundamental 
requirement of good government," the paper derisively noted 
that county lines sometimes ran through the centers of towns, 
- 
resulting in justices at one end of town having double the 
jurisdiction as those on the other end." 
The General Assembly's preoccupation with the special needs 
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of individual counties constituted only part of the general 
problem of local legislation which by 1860 had grown to be a 
dilemma for practically every state in the Union. More and 
more the nation's legislatures found themselves bogged down 
in trivia, passing laws for the benefit of the keepers of stud 
horses, jacks, and bulls; incorporating village graveyards; char- 
tering numerous businesses; and changing the names of small 
towns (e.g., Buzzard's Roost to  Upper Blue Lick Springs). The 
pernicious effects of such a system were obvious to many 
Kentuckians and applied as well to  the legislative processes ;f 
other states. Describing the evils of special legislation generally 
as "vicious," "fraudulent," and "outrageous," observers noted 
more particularly that Kentucky's General Assembly had little 
time t o  cope with the general problems of the Commonwealth. 
When the legislators tended to such problems they often did so 
hastily and sloppily. So scandalous had the situation become 
that in 1879 politician-lawyer Robert M. Bradley was able to  
pen a satire o f the  whole legislative process, A sketch of Granny 
Short's Barbecue and the General Statutes of Kentucky. Typical 
of their incongruity, Bradley observed, were statutes requiring 
commonwealth attorneys to prosecute all crimes within their 
districts, but forbidding them to practice law there except in 
civil proceedings. Such a "gross absurdity" in the statutes illus- 
trated the tendency of Kentucky's legislators to be much better 
at politicking than at lawmaking. According to Bradley, even 
the ablest members of the bar were "at a loss how to advise 
their clients owing to the ambiguous" nature of legislation."j 
While some argued that local legislation increased the power 
of the legislature over the counties, the reverse was often true. 
Legislators were so besieged with demands for local and special 
statutes that they sometimes lacked time to  draft the necessary 
bills and had to rely on their petitioners to  present their own 
drafts. County officers were no exception and county court 
order books contain resolutions authorizing the drafting of bills 
to achieve some special object of local government. 
Nor was this process very democratic. A delegate to the 
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constitutional convention of 1890-1891 observed that whenever 
Kentucky's county residents met in local conventions they 
discussed national not local problems. In contrast, northerners, 
who relied more heavily on the township and town meetings, 
concentrated on local business. Often unafraid or unaware of 
local public opinion (internal improvement questions were an 
exception) and desirous of avoiding protracted discussions on 
the local level, county officials frequently bypassed their con- 
stituents and dealt directly with the county's legislative repre- 
sentatives. The local representative, usually unaware of signifi- 
cant sentiment opposing local propositions and acting in con- 
junction with the local state senator, secured most special 
legislation without debate or opposition by virtue of legislative 
courtesy, a presumption on the part of all legislators that "the 
man who represents a particular county legislates in all local 
matters for that county." What local legislators could not ob- 
tain by courtesy, they usually secured through vote-trading. 
Repeal of unpopular laws proved difficult, especially if a local 
representative or senator lived in an area remote from the 
locality affected by the statutes. Since county officers usually 
drafted the legislative bills affecting their own interests and 
since these bills were often routinely passed with little debate, 
the county officers in effect possessed de facto legislative pow- 
ers made unique by their insulation from public scrutiny. 
Because of the vast number of bills dealing with local matters 
(in 1873, 1,034 out of 1,119 statutes were local or special in 
nature) and because most legislators feared the wrath of special 
interests if they did not tend to their needs, the General 
Assembly inevitably put off to the end of the session proposals 
dealing with the Commonwealth's general needs. Consequently 
the solons passed few general laws, many of which were poorly 
drafted and ill considered. Kentucky's legislature had become in 
many respects nothing more than a codifier for special and local 
interests. All of this further enhanced the position of the 
counties in the state constitution.17 
As the amount of local legislation increased, so did demands 
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for its curtailment, if not abolition. Newspaper editors, legisla- 
tors, and even some governors recommended a variety of solu- 
tions, including transferral of much of the business of local 
- 
legislating to  the county courts and the passage of a general law 
of incorporation. Before 1890 efforts at effective reform failed. 
A bill to  dispense in part with local and private legislation 
introduced in 1860 met with summary defeat and represented 
one of the very few times legislators tried to grapple with the 
problem. During the Civil War, the General Assembly, doubtless 
because of the prevailing mood of crisis, resolved on more than 
one occasion to dispense completely with local legislation or to 
devote only specified periods of time to  consideration of same, 
but attempts to follow these healthy precedents following the 
military conflict failed. On three postbellum occasions, Gover- 
nor John Whyte Stevenson successfully vetoed local legislation 
dealing with counties, representing the only examples of such 
vetoes during the period of the third constitution. In 1869 he 
vetoed an act that would increase the power and jurisdiction of 
the constable of the first district in Larue County on the 
grounds that the statute in effect gave the county two sheriffs 
instead of one and would reduce the fees of the sheriff de jure, 
that the statute discriminated against other constables, and that 
- 
acquiescence in such a law would permit some future legislature 
to  abolish the sheriffalty, a constitutionally protected office. In 
the same year, Stevenson vetoed an act to  exempt Livingston 
County from the provisions of a statute to prohibit county 
judges from bringing suits to settle the estates of deceased 
persons. Citing Article XIII, section 1 ,  of the Constitution of 
1850, the governor reasoned that the law violated the prohibi- 
tion against "special, exclusive privileges or immunities" not in 
consideration of public service and the necessity for laws regu- 
lating the administration of justice in the respective counties to 
be uniform and equal in their operation. Finally in 1871 Steven- 
son vetoed legislation making it easier for Mercer countians to  
rectify errors in proceedings authorizing the sale of orphans' 
real estate, again on the grounds that laws should be general and 
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not affect just one county. But apparently other governors of 
the period did not share Stevenson's concern for uniformity or 
feared to  express such reservations in the form of vetoes, since 
no other governor in the period issued similar vetoes.'* 
By the eve of the constitutional convention of 1890-1891, 
many claimed that public outcries against local legislation had 
reached substantial proportions. In the convention itself some 
delegates asserted that virtually all Kentuckians demanded the 
abolition of local legislation and several introduced resolutions 
and amendments t o  that effect. A majority of delegates feared 
that a more general invalidation of special and local legislation 
could be evaded by subsequent legislatures and demanded pro- 
hibition of specific categories. In the end the convention out- 
lawed a variety of local and special legislation, including statutes 
ratifying invalid or unauthorized acts of governmental officials 
or institutions, extending the period of lawful fee collection, 
authorizing the appointment of deputies, or locating or 
changing county seats. The convention also made uniform the 
jurisdiction of county judges, quarterly courts, and justices of 
the peace. Supporters of the reform asserted that they had 
eliminated at least nine-tenths of local and special legislation, 
and their claims seemed to ring true as the legislature began 
operating under the new constitution. The legislators devoted 
most of their time to  general legislation, and the bound "Acts 
of the Legislature" were thereafter much slimmer volumes, 
containing very little local or special legislation.19 
If counties enjoyed a one-sided relationship with the legis- 
lature, obtaining most of the local legislation they desired and 
enduring only minimal regulation, they maintained a more 
balanced association with towns and cities, requiring them to 
engage in more genuine negotiation. Especially in the area of 
politics, county residents sometimes complained about the out- 
come of such negotiations. 
Political rivalry over the residence of party nominees occa- 
sionally plagued the relationship between county and city. In 
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July 1869 Fayette County Democrats accused city politicians 
and "flunkies" of establishing "superior claims of the city for 
every office worth having," thereby making Lexington "odious 
to the county round about it." Submitting that the city was 
much more dependent upon the county than the county upon 
the city, county interests accused the city of dominating most 
of the important county offices since 1862. City spokesmen 
denied they monopolized county offices, pointing out that the 
countians had possessed the lion's share of the spoils until 1862 
and that afterwards many of the party nominees had resided in 
the county before being elected and moving to  the city. The 
debate raged into the next year with countians demanding half 
of the nominations and city Democrats urging an end to intra- 
party conflict so that full attention could be given to  defeating 
"Black ~ e ~ u b l i c a n s . " ~ ~  
City-county tensions over the residence of Democratic nomi- 
nees simmered throughout the next two decades. The party's 
- .  
convention of March 1874 was particularly stormy with county 
delegates threatening to boycott the party ticket if a county 
resident was not nominated for county judge. The threat appar- 
- - 
endy worked as the party nominated John T. Stevenson, who 
lived outside of Lexington. At the convention of April 1878 
county delegates renewed their demands for a fair share of 
party nominees and some even suggested that if enough quali- 
fied candidates were available, the county should secure all the 
nominations, since the city had its own government. Seven 
years later while initially denying a rivalry between town and 
county over county offices, the Lexington Weekly Press contra- 
dicted itself by endorsing the view that most, if not all, of these 
officers should reside in the county.21 
It must, however, be noted that the urban-rural conflict 
which marred relations within Fayette County did not represent 
a general condition throughout the state. In most cases county 
residents and their governments enjoyed harmonious relations 
with their urban neighbors. Jefferson County and Louisville 
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took care to  secure elaborate statutory protection against con- 
flict. Both ~ouisville and the Jefferson County Court enjoyed 
virtual autonomy over its own affairs within its own boundaries. 
A statute of 1860 provided in part that only justices of the 
peace residing outside of the city could vote on the county levy 
court (similar to  the court of claims in other counties), although 
a subsequent statute did allow Louisville justices to  vote for 
county officers elected by the court. But the two governments 
could not operate in complete isolation from one another, and 
when they did jointly incur expenses or participate together in 
planning, they divided responsibilities and financial obligations 
by written agreement or according to  statutory formula. The 
city paid the larger share of the county judge's salary, eleven- 
sixteenths according to  statutory p r e ~ c r i p t i o n . ~ ~  
Statutes dealing with county-city affairs provided also that 
each government could sue the other over outstanding claims, 
but litigation between the two was rare. Probably the most 
serious dispute between the governments arose in 1867-1868 
over a proposition by the county t o  build a new jail. County 
authorities were anxious for the city to share the expense of 
construction, as well as the responsibility for maintaining the 
new structure. Finding it impossible t o  agree with the city on a 
formula of construction cost allocation, the levy court pro- 
ceeded to  initiate plans for construction of a new jail on its own 
and threatened to  secure legislative authority t o  tax city resi- 
dents for their share of the cost. Faced with such determination 
and the probability that the county tax might exaggerate the 
city's "fair share," city authorities finally entered into a 
formal agreement with the county dividing costs and respon- 
sibilities, a contract formally codified by the General Assem- 
bly. By its terms the city and county allocated construction 
and maintenance costs according to  the proportionate num- 
bers of white tithables within each governmental unit. Despite 
a rumor that dissidents within the city, apparently displeased 
with the city's assumption of over three-fourths of the expense, 
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were endeavoring to stall construction, the building of the jail 
proceeded on schedule, each government appointing commis- 
sioners to  oversee the c o n s t r ~ c t i o n . ~ ~  
Most of the other urban counties of nineteenth-century Ken- 
tucky maintained harmony with the cities within their bound- 
aries. In part this tranquillity resulted from far-sighted county 
and city officials seeking local legislation accommodating the 
needs of the cities. Although neither Covington nor Newport 
was a county seat, each benefited from a series of statutes 
requiring county services, including courts, to  be offered in each 
on a monthly basis. Legislation also provided that each city 
would pay its share of the expense of court sittings and other 
county services.24 
Even potentially contentious problems of urban annexation 
of surrounding county territory proved amenable to generally 
easy solution. For example, a statute secured by local author- 
ities in 1867 provided that the city of Louisville had to  pay the 
county "a fair and just portion, pro rata, of the existing debt or 
debts of said county to  the extent of the taxes or means of the 
county being reduced or diminished by the extension of said 
city boundaries beyond the present taxable limits of said city." 
The statute further provided that county lands annexed into the 
city would not be liable for city taxes until they were given 
streets. Numerous annexations by Newport of surrounding 
Campbell County land produced few, if any, ostensible con- 
flicts. In an era when cities and towns were growing rapidly 
even in predominately agricultural Kentucky, annexation was 
often long overdue. The lament of the Lexington Leader in July 
1890 that over 750 Fayette countians enjoyed all the benefits 
of city life without paying its taxes probably typified the 
situation of many Kentuckians who lived adjacent to cities.25 
Aside from rivalries over court days and railroads, counties 
generally enjoyed favorable relations with one another during 
the period of the third constitution. Inevitably conflicts arose 
over probate jurisdiction, but these occurred infrequently and 
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were resolved by the Court of Appeals or the General Assembly. 
The legislature determined by statute in 1869 that jurisdiction 
over the estate of Joseph F. Wilson should reside in the Han- 
cock County Court even though the Marshall County Court was 
asserting its own claim in the Hancock Circuit Court. Occasion- 
ally, too, disputes erupted between counties over proposed 
bridges, but again the legislature and courts usually resolved the 
issues without undue controversy. By statute it was provided 
that when two counties could not agree upon the necessity of 
building a bridge between the two, the appropriate circuit court 
should resolve the issue. In 1874, for instance, the Boyle 
County Circuit Court upheld its county's contention that a 
bridge between it and Garrard County was not necessary be- 
cause two already existed and Boyle County's debt would not 
permit further borrowings; and in 1886 the Court of Appeals 
reversed a Grayson Circuit Court and ruled that a bridge be- 
tween Grayson and Breckinridge counties was not indispensable 
and would seriously imperil Grayson County's financial stabil- 
ity.26 
The preoccupation of the General Assembly with the needs 
of individual counties reinforced their semi-autonomous nature. 
Although theoretically supervising the counties, the legislature 
was in reality surrendering much of its constitutional control by 
immersing itself in the processes of local legislation. Because 
county officials initiated most of the bills which became local 
legislation, because the local legislator generally obtained what 
he wanted, and because the legislature had no time to consider 
each piece of legislation with sufficient thoroughness, the coun- 
ties were in many ways legislating for themselves and exercising 
a kind of home rule. Harmony between counties and their 
neighboring cities and towns and the creation of fewer counties 
after 1850 did not detract from these characteristics of indepen- 
dence and sovereignty. 
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As with all institutions, the usefulness of county governments in 
nineteenth-century Kentucky depended upon the competence 
of their officers. Alleging that many county officers performed 
inadequately, mid-nineteenth-century reformers adopted a sim- 
ple remedy: they prescribed heavy doses of democracy, pro- 
viding that the voters would elect most county officials. But 
they and subsequent legislators failed t o  alter the basic structure 
of local government and the fundamental responsibilities of 
most officials. It remained to  be seen whether democracy alone 
could alter the nature and problems of the local constitution. 
The reformers of 1849-1850 sought to  redress the cumber- 
someness of the old county court system by consolidating much 
of the judicial power of the county court in a single officer of 
county government, the county judge. Although the office was 
not without its problems, it may be said that the drafters of the 
Constitution of 1850 were in large part successful in their 
attempts to  bring a form of unitary judicial leadership to  the 
often directionless county judiciary of antebellum Kentucky. 
Given almost exclusive control over county probate and fidu- 
ciary matters, the county judge also served as the presiding 
officer of the county court of claims and himself usually con- 
stituted the quarterly court, possessed of important civil and 
criminal jurisdiction. The county judge also had licensing and 
naturalization powers, both of which sometimes produced con- 
troversy. Nonetheless the county judge was in no sense the chief 
executive officer of the county, with supervisory powers over 
other county officers and county business as a whole. In most 
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instances, each county official was responsible only to  the state 
and to  a collection of  statutes, though just as often this respon- 
sibility was vague and remote. In short, except in judicial 
matters, county government during the period of the third 
constitution was headless. 
The legislature originally gave t o  the county judges as the 
judicial officers of the quarterly courts power to hear civil cases 
involving the recovery of money or personalty of up to  $100 in 
value. This amount was later increased to $200 for many 
counties and as high as $500 for a few. Such jurisdiction was in 
part concurrent with that of the circuit courts and that of 
justices of the peace who initially could hear cases involving 
money or  other personalty in value up to  $50 (later increased 
for some as liigli as $250). Apparently the judges enjoyed full 
quarterly court dockets in most counties until the legislature in 
the mid-1870s increased the jurisdiction of many justices of  the 
peace and created more courts of common pleas, both of which 
encroached rather substantially on  the business of the quarterly 
courts and rendered some of their sessions almost useless.' 
The county judge also was a conservator of the peace, could 
entertain actions against constables for defalcation in office, grant 
injunctions, hold inquests upon idiots and lunatics, perform mar- 
riages, appoint inspectors of illuminating oils, and had appellate 
jurisdiction over certain of  the civil cases of the justices of  the 
peace and police judges. In addition, the county judges shared 
important criminal jurisdiction with the justices of the peace, 
including the power to  hold examining courts in cases of alleged 
felonies (their powers over alleged homicides being exclusive after 
1884) and the power to hear cases involving riots, routs, or 
breaches of  the peace. In 1876 the judges were given jurisdic- 
tion concurrent with circuit and criminal courts over misde- 
meanors in an effort to relieve the crowded dockets of the latter 
two tribunals. County judges did not uniformly greet all this 
accretion of power with great joy. Some complained that they 
were overworked and underpaid, and others sought higher sal- 
aries and more assistance. Initially county judges had t o  be 
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their own quarterly court clerks, but eventually they won the 
right to  appoint separate clerks. Courts of claims sometimes 
eased the financial distress of judges by voting them higher 
salaries and in some counties, circuit court judges appointed 
them their special commissioners, one of the few governmental 
positions which they could hold simultaneously with their 
judgeships.2 
Soon after the adoption and implementation of the Constitu- 
tion of 1850, a correspondent to  the Frankfort Commonwealtl~, 
emphasizing the seriousness and complexity of the newly cre- 
ated county judge's probate and fiduciary responsibilities and 
the need for patience and expertise t o  execute them properly, 
cautioned voters not to  "sustain any individual for county judge 
unless he could cheerfully commit his estate t o  his hands after 
his death, and the rights of his tender children." If we can 
believe the testimony of another interested observer, that of J. 
Fletcher Johnston, candidate for Fayette county judge in 1878, 
some voters did not adhere to  the Commorzwealth's caveat. 
Johnston alleged that county judges were too often remiss in 
their probate and fiduciary duties. Many of them permitted 
irresponsible executors, administrators, and guardians to 
squander the assets of helpless widows and orphans. Others 
permitted settlements of estates without sufficient accounting 
and examination. Some activity of county judges in this area 
bordered on criminality. "To tell what I actually know in this 
connection would startle the people and set them firmly in the 
resolve to  protect interest by selecting competent and faithful 
men for places of trust," he added. Claiming that conversations 
with a former county judge of a neighboring county reinforced 
his impressions, Johnston argued that the solution t o  the prob- 
lem lay not in sweeping reforms but in greater vigilance by the 
 voter^.^ 
Yet criticisms such as Johnston's were not widespread, and 
during the period of the third constitution reformers did little 
to  alter the basic structure of probate and fiduciary adminis- 
tration. The General Assembly did provide for a public adminis- 
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trator and guardian in each county, but  he had jurisdiction only 
when court-appointed fiduciaries failed to  qualify. Likewise the 
county judge always had the power to  appoint a special com- 
missioner to  make settlements with fiduciaries, but  this power 
was discretionary. Nor did the delegates at  the constitutional 
convention of  1890-1891 seriously consider the creation of 
separate probate courts any more than their counterparts had 
done so some forty-one years earlier. Aggrieved widows and 
orphans largely had to  rely on the circuit courts to  redress the 
errors of county judges, an expensive, time-consuming, and 
often unrewarding experience. Some courts did rule against 
county judges in flagrant cases, but  this was not a common 
o c ~ u r r e n c e . ~  
Observers noted that if county judges did not always com- 
mand the legal expertise needed for effective probate and fidu- 
ciary administration, they more often exhibited the responsi- 
bility necessary for efficient management of the county's fiscal 
affairs. This was especially true in the area of appropriations 
where county judges not infrequently resisted efforts of courts 
of claims to  invest unwisely in shaky railroad ventures; some 
went so far as t o  refuse to  issue bonds already supported by a 
majority of  voters. A forceful county judge could work his will 
against a recalcitrant court of claims even though he was al- 
lowed to  vote on appropriations only in case of a tie. In one 
reported incident, Benjamin F. Graves, Fayette county judge, 
threatened to  seize the  county attorney and the assembled 
justices of the peace by the napes o f  their necks if they did not 
vote in accordance with his wishes. On this occasion and many 
others, Graves triumphed in stormy struggles over control of 
local fiscal policy.' 
County judges had virtually complete discretion in the grant- 
ing of  liquor licenses in the county and posed in a sense as 
overseers o f  popular morality. The Harrison county judge, for 
example, once refused to grant a tavern license in one locale 
because, in his opinion, its residents were "too free and un- 
bridled" in their use of  whiskey; and on one occasion, the 
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Rockcastle county judge refused to  grant any liquor licenses in 
his county. The Court of Appeals more than once supported 
such broad exercises of power. Following the Civil War, county 
voters assumed more control over the administration of liquor 
laws by successfully petitioning the legislature for the right to 
vote on local option laws which, if approved, prohibited the sale 
of liquor in all or parts of c o ~ n t i e s . ~  
During the nativist controversy in the 1850s, arguments arose 
over whether county judges had the power to naturalize aliens. 
Nativists generally claimed they did not (especially in Demo- 
cratic counties), pointing to a federal statute requiring natural- 
izing courts to  have common law jurisdiction and arguing that 
county courts lacked such power. Supporters pointed out that 
county courts did have limited common law powers as, for 
example, in the partitioning of land. The Court of Appeals 
decided that city courts had jurisdiction, and although it never 
ruled on the rights of county courts, these tribunals were 
reported exercising such power long after the nativistic con- 
troversy had abated.' 
Appraisals of county judges during the period of the third 
constitution were mixed. Early in the period, "A Farmer," 
writing in a Frankfort newspaper, denigrated the jurists, be- 
seeching the General Assembly to devise a plan to  "command 
better qualified county judges" and arguing that "in many of 
the counties the office is filled by clever men, but totally 
incompetent to discharge the vast and important duties en- 
trusted to  them." Periodically throughout the era observers 
complained about the allegedly debilitating effects of the elec- 
tive judiciary without singling out county judges for any special 
condemnation. Occasionally critics leveled charges at individual 
county judges. The editor of the Stanford Interior Journal, for 
example, accused the newly elected county judge of ~ i n c o l n  
County of locking him in his office and threatening to  beat him 
unless he retracted an unfavorable editorial.' 
On the other hand, there were many individual notices of 
other county judges which were more complimentary. The 
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Lexington Kentucky Gazette observed that Fayette County's 
newly elected county judge, W. B. Kinkead, "appears perfectly 
at home on the bench, and pushes all business through that 
comes before him with commendable alacrity. He is most cer- 
tainly the right man in the right place." The Gazette likewise 
praised Kinkead's predecessor as a "widely known and highly 
respected" judge, while a decade later the Lexington Leader 
described incumbent judge P. P. Johnston as "one of our purest 
public men, fair and impartial in the administration of his high 
office." The Maysville Bulletin labeled two of Mason County's 
postwar judges as exemplary, while observers in Franklin, Bour- 
bon, and Laurel counties were known to  speak approvingly of 
other judges, sprinkling their characterizations with such terms 
as "venerable," "honored landmarks," and "dignity.779 
Perhaps the best example of the nineteenth-century Ken- 
tucky county judge is Benjamin F. Graves, who presided over 
the Fayette County Court for more than fifteen years. Failing 
at several business ventures before studying law, Graves became 
. - 
a justice of the peace a t  the age of forty and shortly thereafter, 
in 1851, the first county judge of Fayette County. Often crude 
(once seizing a young bride he had just married and forcing a 
kiss upon her startled face), exhibiting only a superficial knowl- 
edge of the law ("some of his decisions, if put in print, might be 
calculated to  produce a laughH), and tending t o  fall asleep on 
the bench (when once awakened by counsel, he protested that 
"this court can hear just as well when it's asleep as when it's 
awake"), he nonetheless earned the respect of most of his 
contemporaries with the intrinsic fairness of his decisions. 
Favoring equity over the law and manifesting a strong common 
sense, his decisions were seldom reversed by higher tribunals. 
Other county judges were equally as colorful and some very 
enterprising. The judge of the Kenton County Court specialized 
in marrying minors from other counties and protected his 
flourishing business by refusing t o  grant licenses t o  justices of 
the peace or ministers to  compete against him. A certain Judge 
Smith of the Bullitt County Court, when accused of favoritism 
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by an attorney, adjourned court, administered a sound thrash- 
ing to  the sarcastic counsel, voluntarily appeared before a jus- 
tice of the peace to be fined twenty-five dollars for disorderly 
conduct, returned to  the bench, and continued the trial.'' 
While some doubted the competence of individual judges and 
others marveled at their eccentricity, few denied the importance 
of the office. Many pronounced it the most significant position 
in the local constitution, its powers most profoundly affecting 
the greatest numbers of people, demanding the skills of a 
lawyer, accountant, and businessman. And most seemed to 
acquiesce (however reluctantly) in the appraisal of a delegate to 
the constitutional convention of 1890-1891 who declared that 
"the county judgeship is so engrafted upon the affections of the 
people, so deeply in their prejudices in favor of i t ,  that it would 
be dangerous to abolish the county judge."" 
If the county judge was the most powerful county officer, 
the sheriff was a close second. Possessed of those responsibilities 
which he had retained almost from the beginning of the Com- 
monwealth, the sheriff was the principal tax collector of the 
county, its chief election and law enforcement officer, and the 
primary executive officer of the circuit, criminal, and common 
pleas courts. In the latter capacity he summoned jurors, served 
processes, and enforced judgments. He also sometimes acted as 
a court-appointed estate administrator. 
Although the sheriff received a commission on the county 
levy and state taxes which he collected, his responsibilities to  do 
so were more often a source of frustration than of profit. 
Statutory insufficiencies probably accounted for most of the 
sheriff's frustrations, which were born of the fact that in a vast 
majority of counties nearly 20 percent of the taxpayers were 
routinely turned in as delinquent, rendering it more difficult 
for the sheriff to  make a final accounting. As the sheriff of 
Franklin County complained to the state auditor in March 
1872, it was cheaper for taxpayers to  pay delinquency fines of 
only 5 percent of the tax due than to  borrow money at the going 
rate of 10 percent. Furthermore, sheriffs were forced to ride 
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from precinct to precinct and sometimes from house to  house 
collecting from each taxpayer.12 
The legislative journals and statute books are filled with 
special bills and acts granting individual sheriffs more time in 
which to collect delinquent taxes, while the county court order 
books were likewise reolete with the entries of the settlements 
by ex-sheriffs of delinquent taxes due (sometimes for more than 
ten years). Each year the state auditor squabbled with more than a 
few sheriffs about taxes for which there was no accounting. 
- 
In many counties the problem of back taxes was so great and 
the amount owed so large that special collectors were appointed 
and, in a few, back tax lists were sold to the highest bidder. 
Often counties never did collect back taxes from sheriffs, and 
courts of claims proceedings were occasionally the scenes of 
heated controversy between sheriffs and other county officials 
over the question. So great was the resistance of some sheriffs 
to the duty of tax collection that the legislature felt com- 
pelled to  pass a statute imposing a stiff fine on all of those 
who failed to execute their revenue bonds, although an earlier 
statute provided for forfeiture of office in such event. In 1878 
Governor James B. McCreary vetoed a bill which would have 
exempted the sheriffs of four counties from the forfeiture 
statute on the grounds that it would encourage the sheriffs of 
almost every other county to do  likewise and result "in the 
greater part of the state revenue remaining uncollected." Un- 
usual indeed was the statute passed in 1863 to release the 
former sheriff of Lyon County from tax delinquency liability 
because it appeared that "such failure was the result of his 
misfortune and not of any culpable neglect of duty." Rare also 
was the elaborately contrived but unsuccessful attempt of the 
sheriff of Jessamine County to defraud the county of taxes 
already collected. Some sheriffs obtained partial relief from 
what was often a burden by securing from the General As- 
sembly special statutes relieving them of the task of collecting 
railroad taxes. Particularly painful to many sheriffs was the 
discovery in 1863 that Thomas A. Page, state auditor of 
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accounts from 1850 to  1861, had embezzled "large amounts of 
the public revenue" and that they who had collected same 
would probably be liable for the deficiencies.13 
Not surprisingly these deficiencies produced periodic calls for 
reform. In February 1871 "quite a number of sheriffs" met in 
Frankfort to discuss ways to secure speedier collection of taxes. 
A correspondent to  the London Mountain Echo called for the 
abolition of the "antiquated" obligation of sheriffs to ride 
around the county collecting taxes and for the establishment of 
a central tax-collecting office such as that which existed in all of 
the "progressive states." To the distress of most sheriffs and 
other reformers, none of these efforts was successful.14 
The sheriff's constant involvement in the daily process of 
executing civil judgments and criminal warrants made him fi- 
nancially vulnerable in other ways. For example, the Court of 
Appeals ruled on separate occasions that sheriffs were liable for 
failure to return an execution without cause, for negligently 
failing to  arrest a person named in a warrant, for willfully taking 
insufficient security from those arrested for unlawful gaming, 
for false returns of deputies upon execution on an estate, and 
for mistakenly selling property thought to have belonged to a 
debtor but actually belonging to  a third party. But more to  the 
point, such activity rendered more insecure the financial posi- 
tion of the sheriff's sureties, both on his bond to guarantee 
faithful performance of his general duties and his bonds to 
insure lawful execution of his tax-collecting functions. The 
digests are full of cases involving the liability of the sureties of 
misfeasant sheriffs and the statute books of acts granting special 
relief to  some of these sureties in distress.'' 
For all this potential grief, sheriffs in most counties received 
very little income from their official duties. During most of the 
period their commission on tax collections represented, in the 
words of the state auditor, "a mere pittance," and by 1875 the 
master commissioners were making serious inroads on their fees 
from civil cases. So critical had the problem become that more 
than a few sheriffs resigned or refused to  qualify. In 1878 the 
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legislature authorized the auditor to  appoint special tax collec- 
tors in counties without sheriffs and t o  permit the collectors to  
reserve a commission much larger than that awarded sheriffs. 
This statute only aggravated the dilemma by prompting still 
more sheriffs t o  resign their offices and arrange for friends to  be 
appointed special collectors under whom they served as depu- 
ties in order to  secure increased compensation. In an effort at  
partial remedy, the legislature in 1882 implemented a sugges- 
tion of the state auditor that sheriffs be given larger com- 
missions for tax  collection^.^^ 
Yet in the larger, more prosperous counties where the office 
could return a handsome profit, politicians continued to  seek 
the sheriffalty eagerly and resourcefully. Frequently political 
parties held primaries solely to  nominate for the sheriffalty and 
competition at  those times, as well as in the general election, 
was usually keen. Many candidates advertised their choices for 
deputies or  at  least promised they would appoint respectable 
men from all parts of  the county. In some primaries, voters 
actually nominated deputies and in at  least one general election 
voters elected them, although usually the sheriff himself ap- 
pointed his assistants. l 7  
Clearly a prospective sheriff's announced choices as his 
deputy-designates could be crucial in close elections. William M. 
Chinn reportedly won the Democratic nomination for sheriff in 
Franklin County in 1872 because voters understood that his 
brother Franklin would be his deputy. And voters in some 
counties doubtlessly realized that chief-deputy designates would 
actually become the sheriff-in-fact or that the deputies collec- 
tively would divide the responsibilities and profits of the office 
equally. Such practices were rather commonplace and repre- 
sented ways in which a man or  men in a sheriff's office evaded 
the constitutional requirement that a sheriff serve for only two 
consecutive two-year terms. Sometimes an individual, designat- 
ing himself as the chief deputy, announced another a; the 
candidate for sheriff but upon winning the office actually 
controlled its responsibilities, profits, and patronage. In other 
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instances, groups of deputies took turns as candidates for sheriff 
and, after securing election, reappointed one another as depu- 
ties. In either case, such tactics usually insured the perpetuation 
of the incumbency. To enhance the prospects of victory, the 
establishment sometimes wooed or intimidated voters by ex- 
tending the time for payment of taxes or executions, or by 
threatening the prompt implementation of a potentially embar- 
rassing legal action. 
With all its negative features, chiefly resulting from the un- 
of tax-collection, the sheriffalty continued in the 
second half of the nineteenth century t o  be a position of power 
and significance. Some even rated it above the county judge- 
ship, since the sheriff had more personal contact with greater 
numbers of people. William B. Allen devoted an entire chapter 
in his Kentucky Officer's Guide and Legal Hand-Book t o  "the 
office of sheriff" because of its "great importance, trust, and 
authority." Largely because of its crucial position in the elec- 
tion process, party leaders, especially in closely contested coun- 
ties, emphasized the need to  secure the sheriffalty. J. F. Robin- 
son, Jr., chairman of the Fayette Democratic Committee, 
warned his fellow party-members in 1876 that to lose the 
sheriffalty would surrender his county "to the evils of Radical 
rule." It was the best and worst of jobs.19 
Once an office comparable to  the sheriffalty in prestige, the 
justice of the peace somewhat receded in power and stature 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. No longer 
collectively comprising the county court, the justices still con- 
stituted the court of  claims and retained most of their multi- 
farious judicial duties. As the lowest tier in the Common- 
wealth's judicial system, the justices heard petty civil and crim- 
inal cases, were an examining court for felony charges, main- 
tained jurisdiction over riots and disorderly conduct, and en- 
forced numerous statutes, including those prohibiting illegal 
peddling, disturbance of public worship, and gambling. In most 
counties they held court four times a year for as long as it took 
to  dispose of all pending bu~iness .~ '  
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One of the major complaints of the reformers at the constitu- 
tional convention of 1849-1850 was that there were too many 
justices of the peace in the Commonwealth, observers esti- 
mating that there were approximately 1,500 for Kentucky's 
100 counties. Although many delegates bemoaned the excess of 
county magistrates, they did not limit their number and left 
that question to  future legislatures. The first legislature meeting 
under the new constitution reduced the number of justices of 
the peace by over 300, but subsequent legislatures gradually 
increased the number so that by 1889 there were approximately 
2,000 local jurists. While there were 119 counties in that year, 
still the average per county was nearly seventeen, representing 
an increase of nearly two per county since 1850.21 
Despite the ability of the justices collectively to formulate 
county fiscal policy and make decisions on local investments in 
internal improvements, generally neither voters nor politicians 
manifested much interest in the office. Occasionally county 
party leaders would launch a spirited and well-organized drive 
to capture control of the board of magistrates. This occurred in 
Franklin County in 1859 when Democrats ousted the American 
party's majority control of that board. More typical was the 
election in Nelson County in 1852 in which P. C. Slaughter was 
elected a magistrate "without any solicitation on his part" after 
his only opponent withdrew as soon as he learned people were 
voting for him. Periodically, newspaper editors chided the elec- 
torate for ignoring magisterial elections, claiming the offices 
were much more important than commonly supposed. Such 
apathy doubtless resulted in part from the poor pay of justices 
and contributed to  the rather large number of justices of the 
peace who resigned their positions during the course of a year. 
By statute the governor temporarily filled vacancies until the 
next regular election, and in making such appointments he 
usually relied heavily on the advice of the county judge, the 
other justices of the peace, and any other county officers who 
happened to make  recommendation^.^^ 
During almost every legislative session until 1874, certain 
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legislators attempted to increase the civil jurisdiction of the 
justices of the peace to include money and personalty con- 
troversies involving up to  $100 in value. In 1874, such a statute 
was enacted, but it applied to only fifty counties. Such moves 
usually touched off debate about the relative worth of the 
justices. Proponents of an increased jurisdiction argued that 
most magistrates were honest and fair judges, bringing quick 
solutions to  many of the problems of their constituents without 
undue expense or insistence upon complex pleadings. Claiming 
to  speak in behalf of the "horny-handed yeomanry of the 
county," Representative J. W. Ogilvie argued in April 1873 that 
the masses benefited from such cheap justice and defended the 
justices against charges of incompetence. Ogdvie maintained 
that "a large majority of justices [were] men of splendid 
practical ability," who, although they might lack education and 
legal training, were "decidedly superior" to members of the 
higher judiciary "in practical common sense, in virtue, and in a 
desire to administer justice in its Christian purity." The com- 
mon man, Ogilvie and others submitted, deserved an inex- 
- 
pensive and simple form of justice and should not be dependent 
upon the costly, time-consuming, and often complex proceed- 
ings of higher tribunals.23 
Others held similar opinions about the justices of the peace as 
is evident from contemporary appraisals of individual magis- 
trates and collective assessments at the constitutional conven- 
tion of 1890-1891. Fayette County newspapers uniformly 
praised their county magistrates as typified by the Weekly 
Press's estimation that a newly elected justice would "doubtless 
preside with characteristic dignity and urbanity." Obituary no- 
tices revealed that throughout the Commonwealth certain 
counties had held particular justices in the highest esteem, as in 
the cases of the late "Squire Rutter" of Harrison County, who 
was eulogized as an "estimable man. . . . well and favorably 
known as an honest and upright man," and George W. Gwin of 
Franklin County, a justice for thirty years whose "entire course 
as a public officer has been characterized by honesty and 
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impartiality. . . . never swerv[ing) from strict justice in the dis- 
charge of official duty." A delegate t o  the constitutional con- 
vention commented that "for the preservation of the peace, for 
the enforcement of law and order, for the elevation of the 
morals of the communities in which they have presided, they 
have accomplished more than any other class of men in this 
broad land."24 
Opponents of increased magisterial jurisdiction, as well as 
critics in general, found most of the magistrates to  be incom- 
petent. Shortly before the Civil War, a justice of the peace 
himself castigated his fellow magistrates on the poor quality of 
their record-keeping. Contending that "a quarto volume of one 
thousand pages would not afford space sufficient t o  record the 
blunders made by the magistrates of a single county in Ken- 
tucky," the justice of the peace argued that if a "good clerk" 
examined the record books of almost any fellow-magistrate he 
would "be struck with astonishment." The in-house critic sub- 
mitted that the system of an elective judiciary certainly had 
done nothing to  improve the quality of the local magistracy, a 
charge readily echoed by the Paris Western Citizen some 
thirteen years later. Reflecting the sentiments of most critics, 
certain delegates a t  the constitutional convention of 1890-1891 
- 
labeled the county magistracy as a "class of men whose judg- 
ment [did not]  commend itself very largely to the respect of 
the people." Voters, they contended, were apathetic during the 
election campaigns of would-be justices because they were by 
and large insignificant men lacking common sense and good 
judgment. One delegate expressed more ominous beliefs, des- 
cribing the local officers as "the most dangerous body in every 
county of the commonwealth," men without much property 
themselves who imposed taxes on others and paid very little 
them~elves.~" 
On balance, detractors of the institution appear to  have been 
- - 
more accurate in their assessment of the local magistracy. An 
anonymous writer for the Courier-Journal best summarized the 
realities of the position. "There are not a few justices that are 
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really, as they were intended to be, learned in the law," he 
observed. "That such are in a minority," he added, was a 
necessary consequence of the "very small compensation that is 
paid to  the incumbents of the office, except in a few populous 
localities." Because of the poor pay and the paucity of lawyers 
in many places, Kentuckians had come to expect that most 
justices would not be learned in the law. But they did expect 
that the magistrates would be men "of character, fair intelli- 
gence and good judgment." Those who did measure up to this 
standard were "extremely useful men in their districts, not only 
by giving intelligent decisions of small controversies that arise, 
but also by giving good advice by which many lawsuits are 
avoided." Ironically, by dignifying the office, the prestigious 
squires served ultimately to degrade it by making it attractive to  
inferior men. Because of the poor pay and time-consuming 
burdens, respected men too often shunned the office, leaving it 
to  incompetents whose "ludicrous mistakes" made both them- 
selves and their positions seem r i d i c u l o ~ s . ~ ~  
Observers often commented that not even God himself knew 
how a justice of the peace would decide a case. Decisions were 
sometimes incongruous and often humorous examples of fire- 
side equity. A Kenton County magistrate in one instance re- 
portedly fined a man for selling candy on Sunday, but dismissed 
a charge of selling beer because it was an essential commodity. 
A Franklin County squire, upon learning of the innocence of a 
man whom he had ordered whipped for horse-stealing, replied, 
"It's all right, the fellow needed the thrashing anyhow." 
Famous for their decisions which split the difference, a magis- 
trate in Pendleton County ruled for both parties in a trespass 
suit. Flexibility, even ingenuity, characterized the decisions of 
the justice who dissolved a marriage so that the wife could 
testify against her husband in a wife-beating case and his col- 
league who married a couple only after forcing the bride to 
swear off other men." 
The conduct of other justices of the peace bordered on 
negligence, if not illegality. In 1872 the Georgetown Weekly 
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Times and the county attorney accused two Scott County 
magistrates of illegally admitting an accused murderer to bail, 
and three years earlier a Fayette County newspaper denounced 
two Woodford County magistrates for discriminating against 
black defendants. Critics chided Jefferson County squires for 
. - 
failing to  return marriage certificates to the county clerk's 
office. Other reported allegations involved possible conflicts of 
interest, false imprisonment, wrongful discharge of debtors, 
illegal arraignment, and pervasive corruption.28 
Although cynics could justifiably accuse many of Kentucky's 
justices of the peace of being incompetent, negligent, ludicrous, 
and even corrupt, they nonetheless underestimated the office 
by branding it too as inconsequential. The most perceptive 
critics understood that the local magistracy wielded potentially 
great power. Writing in 1873 in opposition to the imminent 
legislative increase of magisterial civil jurisdiction, "Green Bag" 
warned "if the proposed bill becomes a law, it will prove to 
Kentucky what the coup d'etat did to  France." Claiming that 
the justices of the peace already had "immense leverage," the 
correspondent predicted that "nothing but a multitude of fu- 
ture Sedans" could rescue Kentuckians from the two would-be 
"imperial Louis Napoleons" which would reside in each justice's 
precinct. Already the local jurists exercised "absolute and un- 
limited sovereignty," in the opinion of the writer. Eschewing all 
written authority in their pursuit of "jesstiss" and "ekkity," 
most magistrates relied exclusively on their "Guides to Justices" 
and their own unique conception of the law. One lawyer when 
advised by a justice that his references to a learned commen- 
. - 
tator were to no avail, "explained apologetically that he had no 
purpose of changing his honor's opinion, but merely desired to 
show what a d---d fool Story was." Whether the justices of the 
peace were "anachronisms" and "absurdities" as some con- 
tended, or "institutions of the last importance and the bulwarks 
of social order" as others maintained, they were clearly masters 
of their own  bailiwick^.^^ 
The so-called democratic reforms of 1849-1850 produced 
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little impact on the realities of the office of county clerk. It was 
a position of great profit before 1850, and as such often sold to 
the highest bidder; it remained remarkably unchanged after 
mid-century. In Jefferson County alone, the post earned 
$10,000 or more annually and caused aspirants for the office to 
spend large sums in their campaigns, some of which was al- 
legedly used to buy votes. The clerks of populous counties 
commanded much patronage, and armies of incumbent or 
would-be deputies earnestly canvassed for votes in every elec- 
tion. But in less populous counties, as before, the office earned 
very little, and occupants not infrequently served also as the 
local clerks of the circuit courts in order to make ends meet. 
Democracy also had little effect on the tendency of individual 
men and families to dominate the office for long periods of 
time. In Perry County, for example, Jesse Combs was the circuit 
and county court clerk from 1820 to  1873 and was succeeded 
by his grandson Ira J.   avid son.^' 
If the political realities of the county court clerkship changed 
little during the period of the third constitution, the responsi- 
bilities of the office did grow more complex as the economy of 
the Commonwealth matured. The clerk became not only a 
recorder of many kinds of legal documents but also an auditor 
of tax records and a compiler of statistics. So complicated were 
the clerk's duties that by the end of the Civil War groups of 
them were clamoring for legislative clarification of their statu- 
tory obligations. But the General Assembly did little more than 
periodically require the clerks to index better and to  preserve 
their records in regular-sized books. The expertise needed t o  be 
- 
a competent clerk usually meant that most began as deputies at 
a relatively young age, a practice officially recognized by the 
Court of Appeals when it ruled that it was valid for a deputy 
clerk who was a minor to take an acknowledgment and receipt 
of a deed.31 
Some clerks who were also lawyers apparently still relied on 
the rather traditional practice of associating with other clerk- 
- 
lawyers in an effort to bolster their income by taking advantage 
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of the leverage afforded by their office. Although the legislature 
before 1850 had prohibited clerks from practicing law in their 
own courts, they were not prevented from practicing in other 
courts or from forming partnerships with other clerks until 
1873, at which time they were prevented also from leasing part 
of their offices t o  a practicing attorney.32 
Despite the increasing burdens of their office and their often 
low pay, there were few public complaints and little recorded 
litigation suggesting that the county court clerks of the period 
of the third constitution generally performed less than com- 
petently. The available evidence rather supports the observation 
of the editor of the Frankfort Kentucky Yeoman, who wrote in 
1869 that he had recently corresponded with all the state's 
county clerks and discovered that they were "an educated class 
of citizens."33 
The other officials of  county government performed more in 
the manner of sheriffs and justices of the peace than county 
judges and clerks. While the county attorney was not a consti- 
tutional officer during the period of the first two constitutions, 
his stature and duties had grown so by 1850 that the authors of 
the third constitution included his office in the new frame of 
government. By statute he represented the county before the 
county courts and all other tribunals, advised the court and all 
county officers, screened all claims before the court of claims, 
and opposed what he regarded as improper petitions for tavern 
or merchants' licenses. He also prosecuted rioters and those who 
breached the peace, all felony charges before examining courts 
(after 1884 assisted the commonwealth attorney in the prosecu- 
tion of felonies committed in his county), delinquent county 
taxpayers, attorneys in his counties wrongfully withholding 
judgments collected for clients, and nonresidents for failing to  
list their lands with the county clerk.34 
As with most county officers, opinions differ as to the 
competence and importance of the county attorney. Some 
observers submitted that he was even more important than the 
commonwealth's attorney, since he not only was indispensable 
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to  the latter in the prosecution of major criminal cases (espe- 
cially after 1884) but also was a principal legal figure within the 
structure of county government. Especially significant, they 
argued, was his ability to  trim county expenses by paring down 
excessive claims before the fiscal court. On the other hand, 
detractors of the office submitted that it was difficult to  find 
good county attorneys because of the poor pay. Supporters 
countered by noting that in most counties, the county attorney 
spent only about one-third of his time in his official capacity 
and the rest at private practice and could therefore earn an 
adequate living. On balance, the critics of the office appear to  
have been most accurate in their assessment, although on oc- 
casion individual county attorneys performed exceptionally 
well. Most county attorneys seem to  have been ambitious young 
lawyers who desired to  use the office to advance themselves 
professionally and politically, or older barristers who needed 
the salaries and fees to  supplement their incomes. Whether old 
or young, successful candidates for the position apparently 
often allied themselves with powerful families. Their average 
annual income seldom exceeded $500, although attorneys for 
the most prosperous and populous counties made much more 
than that. And most of them lacked either the experience o r  the 
native intelligence t o  furnish their respective counties with 
first-rate legal e ~ p e r t i s e . ~ '  
The jailer earned much more money from his office than the 
county attorney, although he probably performed his duties no 
more efficiently. Generally regarded as the most lucrative posi- 
tion in county government, the jailer commanded a variety of 
fees from all levels of government for imprisoning, shackling, 
maintaining, and transporting state and federal prisoners. Also 
custodian of the public buildings in the public square, including 
the courthouse, clerk's offices, jail, and stray-pen, Kentucky's 
119 jailers earned an estimated $300,000 per year, with over 
one-third coming from the state. Such relatively large fees could 
generally be supplemented with income from other employ- 
ment since in most counties the job was not a full-time one.36 
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Probably because of the potential profitability of the office, 
many sought election to the jailership. In 1886 thirty-six vied 
for the Democratic nomination for jailer in Franklin County. 
Candidates in all counties campaigned strenuously, the in- 
cumbent jailer of Fayette County converting the vestibule of 
the courthouse into a bar serving "a sumptuous lunch, with 
ample toddy, and soberer drinks" for attendant "clients, 
lawyers, witnesses, judge, and jury" shortly before the election 
of 1870. In 1858 Democratic and American party nominees 
contested bitterly for the extremely lucrative jailership of Jef- 
ferson County, with the latter winning only after the Court of 
Appeals dismissed the former's charges of fraud on a technical- 
 it^.^' 
Nineteenth-century Kentucky jailers apparently operated 
their jails fairly loosely with escapes not uncommon and other 
liberalities taken for granted. Although denying a charge that 
his jail was legally a "tippling house," Jacob Hackney of Laurel 
County admitted in 1876 that he allowed his prisoners a rela- 
tively free use of whiskey and that what spirits he did not 
provide himself could be readily purchased from others. There 
are also reported cases involving willful and negligent conduct 
on the part of jailers leading to  escapes. And it was not uncom- 
mon for county courts to fine or grand juries to indict jailers for 
failure to  keep their jails in a healthful and sanitary condition. 
Yet some jailers went beyond the call of duty, such as one in 
Kenton County who quit his trade as a blacksmith in order to 
afford special care to  a sickly prisoner.38 
. - 
Created by the framers of the third constitution, the assessor 
evaluated the property liable for state taxes, determined the 
names of all tithables, and performed various data-gathering 
functions, such as the number of births, marriages, and deaths 
within the county. For this he received fees averaging about 
$750 annually, a respectable income for a part-time government 
job. Like many county attorneys, assessors were frequently 
ambitious young men seeking a beginning to a bright political 
career. They, too, were often aligned with powerful families and 
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assembled their own "squads" of political allies who would 
assist them in securing the assessor's office and aid them in 
- 
future campaigns for more prestigious positions. Observers im- 
plied that many assessors undervalued taxable property because 
they had no business experience and because they wished to 
gain favor with voters in future elections. Such under- 
assessment, of course, contributed to  the chronic tax problems 
of late nineteenth-century Kentucky.39 
Unlike the assessor, the office of coroner possessed a rich 
English and colonial heritage, but tradition did not reduce its 
deterioration. The coroner performed preliminary criminal en- 
forcement duties, being bound to hold inquests upon the bodies 
of persons "slain, drown, or otherwise suddenly killed, or where 
any house be broken." If the coroner's jury found "any per- 
son . . . capable of murder, manslaughter, or of house-breaking, 
or of being accessory thereto," the coroner either arrested such 
person himself or had another law officer do it for him. The 
coroner also served as a substitute for the sheriff in case of a 
vacancy or conflict of in te re~ t .~ '  
An office of little profit, the coronership in many counties 
became an object of near ridicule. When put up for the job by 
pranksters in Bourbon County in 1870, A. J. Lovely sarcasti- 
cally withdrew from the race, claiming that he had recently 
been appointed Supervisor General "in the secret service of the 
I.O.K.O.S.P.," a position which commanded a salary of 
$100,000 per year and a free pass over all "rail and other roads, 
canals, rivers, lakes, bays, p l f s ,  seas and oceans within my 
jurisdiction." Fayette County Democrats offered to  reward 
H. K. Milward, outgoing county coroner, with the nomination 
for sheriff because he had accepted the present office "solely to 
further the interests o f .  . . party . . . at considerable personal 
sacrifice." The office did not require a physician as occupant 
and those few who did seek it apparently did so often to  have 
ready access to  cadavers for experimentation. In some counties 
the position went ~ n f i l l e d . ~ '  
Similarly the office of constable degenerated into an almost 
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empty sinecure. Essentially a process server and debt collector, 
constables were theoretically the administrative officers of jus- 
tices of the peace and their judicial equivalents. There was 
usually one of them for every two justices. By statute they were 
required to  serve civil summonses, peace and search warrants, 
levy attachments, summon garnishees, take up vagrants, sum- 
mon witnesses, collect money under execution, collect fee-bills, 
summon and attend juries, kill mad dogs, kill and bury distem- 
~ e r e d  animals, alter studs and bulls, apprehend alleged felons, 
and convey prisoners.42 
Although there were seldom lively contests for the office, it 
did not go abegging as in the case of the coronership. Ap- 
parently several men sometimes agreed to  divide the profits of 
the office, a practice much like that which frequently occurred 
during the period of the second constitution. On at least one 
occasion, a local businessman sought a constableship because he 
had personal debts outstanding of over $4,000 which he could 
collect cheaply and expeditiously in an official capacity.43 
Because of their frequent contacts with persons in trouble 
with the law or creditors, constables sometimes encountered 
stiff opposition to the performance of their duties and on other 
occasions they themselves seemingly exceeded the proper 
bounds of conduct. In 1878 friends of the Reverend A. L. 
Jordan, a Harrison County Baptist minister, allegedly prevented 
R. A. King, constable for the Berryville Precinct, from levying 
on Jordan's coat and valise and aided Jordan in escaping to 
Ohio. In the same year, Mrs. Andrew Schlegel threw a bucket of 
water in the face of Frank Gosnell, a Jefferson County con- 
stable, and her husband threatened to  kill him as he was trying 
to  levy executions from a local magistrate's court. Gosnell was 
forced to enter the Schlegels' house by force and to throw Mrs. 
Schlegel on the ground and place his knee on her chest in order 
to accomplish his mission. In a subsequent legal action, a local 
judge fined Andrew Schlegel ten dollars for breach of peace and 
admonished Gosnell to execute his duties more gently. In other 
reported incidents, outraged citizens accused constables of 
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every excess from illegal seizure and housebreaking to rape.* 
The remaining constitutionally created county officer, the 
surveyor, constituted the position of least significance within 
local government. Dutybound "to execute every order of survey 
made by any court of lands lying in his county, and make out 
and return a true plat and certificate thereof," the surveyor had 
increasingly less business and official income. Most, if not all, 
who sought the office, did so to  bolster their own positions as 
private survey or^.^' 
Although not mentioned in the constitution or a general 
statute, the office of county treasurer existed in a number of 
counties. Created by special legislative statute, the county trea- 
surer normally collected monies from the sheriff and other 
"collecting officers" of the county and accounted for and 
- 
banked same. In some cases treasurers had more limited duties, 
such as taking charge of all the county's internal improvement 
investments. Even though the practice was illegal in many, if 
not most, counties, local bankers bid on the right to be ap- 
pointed treasurer by the county court, since the position al- 
lowed the bank to  house county deposits. In Clark County, 
bankers bid as much as $1,500 for the right to serve as treasurer 
for one year.46 
Amazingly, despite seemingly impregnable legal barriers, 
women managed to  crack the male monopoly of county offices, 
although most, if not all, served as deputies or in other subor- 
dinate positions. In 1885 Mrs. M. C. Lucas was elected to  the 
jailership of Daviess County, only to  have her election invali- 
dated by the Court of Appeals on the grounds that the clear 
intention of the third constitution was to preclude women from 
serving in government. Some women did succeed in obtaining 
positions as deputies in various county offices, such as Fannie 
R. Bullock, who was appointed deputy county clerk of Fayette 
County in August 1882. In 1888 the legislature authorized what 
may have been an illegal practice by enacting a statute per- 
mitting county court clerks to appoint unmarried women as 
their deputies.47 
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The democratic revolution of 1850, which saw framers of 
Kentucky's third constitution convert all its offices into elective 
positions, had little effect on the caliber of county government. 
Probably the constitution-makers succeeded most clearly in 
their invention of the county judge, who seemed to  bring a 
semblance of judicial order out of what had often been com- 
plete chaos. County clerks generally performed with com- 
petence, but the tax collectors, process servers, legal document 
receivers, and criminal law enforcers enjoyed little public con- 
fidence. And they deserved little, being either personally in- 
capable of performing efficiently or prevented by their statu- 
tory powers from functioning effectively. 
THE MAD SCRAMBLE 
FOR OFFICE 
The reformers of 1849-1850 plunged county government into 
the thicket of elective politics. The Constitution of 1850 pro- 
vided that all but two county officers were to be elected for 
four-year terms; the sheriff and constable were to be elected for 
two-year terms. By legislation elections for most county officers 
were held on the first Monday in August every four years 
beginning in 1854, the first being held in an odd year, 1851. 
For a time elections for justices of the peace and constables 
were held in May of odd-numbered years.' 
Although Kentucky's first two-party system had reached full 
maturity by 1851, some observers hoped that party partisanship 
would not taint the politics of county government elections. 
Somewhat naively, the Louisville Journal argued that county 
offices were "not political, and the voters should not be influ- 
enced by partisan politics in filling them." On the eve of the 
county elections of 1851, the Journal found little indication of 
party activity, but warned that the Whigs would quickly enter 
the field should the Democrats attempt to  organize. The Demo- 
crats remained aloof apparently, for in reporting the results of 
the race, the Journal mentioned no party labels, nor did any of 
the other Kentucky newspapers extant for that p e r i ~ d . ~  
Such nonpartisanship unfortunately proved only temporary. 
While reported party conflict in 1854 involved only scattered 
elections, partisanship affected a majority of county contests in 
1858. Of fifty-nine county races reported with sufficient partic- 
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ularity, thirty-seven matched Democrats versus American party 
aspirants, while in nineteen others parties contested over some 
but not all county offices. In only three counties did members 
of one party or the other capture races without meaningful 
party opposition. But in some counties, certain contests at- 
tracted two or more candidates from a single party, while others 
were uncontested. In Meade County, American party candidates 
for sheriff, county attorney, and surveyor ran unopposed; a 
Democrat opposed an American party candidate in each of the 
races for county judge and assessor; an American opposed 
another American aspirant for county clerk; two Americans 
opposed two Democrats for jailer; and two Americans opposed 
one Democrat for coroner. The situation was nearly as confused 
in Muhlenberg County. Similar conhtions prevailed in at least 
eleven other counties. In some cases, more than one candidate 
from a single party doubtless entered county races a t  the urging, 
and even the connivance, of the rival party which desired to  
split the opposition. The Louisville Democrat reported that in 
Hart County "there was a vast amount of wire-working to  
defeat the nominees of the [Den~ocratic] Party. Independent 
candidates from the Democratic ranks were induced to  run, 
with a view t o  split and confuse the party, and thus contribute 
to  the success of the Know-Nothing  candidate^."^ 
County elections seem to  have become largely partisan by 
1858 because each party was suspicious of the other's inten- 
tions and because party leaders and spokesmen believed that 
party activity at the local level would assist the party effort at 
the state and national levels. Experiences in Fayette and Frank- 
lin counties paralleled each other and highlighted the gadual  
politicization of county officeholding. Elections in both coun- 
ties were nonpartisan in 1851, but on the eve of the 1854 
election, each side accused the other of  secret attempts t o  elect 
party slates put into the contests at the last minute. In both 
counties Democrats enjoyed more success in their eleventh-hour 
campaigns. But four years later, both parties organized openly 
well before the election and in each instance American party 
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candidates won. The hope for nonpartisanship which had pre- 
vailed in 1851 and the public regret for the need for par- 
tisanship which had accompanied the secret machinations of 
1854 had given way to  blatant party organization in 1858. In 
the following year, the Frunkfort Commonwealtlz, spokesman 
for the American party, doubtless sounded a commonly held 
notion when it urged party workers to  continue to  labor ear- 
nestly in local elections if for n o  other reason than because "the 
better fight we make for county officers, the greater service we 
do for the state ticket."" 
Elections in 1862 apparently experienced a drastic decline in 
party activity. Few newspapers are extant for the period, and 
those report little party action in county elections, most of 
which involved "Union tickets." Kentucky's party system was 
in a definite state of transition a t  this time, and pro-confeder- 
acy politicians doubtless were discouraged in their attempts to  
run for county office by  the presence of Union troops and the 
decrees of their commanders specifying that only loyal citizens 
could run for office or  vote. 0. P. Hogan complained to  Gover- 
nor Beriah Magoffin that Union sympathizers in Grant County 
forced all candidates to  join the "Union Party" and swear 
allegiance t o  same or  drop out of the race. A correspondent to  
the Louisville Journal from Warren County reported that "there 
. . 
were no Southern Confederate candidates upon the track, as 
under the instructions of General Boyle. . . . they saw how 
utterly preposterous and contemptible it is for a man to  ask 
office under a government towards which every thought and 
feeling. . . is inimical."' 
If the Civil War curtailed party activity at the county level, 
the coming of peace witnessed a sharp revival of local partisan- 
ship. Reports from fifty-four counties in 1866 indicate that in 
approximately 70 percent of them slates of candidates variously 
calling themselves conservative unionists, Republicans, or Inde- 
pendents vied with Democrats for county offices, while in 
two-thirds of the remaining counties several, but not all, of the 
offices were the objects of partisan contests. While antebellum 
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Whig and American party candidates had closely contested 
Democratic candidates for county offices in most counties, in 
1866 and ensuing elections Democrats won by far the largest 
share of the races. Such domination reflected a similar ascen- 
dency in contests for state and national offices. Only in south- 
eastern Kentucky and in some eastern counties where Union 
sentiment had been strong in the war did Republicans enjoy 
general s ~ c c e s s . ~  
The ratification and hoped-for implementation of the Fif- 
teenth Amendment prompted Republicans in many counties to 
wage all-out battles for control of county governments in the 
elections of 1870. Of seventy-eight reported elections, the vast 
majority involved Republican versus Democratic tickets. In 
several others, so-called Independents or Independent Demo- 
crats or both fought Regular Democrats for county offices. In 
Kenton County, a "Citizens' Party" vied with Independents and 
Democrats while in Meade County temporary factions favoring 
or opposing division of the county warred against one another. 
In Adair county, Democrats sometimes opposed each other for 
certain offices and in other races ran against candidates calling 
themselves Republicans or Conservatives. The Democracy in 
Cumberland County, according to  a local correspondent to  the 
Courier-Journal, "survived a most dangerous experiment" 
wherein twenty-two Democrats ran for eight offices with only 
four members of opposition parties in the field. Despite over- 
whelming support from thousands of blacks voting for the first 
time, Republicans made few inroads on Democratic county 
bastions." 
While party activity on the county level abated during the 
next six years, some spirited races did take place in certain 
areas. Contests in 1872 and 1874 for the sheriffalty of Fayette 
County, where large numbers of freedmen resided and voted for 
Republican candidates, were especially heated. Sensing that the 
Republican candidate, L. P. Tarlton, Jr., stood a good chance of 
winning the election, the Fayette County board of magistrates, 
all Democrats, threatened to appoint someone other than the 
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sheriff as collector of the county levy should Tarlton win. 
Undaunted by these threats, Republicans worked feverishly for 
their candidate and secured a narrow victory. The Democratic 
threat proved idle (as well as illegal), and despite dire predic- 
tions of racial warfare and black supremacy, Tarlton proved to  
be a fair and competent sheriff. This did not deter Democrats 
from making a concerted effort to win back the office, which 
they did narrowly in 1874.' 
Republicans in Mason County in 1874 adopted a strategy 
increasingly attractive to "out" parties. Labeling themselves 
"Independents," they campaigned vigorously against Democrat- 
ic incumbents only to  lose narrowly at the polls. Often in the 
minority, Republicans not infrequently wrapped themselves in 
the garb of "Independents," a tactic decried by Democrats who 
just as usually warned their party members to  beware the phony 
lure of "Independence" and "no-partyism." Claiming that poli- 
tics was "unimportant in county offices," Republicans in Lin- 
coln County nonetheless nominated a candidate for county 
judge and elected him despite warnings by the dominant Demo- 
cratic party that the opposition was trying to  lull voters into 
nonpartisanship. In Gallatin County, Republicans entered a 
candidate for jailer at the last minute, hoping to  take advantage 
of the fact that there were four Democrats in the field, but their 
ploy failed narrowly. In Bell County politics were at such a low 
ebb that neither party could "concentrate their men," and 
Democrats and Republicans held a joint convention to  divide up 
nominations for county officers, pretending to  be motivated by 
a desire to "select competent and qualified men from each of 
the parties alternately so as to avoid the trouble and excitement 
of heated political contests." In some counties in 1874, as in 
other elections, truly "Independent7' slates competed with both 
Democrats and Republicans for county offices. According to 
the Courier-Journal, the Granger party ran a ticket in only one 
county, Pendleton, losing to the Democratic slate. Generally in 
that year's elections, fewer county races involved party politics, 
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and appreciably more candidates faced no opposition in the 
general e l e ~ t i o n . ~  
The National Greenback Labor party ran tickets in at least 
six counties in the 1878 elections but "cut no figure." Local 
partisan politics seemed to increase in that year, although many 
election clerks failed to send in returns for publication and 
county papers often neglected to  designate the politics of candi- 
dates. In Montgomery County, Republicans ran a fusion ticket 
for jailer with Irish Democrats, they being angered by the defeat 
of their candidate in the Democratic primary; and in Hart the 
Grand Old Party took advantage of voter dissatisfaction with 
the results of the Democratic primary, but in most other coun- 
ties outside of the southeastern section Democrats maintained 
their domination.1° 
Prohibitionists, usually composed mostly of Republicans, ran 
candidates for county offices for the first time in 1882, al- 
though their slates appeared in only a few counties. Candidates 
calling themselves Greenbackers ran in several counties in 1882, 
but none after that. In both the 1882 and 1886 elections the 
number of county contests with reported party activity vastly 
outnumbered races with little or no party conflict, and in most 
cases Democrats emerged victorious with Republicans securing 
most of their wins in their traditional strongholds." 
County elections on the eve of constitutional reform in 1890 
are especially significant because the degree of party partic- 
ipation was reported for over two-thirds of them, the most 
complete sampling of any election. These sources indicate that 
party activity continued to  dominate most elections, existing to 
a marked extent in over three-fourths of the races reported. In 
most contests, Republican slates opposed the majority Demo- 
cratic party candidates, but in some Prohibitionists and the 
ever-present Independents formed either the major source of 
opposition or one of two major sources. And for the first time, 
candidates from the newly organized Farmers' Alliance party 
appeared in a few elections. The election in Bracken County 
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proved particularly heated with Republicans, buoyed by indi- 
vidual successes in recent elections, fielding nearly a full slate 
against the dominant Democrats only to "encounter a Water- 
loo." But in normally Democratic Hopkins County, Republi- 
cans were able to  take advantage of dissension within the 
majority ranks over the results of a controversial primary and 
the question of prohibition, to secure the county attorneyship 
and closely contest other offices.12 
Lack of party conflict in county elections did not necessarily 
mean lack of candidates for office. If dominant parties held 
primaries or nominating conventions, these affairs were usually 
crowded with would-be nominees. Nor would disappointed can- 
didates always abide by the results of the party's nominating 
process. Such disappointed suitors frequently continued their 
pursuit of office, running as independents against regular party 
nominees. Sometimes majority parties facing no appreciable 
opposition from "out" parties had no formal nominations, and 
general elections featured four or five or more candidates for 
each office. By 1878 critics perceived an obsession motivating 
hordes of persons to  seek county office who "would not other- 
wise descend into the cesspool of politics." In the opinion of 
the Boone County Recorder many felt driven to seek office "in 
the hope of being aided in providing for their families by the 
salaries paid these offices." Ironically, the paper noted, the least 
lucrative offices seemed to attract the greatest number of candi- 
dates. A correspondent from Green County reported that a 
majority of the candidates for county office in 1878 focused 
attention on their financial needs rather than their qualifica- 
tions for office. Even more cynical about the process, the 
Kentucky Gazette argued that "the struggle for office is one of 
the most disgusting and disgraceful phases that politics has ever 
assumed and is fast driving the most respectable . . . citizens 
into private life, leaving only the hardened, selfish, and unquali- 
fied to continue the frantic contest." The mad scramble for 
office produced overly lengthy campaigns which sometimes 
began in mid-winter even though elections were not held until 
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August. The Gazette sarcastically noted in February 1878 that 
"candidates are thick as corn-cobs around a county school 
house . . . they all want to serve the dear people, their county, 
and themselves in particular. . . . for each office there are about 
ten aspirants and everyone sanguine that he will be the lucky 
man." By July 1878 the Gazette was calling for shorter cam- 
paigns, arguing that the existing system harassed candidates and 
voters alike.13 
If competition for most county offices remained lively, if not 
always the subject of interparty conflict, throughout the period 
of the third constitution, interest in the offices of justice of the 
peace and constable lagged in many places. Political parties 
seldom made formal nominations for these positions, although 
in a number of races individual candidates ran as partisans. 
Newspaper editors periodically chided parties and voters for 
paying scant attention to the office of justice of the peace and 
noted the significance of the court of claims, but this made 
little impact on the prevailing condition of apathy. 
The presence of heated two-party confrontations in many of 
the county elections meant that often the paramount issue of 
campaigns amounted to nothing more than which party could 
command the most loyalty from its members. In others, 
. . 
economic issues complicated the process. These ranged from 
controversies over fiscal management and accountability to 
disputes over allegedly inflated salaries or the necessity for 
special taxes for such improvements as railroad construction. 
Following the war, prohibition became more and more of an 
issue in certain county elections. Occasionally ethnic consider- 
ations prevailed in individual races, such as in Mason County in 
1874 and 1878 where Democrats seriously divided over the 
demands by some for a jailer of Irish extraction and in Mont- 
gomery County in 1878, where Republicans joined with dissi- 
dent Democrats to promote the candidacy of an Irishman 
defeated in a bitter primary fight for the Democratic nomina- 
tion for jailer.14 
Intense competition for county office contributed to the 
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generally corrupt and sometimes oppressive nature of Kentucky 
politics in the second half of the nineteenth century. Before 
1850 the most flagrant example of county political fraud 
concerned the sale of offices, most normally that of the 
sheriffalty, county clerkship, and constableships for prices 
ranging from $6,000 for the clerkship of a populous county to a 
few hundred dollars for a minor constableship. Following 1850, 
when most county offices were elective and not appointive as 
before, the simple sale of office became virtually impossible. 
Only in those few cases where offices continued to be 
appointive, as county treasurerships and deputy sheriffalties, 
- - 
did the practice continue. Although technically in violation of 
the state law against the sale or farming of public office, it was 
common practice for boards of magistrates to sell the office of 
county treasurer to  the highest bidder (usually a banker). 
Likewise the profits of the sheriffalty were frequently divided 
up among the high sheriff and his deputies. Prosecutions of 
these offenses occurred infrequently.15 
The absence of outright sale of offices did not mean that 
considerable sums of money were not used to  influence the 
outcome of elections to the most lucrative of county offices. 
Even after the reforms of 1849-1850, voting continued to  be 
- 
done by voice rather than secret ballot. Each voter would 
proclaim his preferences before the precinct sheriff and the 
asseri~bled officials, plus all who wished to hear his declaration. 
The lack of secrecy meant that candidates, politicians, and 
parties could keep running tabulations of how each race was 
evolving, and could determine how each man had cast his vote. 
- 
Such openness helped contribute to  the tendency of aspiring 
politicians to purchase the assistance of professional wire-pullers 
who in turn rounded up votes, oftentimes buying them. 
More than a few observers of Kentucky's elections com- 
mented that vote-buying was commonplace and some even 
called for its termination. Following the county elections of 
1882, the Courier-Journal observed almost casually that "there 
was nothing noticeable about the manner of the contest. The 
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usual number of purchasable bummers swarmed about the 
candidates and their friends and exacted their pound of 
flesh. . . . the features of the day were rather ordinary. . . . the 
floater was paid his price. . . . thousands of respectable citizens 
were crowded away from the polls by purchasable hoodluins." 
A new resident of  turbulent Rowan County testifed that the 
price of a vote in his county ranged from $2.50 to  $50, "with 
the price increasing as close of election approached." The smart 
seller held back until the polls were about to  close. Having only 
recently moved to  Kentucky, the Rowan countian also 
commented that he  had never seen a man sell his vote until he 
had moved to  Kentucky. Levi Grow, justice of the peace for the 
district of  South Elkhorn in Fayette County "made a big hit" at 
a political rally in July 1890, "when he expressed the belief that 
every officeholder in the county, except himself and a few 
other magistrates, had secured their offices by use of money, 
either at  a primary or gencral election." In the same year, the 
Republican Lexington Leader accused a Montgomery County 
candidate for county office of importing thugs from Fayette to  
buy votes in order t o  win a closely contested election. Despite 
the illegality of such practices, violators were seldom 
prosecuted, and the only recorded cases involving vote-buying 
heard by the Court of  Appeals were civil actions attempting to  
invalidate elections because of the vote-buying or loans made to  
purchase votes.I6 
Candidates for county office freely applied intoxicating 
beverages to  wavering voters and often almost literally floated 
to  victory. Election days frequently were the scenes of  drunken 
orgies. The Republicans o f  Grayson County mustered a record 
vote when in 1886 they rented a saloon and set up a free bar. A 
correspondent from Spring Lick (also in Grayson County) 
reported that the whole town was drunk during the elections of 
1882. The Barbourville Mountain Echo reported that  some of 
the county candidates of  Knox County on the court day 
preceding the 1874 elections "were trying, most laboriously, t o  
float into office by way of  the groceries, and a t  the floodtide of 
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drunkenness." Seeking to  counteract the traditionally free use 
of whiskey at their county elections, Prohibitionists in Clark 
County dispensed free ice cream at the polls.17 
, - 
Election-day drunkenness and competitiveness meant fights 
as well as votes. Newspaper accounts of county elections 
contain widespread reports of fistfights, knifings, and shootings. 
In one precinct alone of Green County, a deputy sheriff shot it 
out with an aggrieved black voter, "social knock-downs were in 
- - 
progress all day," miscellaneous shootings and stabbings were 
reported and two factions peered at one another throughout the 
day with shotguns firmly in place. At a Franklin County 
precinct in 1890, excitement ran so high "it was feared there 
would be a general riot, but the night closed with about twenty 
knockdowns and an affray between six or seven whites and 
blacks packed in a crowd of two hundred people in which 
knives, clubs, pistols, and stones were freely used." A 
correspondent to the Courier-Journal reported "only four 
fights" in Boyle County's election of 1878 and a writer from 
Ohio twelve years later noted with some evident surprise that 
no one had been killed in his county's election.I8 
Fisticuffs amounted to  voter intimidation in some county 
elections. Democrats accused Franklin County Americans of 
attempting t o  keep Irish voters from the polls in the hotly 
contested elections of 1854 and 1858, while in 1890 Repub- 
licans accused Democrats of Clark County of importing toughs 
from Lexington t o  browbeat voters into submission. A special 
election in Franklin County in 1863 featured rival gangs 
attempting t o  out-intimidate each other and the  voter^.'^ 
Sometimes county officials themselves played major roles in 
- .  
voter frauds and intimidation. Taking advantage of a recently 
enacted election law requiring the appointment of precinct 
sheriffs and clerks from different political parties, the 
Democratic Franklin county judge on the eve of the 1858 
. -  - 
county elections appointed a member of the American party 
clerk of the Frankfort precinct so that the county sheriff, also a 
member of  the American party, could not serve as election 
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sheriff of his own precinct. Outraged, the ):rankfort Cowl- 
vzonwealth, newspaper of the American party, accused the 
county judge of  attempting to  remove the sheriff from the 
election process so that Democrats could successfully import 
voters from neighboring counties, a ploy that the American 
sheriff had allegedly prevented in 1855 and 1856. Faced with 
arguments that his actions violated the spirit of the new law, the 
county judge reneged. Ironically, following the August election, 
Democrats complained that Americans intimidaged voters at the 
polls.20 
Generally avid interest in securing county office meant 
commensurate interest in the nominating process. While the 
reformers of 1849-1850 provided for popularly elected county 
officers, they did not specify the method of nomination. During 
the first two decades of the third constitution, county 
committees and conventions determined party nominations for 
county offices. Usually composed of prominent men in the 
community, the county committee was not a democratic 
institution but rather appointed by the state party committee. 
While not much information exists regarding its functions, in 
many counties it often determined the mode of nominations to  
county office. Until the period following the Civil War, county 
committees normally decreed that county conventions should 
nominate candidates for county office. Often, committees 
further ruled that precinct conventions should elect delegates to 
the county conventions. County committees sometimes took 
informal control of  general elections, sending agents throughout 
the county to poll voters and rally the faithful in order to 
"know the exact status of the party as to  the number of its 
. . 
votes." Active county committees usually possessed an 
energetic chairman, such as James F. Robinson, who hclped 
revitalize the Democratic party in Fayette County after 1865.21 
Following the Civil War, politicians and voters began to  
complain about "rings," "cliques," and "tricksters," all of 
whom were allegedly dominating the rather closed system of 
party nominations. Some of  this criticism singled out  county 
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committees for reform. In 1871 dissident Democrats called for 
popular election of the Harrison County committee on the 
grounds that the state committee consisted of "self-constituted 
political jugglers" who named only residents of Cynthiana to  
the local committee. But most critics made less specific charges, 
referring vaguely to  "court house cliques" which allegedly were 
more interested in perpetuating their own power than serving 
the interests of the people.22 
Despite considerable hullaballoo to the contrary, some 
observers saw accusations about "tricksters" as nothing more 
than the complaints of would-be county officers trying to  oust 
those in power. Calling such clamor a great "bug-a-boo," the 
Hickman Courier wrote in 1878 that there was much 
"unnecessary excitement about 'rings.' They are often alleged 
to exist when they do not exist; they often exist when there is 
no harm in their existence." According to the Courier, rings 
were often "the natural product of local politics-a war of the 
outs against the ins and the ins against the outs. But, of course, 
the candidates expect the people to  shout themselves hoarse 
about these things." As if to  bear out the Courier's analysis, 
newspaper editors and politicians engaged in lengthy debates in 
such counties as Harrison and Mason following the Civil War 
over whether courthouse rings did exist, and if so, how much 
influence they possessed.23 
Real or imaginary, rings aroused sufficient opposition in 
many counties to  produce successful movements for party nom- 
inations by popular primary. Proponents of the primary argued 
that professional politicians, adept at rhetoric and parliamen- 
tary procedure, dominated party conventions and that the rank 
and file seldom attended. But reformers did not secure popular 
primaries without opposition and controversy continued after 
their adoption. Battles in Franklin, Fulton, Bourbon, Fayette, 
Mason, Pendleton, and Harrison counties following the Civil 
War illustrate the intensity and realities of the struggle. 
Most of the available evidence concerning the evolution of 
the popular primary in Kentucky involves the Democratic 
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party. Although ~epubl icans  apparently did adopt the primary 
in some counties, especially where they were the dominant 
party, in many counties they continued to use the convention 
method. On the other hand, Democrats, especially in those 
counties where they were the dominant party, which was often 
the case, exhibited a greater willingness to experiment with 
popular primaries. 
In the late spring of 1866, Clark County Democrats apparent- 
ly became the first party organization to adopt the popular 
primary as their method of nominating county officers. Al- 
though little is known about the origins of the Clark County 
primary, a neighboring newspaper reported that the county 
committee adopted the new method in order to  "harmonize the 
discordant elements in the county." Evidently successful, the 
Clark County reform served as an impetus for a similar experi- 
ment in Bourbon County two years later when the county 
committee there announced that a primary election would 
determine county officer nominees. But the Bourbon County 
Democratic Committee presumably had second thoughts about 
the scheme, for in the following spring it opted for the more 
familiar convention system as the method of selecting a legisla- 
tive candidate. This decision sparked widespread demands for 
the permanent adoption of the popular primary on the grounds 
that the county committee represented a "Paris clique of a half 
dozen men to control and suppress the voice of the Democ- 
racy." Threatened by a movement to elect delegates to the 
convention who would refuse to vote for any nominee, the 
committee reneged and ordered a primary to be held. By 1874 
primaries constituted the normal way to nominate Democratic 
candidates for Bourbon County office.24 
After sporadic agitation for and against the reform, Fayette 
County Democrats tried the experiment for the first time in 
early 1870, initially nominating city officer candidates, then 
county. But the county committee's commitment was tempo- 
rary, and it revived the convention system for most of the party 
county nominations for the remainder of the decade. A very 
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bitter dispute arising from the county nominating convention of 
June 1878 renewed demands for a return to  the popular pri- 
mary. A maverick Democrat (A. M. Harrison) upset incumbent 
A. G. Hunt for the party's nomination for county clerk when 
two delegates from the Sandersville precinct violated the in- 
structions of their precinct convention and voted against Hunt. 
This prompted a leading Democratic newspaper of the county 
to  describe nominating conventions as collections of "little 
men" whose only successes in life occurred in the "cesspool of 
the primary convention" at the expense of sober, modest gen- 
tlemen. Amid a storm of protest, two delegates shortly after- 
wards acknowledged their heresy, causing the county com- 
mittee t o  call a special convention, which nominated Hunt over 
the protestations of Harrison supporters. Seizing the moment, 
Republicans ran an independent against Hunt in the general 
election and nearly won the election. Thereafter, the county 
committee normally adopted the popular primary as its method 
of determining party candidates for county office. So intense 
- - 
was dissatisfaction with the traditional method of nomination 
in Franklin County, that in 1869 the Democratic nominating 
convention itself called attention to  its own deficiencies and 
suggested, at a minimum, that the county committee initiate 
reforms in delegate selection. Most nominations for county 
officers thereafter resulted from popular primaries. Fulton 
County Democrats experienced a similar revulsion to  conven- 
tions in 1876 and soon after joined the tide of change.'" 
Similarly Mason County Democrats warred over the method 
of nominating county officers as a part of a general power 
struggle which featured rival Maysville newspapers, the Republi- 
can representing the insurgents and the Bulletin speaking for the 
establishment. Blasted for nearly ten years by the Republican 
for its oligarchical ways, the county committee finally adopted 
a popular primary in 1878. Although reluctantly acquiescing in 
the move, the Bulletin found the experience altogether unfor- 
tunate and launched a largely unsuccessful campaign to  return 
the party to   convention^.'^ 
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By 1880 numerous other county party organizations had 
commenced nominating by popular primary, but the reform 
movement, which was initially an intraparty affair, encountered 
such hostility in some quarters that moderate legislative inter- 
vention was needed. From the outset, primaries possessed de- 
tractors. Labeling the concept a "Yankee institution," the 
Maysvillc Bulletin argued that "cliques. rings and tricksters" 
would prevail no matter what system of nomination was 
adopted. Popular primaries only promoted divisiveness within 
the party, encouraged public drunkenness, allowed the opposi- 
tion party to  influence party nominations by encouraging their 
members to  vote illegally, and permitted candidates with only a 
minority of the votes to run in the general election. Other 
voices echoed these charges and noted that weak candidates 
could easily win  nomination^.^^ 
Pendleton County's Democratic primary of  1878 seemed to 
confirm the worst predictions of the reform's critics. Describing 
the occasion as not a primary but a "general election . . . in 
which voters of all political shades and men of all colors and 
citizens of various counties voted, and the candidates who could 
use the most money and whiskey, import[ed] the most votes 
for hire," the Falrnout/z Independent prcdictcd that many Dcm- 
ocrats would vote against the party's nominees. By June the 
Independent's prediction began t o  bear fruit as slates of "Inde- 
pendent Democrats" appeared for all county offices, even some 
for the usually ignored justice of the peace. Others, citing proof 
that nearly half of  the voters in the primary had been Republi- 
cans, minors, blacks, aliens, and nonresidents, demanded unsuc- 
cessfully that the county committee call a new convention to  
screen primary candidates as a prclude to  a new primary elec- 
tion. Although extant records d o  not reveal the winners of  the  
sgencral election, it is clear that the primary of 1878 severely 
disrupted the harmony of Pendleton's ~ e l n o c r a c y  .2X 
The initially popular primary of  the Mason County Democ- 
racy produced similar fireworks. Only a grudging participant in 
the election, the editor of  the Maysville Bzdetin branded the 
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affair as an "instrumentality for the demoralization of the par- 
t y . .  . . and affording temptations for fraud, corruption and 
vice. . . . there never was at any election within our memory, so 
many drunken men at the polls, as there were in the city on 
Monday." Alleging that several primary winners had received 
only a small fraction of the total votes and that the reform had 
been adopted in the first place in response to outcries against a 
"mythical ring," the journalist vowed to  oppose future pri- 
maries which, if they continued, would "end in the annihilation 
of the party that adopts it."29 
While opponents of popular primaries in many counties were 
unable to-defeat the reform, detractors in ~ a r r i s o n  County 
secured at least a temporary delay in the change. Early in 1868 
the Cynthiana News commenced a two-year campaign to  per- 
suade the Democratic county committee to adopt the popular 
primary system of nominations. Citing support from candidates 
as well as masses of voters, the News argued that primaries 
would permit the "reticent farmer" to  gain equality with the 
"orators and manipulators" who had dominated the party's 
conventions. Early in 1870 the committee ordered a primary to  
nominate candidates for county office and again in 1872 or- 
dered one to nominate for the sheriffalty. ~ronically, at the next 
primary in 1873 opponents of the plan succeeded in placing the 
question of its retention on the ballot and defeated it, 685 to 
892. But the setback proved only temporary, and by 1880 the 
county committee restored the popular primary on a generally 
permanent bask3' 
Despite their lack of success, critics of the popular primary 
correctly assessed its basic weaknesses in its early stages. In 
order to correct these deficiencies, some county party com- 
mittees revised procedures on their own; others reformed with 
the assistance of local legislation. The Jefferson County Demo- 
cratic Committee devised a registration system which attempted 
to  insure that only loyal Democrats participated in the county's 
popular primary. Each new voter had to  register at  party head- 
quarters, signing an affidavit that he, if eligible, had voted for 
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the previous Democratic presidential candidate and intended to  
support Democratic nominees of the next primary election. 
Between 1880 and 1890, sixteen counties secured special legis- 
lation enabling political parties at their discretion to  establish 
similar laws of registration and providing criminal sanctions 
against those who violated party rules. Not until June 1892 did 
the legislature enact a mandatory law regulating party primaries 
in all c ~ u n t i e s . ~ '  
The introduction of democratic voting and nominating pro- 
cedures posed new problems and challenges to  Kentucky's 
county politicians. At first they scrambled for office without 
the aid of political parties, but the opportunities for organized 
effort soon proved too alluring; by the end of the first decade 
of the new constitution, Democrats and Americans were in the 
thick of it. Following the Civil War, local politicos gaped with 
the problem of how best to  nominate candidates for county 
office and non-Democratic party candidates struggled against a 





No event highlighted the  semi-autonomous nature of  Ken- 
tucky's counties more than the Civil War. Although the Com- 
monwealth itself remained in the Union, individual counties and 
their officers and governments conducted themselves in ways 
approaching secession. The war also disrupted the functioning 
of county governments and their officials, necessitating cmer- 
gency legislation and much improvisation. 
Although there is no  evidencc that the abortive pro-rebel 
Provisional Government of Kentucky created county govern- 
ments t o  aid in its secessionist activities, there is some indica- 
tion that individual county officers aided the Confederate 
cause. Because it had been represented to the General Assembly 
"that in some of the counties . . . the judges of county courts 
and sheriffs [had]  . . . adhered to ,  sympathized with, and given 
aid and countenance to" the Provisional Government and 
refused to  carry out  their duties to  the regularly constituted 
government in Frankfort, the legislature in March 1862 felt 
compelled to allow by statute the governor to  replace such 
dissidents by special election after only two "loyal resident 
freeholders" swore by affidavit t o  their disloyal conduct. In the 
same month, the legislature authorized the Commonwealth to  
proceed against county officers illegally collecting state taxes 
for use by the Provisional Government.' 
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Early in the course of the war, rebel sympathizers forced 
certain county officers to  swear allegiance to  the Provisional 
Government. On the other hand, G. A. Flournoy, county judge 
of McCracken County, refused to  take an oath to  the federal 
government, which included a pledge t o  "surrender the right of 
trial by jury" if prosecuted for alleged disloyalty. Despite this 
refusal, Flournoy continued in office throughout the war. In 
Wolfe County, unspecified persons prevented the county judge 
from holding court between September 1861 and April 1862 
because he was a suspected southern sympathizer. A loyal 
justice of the peace finally purported to  hold court in April 
1862 and appointed a new sheriff, constable, "and other of- 
ficers to fill the vacancies of officers which have resigned or are 
considered as disloyal." But some entertained doubts as to  the 
legality of the justice's action, taxes remained uncollected, and 
county government had almost ceased to function, prompting 
several to seek guidance from the governor.2 
Military activities disrupted normal county governmental ac- 
tivity and caused the legislature to  enact laws to  remedy emer- 
gency situations. The General Assembly extended deadlines 
when rebel forces prevented the officers of various counties 
from taking prescribed oaths "at the times fixed by law," and 
obstructed numbers of sheriffs from executing bond in a timely 
fashion. Especially harassed were sheriffs who benefited from 
statutes extending the period in which to collect county and 
state taxes and making it a "sufficient return" to swear that the 
presence of guerrilla bands made it impossible to execute 
process or collect money.3 
The war produced more vacancies in county offices than at 
any other time in Kentucky's history. In McCracken County, a 
hotbed of rebel activity in western Kentucky, the newly elected 
county attorney, county court clerk, and coroner failed to 
qualify for office after the August 1862 elections. By 1865 civil 
affairs were so disrupted in eastern Kentucky's Letcher County 
that there were no county officers and the governor had to 
appoint a county judge until one could be elected. The statute 
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books and county court order books are filled with acts author- 
izing special appointments and elections and orders imple- 
menting them.4 
County courts, whether county judges sitting as probate or 
quarterly court tribunals or courts of claims, and justices of the 
peace sometimes found it difficult to  hold sessions at regularly 
scheduled times. Frequently the General Assembly suspended 
courts or enabled county courts to  have jurisdiction over neigh- 
boring counties where courts could not sit. The county and 
quarterly courts of Harlan County were given jurisdiction over 
probate and civil matters in adjacent Letcher and Perry coun- 
ties, "no . . . courts having been held . . . for more than twelve 
months prior hereto, causing thereby much loss and inconve- 
nience to  many persons." In other counties, such as McCracken, 
county courts and other tribunals simply had t o  find different 
places to hold sessions because federal troops had occupied 
courthouses for hospital and other purposes.5 
Initially state officials encouraged counties to  cooperate with 
federal efforts to prosecute the war against the South, but as 
policies and popular moods in the state changed and the Union 
was increasingly perceived by Kentuckians as the aggressor and 
the South the victim, attitudes on the issue of county coopera- 
tion also changed. In August 1861 Governor Beriah Magoffin, 
despite his pro-southern sympathies, directed all county judges 
to make a "diligentH search for all arms, equipment, and muni- 
tions belonging to the state "not . . . in the hands of lawfully 
organized military companies" and return them to the State 
Arsenal. Several months later, the General Assembly directed 
county judges, justices of the peace, and other judicial officers 
to issue arrest warrants for the apprehension of alleged deserters 
from the federal army and instructed sheriffs, coroners, justices 
of the peace, and policemen to arrest and turn them over to 
military authorities. But by 1864 state policy had changed. 
Governor Thomas Bramlette secured a presidential recision of 
General Hugh Ewing's order that the county courts of every 
county levy a tax sufficient to  raise and equip fifty federal 
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troops within each county. Early in the next year, a t  the urgings 
of the counties themselves, the legislature permitted several 
county courts to  levy a tax to  pay for bounties or substitutes in 
order that male residents might avoid the draft laws.6 
War also interfered with county elections. In rebellious coun- 
ties where sheriffs and other county officials refused to  hold 
elections, private citizens were empowered by the legislature to  
do so and to  submit the poll books to the governor. The 
presence of federal troops in some counties resulted in chal- 
lenges to  election results. In McCracken County, J. B. Hinton 
sued J. K. Leeman, the apparent winner of a special election for 
county clerk, on the grounds that federal troops had initimi- 
dated voters, but Leeman remained in office after the Court of 
Appeals ruled that Hinton had pursued the wrong form of 
action. In other counties, aggrieved candidates were known to  
accuse officials of conspiring with federal troops t o  violate the 
rights of certain citizens. In one notorious incident of this 
nature, the General Assembly determined in 1865 that the 
Madison county judge had illegally compiled a list of allegedly 
disloyal county residents and successfully urged federal troops 
to prevent them from voting.7 
Stormy days for Kentucky counties did not end with the 
termination of  the Civil War. The Commonwealth and its coun- 
ties continued their tentative relationship with the federal gov- 
ernment and most especially regarded the presence of the 
Freedmen's Bureau as a hostile imposition to  be resisted at all 
costs. Befitting the children of a parent who refused t o  ratify 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments, Ken- 
tucky's counties and their officials resisted federal efforts to  
amalgamate freedmen into postwar society and instead created 
their own special brand of quasi-servitude. 
Congress's decision t o  extend the jurisdiction of the Freed- 
men's Bureau to Kentucky and other border states, which 
remained theoretically loyal to the federal government, 
stemmed from the presence there of thousands of newly eman- 
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cipated blacks. Two of the bureau's most important functions 
were to aid black orphans and apprentices and assist black 
paupers. Although the bureau maintained over twenty-five field 
offices in the Commonwealth for approximately three years and 
espoused lofty goals of economic and cultural uplifting, the 
success of its orphan, apprentice, and pauper programs de- 
pended largely on cooperation from county governments. In all 
but a few counties cooperation was not forthcoming or only 
- 
given grudgingly. 
Congress had charged the Freedmen's Bureau with the task of 
insuring that black orphans and indigent children were fairly 
and adequately apprenticed. Declaring on October 4,1865, that 
"officers of this bureau are regarded as guardians of orphans, 
minors or freedmen within their respective districts," Major 
General 0. 0. Howard, commissioner of the bureau, instructed 
his personnel to  recognize state apprenticeship laws "provided 
they make no distinction of color." Elaborating upon these 
gidelines, Brigadier General Clinton B. Fisk, head of the bu- 
reau's district for Kentucky, Tennessee, and northern Alabama, 
specified on October 10 of the same year that in all apprentice- 
ship cases bureau agents should secure acknowledgment of 
indentures from county courts. Masters had to  promise to  feed, 
clothe, and train each apprentice and had to be persons of good 
character and reputation, who, if they had been slave owners, 
had not maltreated their slaves. Ordinarily males would be 
apprenticed until twenty-one and females until eighteen, and 
every minor fourteen and over would have the right of choosing 
his or her own master. Indigent parents had to give their 
consent to the apprenticing of their ~ h i l d r e n . ~  
While bureau officials (at least for the record) deemed their 
assignment one of cooperation with state officials in the pro- 
vision and care of black minors, Kentucky's political and judi- 
cial leaders, both on the state and county level, regarded the 
- 
presence of federal authorities on their soil as a massive en- 
croachment on traditionally local business and did their utmost 
to  resist this interference. The General Assembly in February 
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1866 made it a duty of county courts in apprenticeship cases 
involving freedmen t o  give preference t o  their former owners if 
the owners should request it, provided they were "suitable" 
persons. Eagerly seizing upon this statute, former owners and 
county courts commenced apprenticing masses of black chil- 
- - 
dren regardless of the status of their parentage or economic 
situation, perpetuating, in the opinion of bureau officials, "a 
species of slavery by authority of 
Initially, bureau agents in Kentucky sought to  counteract the 
proliferation of postwar quasi-slavery by dealing directly with 
county courts and masters, securing as many legitimate inden- 
tures of apprenticeship as possible and simultaneously undoing 
the collusive and oppressive contracts sanctioned by the courts 
under the statute of 1866. Both tasks proved difficult. In the 
years 1866 and 1867, agents apprenticed on the average only 
about twenty children per month and in 1868, the final year of 
apprenticing, obtained only a handful of indentures, while some 
county courts acting under the state law and without bureau 
participation, approved over a hundred contracts in a single 
year. The field officer for Russell, Wayne, and Adair counties 
lamented that while there were "a good many orphans and 
abandoned children'' in his area, he found "it impossible to  
apprentice them to  good  master^."'^ 
Upon learning of  a coercive apprenticeship, bureau officials 
moved t o  secure voluntary dissolution of  the contract and the 
return of  the child t o  his parents, if living, or apprenticeship to  
a more suitable master. Not surprisingly the majority of such 
cases involved children of living parents, since orphans pre- 
sumably found it difficult t o  notify the bureau of their griev- 
ances. In Boone County, one Willis Street was accused of 
possessing the two daughters of John Finney without his per- 
mission and was requested to produce his authority for doing 
so. Similar requests went to  Mrs. Green Mudd of Marion County 
in relation to the children of "Alice" and to Mrs. Caroline 
Murphy (residence not indicated) with respect to  Susannah 
Hobbs, daughter of  Else Hobbs. The bureau accused Jack Dick- 
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inson not only of possessing thirteen-year-old Lucien Scott 
(Dickinson) from March 1865 to April 1866, but of maltreating 
him and of refusing to compensate his mother for his services. 
Similarly, agents charged N. R. Black of Crittenden County of 
apprenticing two children of Mingo Clements without his per- 
mission." 
In other cases, officers of Kentucky's bureau instructed field 
superintendents to deal directly with county judges who had 
apprenticed blacks in violation of bureau regulations. For exam- 
ple, on the first day of September 1866, Levi Burnett instructed 
John L. Peyton, superintendent of the Madisonville office, to 
"call upon" the judge of Hopkins County and request that he 
cancel an indenture apprenticing a black child to Mrs. Bathshe- 
ba W. Cox without consent of her relatives, taking with him 
"the nearest relative of the girl." Other county court judges, 
such as those for Cumberland, Clinton, and Monroe counties, 
did in fact apprentice blacks to  "good families" without much 
urging by bureau agents. But most judges followed the lead of 
~ o u r b o n  county judge Richard Hawes, who in early 1867 ruled 
in the case of the children of former slave Harriet Hurley that 
the Freedmen's Bureau Act did not apply to Kentucky and that 
all contracts of apprenticeship made by bureau agents in the 
state were "null and void." Even though Hawes's ruling repre- 
sented a flagrant misreading of the statutory law and was 
undoubtedly overruled if appealed (no evidence exists as to  the 
outcome of such a proceeding), it nonetheless signified the 
beliefs and practices of most of his colleagues in other coun- 
ties.I2 
County court records generally confirm appraisals of the 
bureau. Entries for the years 1866 through 1868 for ten coun- 
ties with slightly over 25 percent of the state's freedmen indi- 
cate that the county courts therein apprenticed 553 black 
children. Most children were apprenticed without parental con- 
sent, although many were orphans. Five counties noted whether 
masters had been previous owners, and of 320 apprenticeships, 
200 involved the former owners of those children. The ten 
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county courts canceled seventeen indentures and only one at  
the behest of  the bureau, although two others were subjects of 
show-cause orders apparently never executed. Of the ten sample 
counties, Christian County possessed the second most freedmen 
(9,812) and apprenticed more blacks (205), apprenticed more 
to former owners (159), and canceled more indentures (9) than 
any of the other nine counties. On the other hand, while Boyle 
County in central Kentucky possessed substantial numbers of 
freedmen (3,679), the order books indicate that the county 
court apprenticed only a few children.I3 
By early 1867 bureau officials in Kentucky realized that their 
policy of  dealing directly with former slave owners and county 
courts in an attempt to undo harsh indentures of  apprenticeship 
had proved a dismal failure. The monthly report for February 
1867 indicated that county courts, especially in the western and 
northwestern subdistricts, were indiscriminately binding out 
blacks to  their former owners regardless "of age or condition" 
and that many of these masters were in turn hiring out their 
new charges to  third parties in violation of the indentures. 
Shortly thereafter, bureau officials hired prominent Louisville 
attorney and former United States Attorney General James 
Speed to  contest the validity o f  the Kentucky statute of  1866. 
By October 1867 Speed had advised bureau officials that coun- 
ty courts could not validly bind out black children under the 
statute of 1866 if the indentures discriminated against them 
because of color and advised bureau chiefs to  encourage ag- 
grieved freedmen to seek writs of habeas corpus from federal 
court. In early 1868 bureau officials reported that they were 
following Speed's prescription and that the federal court was 
invalidating discriminatory indentures for most freedmen who 
applied to  it for relief. Regrettably for apprenticed freedmen, 
the bureau exaggerated the impact of the federal court on their 
plight. While relevant records for the federal court for the east- 
ern district of  Kentucky are not extant, records for the court 
for the western district sitting primarily in Louisville reveal that 
that tribunal afforded only minimal relief to  black apprentices. 
68 LITTLE KINGDOMS 
Between September 1866 and November 1869 the court heard 
only eleven petitions seeking dissolution of apprenticeships, 
with all of  them being decided between May 1867 and February 
1868. Although the court ruled in favor of the apprentice in 
every case, eleven dissolutions out  of  several thousand appren- 
ticeships hardly represents a major victory for the bureau and 
freedmen against the connivances of the county courts and 
former slave owners.14 
Bureau officials in Kentucky also tried t o  insure that impov- 
erished freedmen received adequate care by cooperating with 
county officials, the traditional dispensers of  poor relief. But, as 
in the case with apprentices, the bureau claimed to  receive little 
cooperation from the counties, despite the passage by the 
legislature of  a statute providing special funds for black poor 
relief. Apparently some recommended challenging alleged coun- 
ty intransigence in federal court, but  n o  one did so, and 
throughout its brief sojourn in Kentucky, the bureau did little 
more than lament these apparent transgressions. 
Initially it appeared that the bureau and counties would 
cooperate in providing for the black poor. Bureau leaders in- 
structed agents t o  refer all cases of  pauperism to county courts 
and t o  encourage the tribunals to  permit former masters to  aid 
their "aged and infirm" former slaves. In February 1866 the 
General Assembly passed a statute requiring county courts to  
collect a two-dollar capitation tax on all black males over the 
age of eighteen, requiring them t o  use the funds for poor relief 
and education. But by the late spring of  1866 bureau officials 
were complaining that while counties were collecting the tax, 
few of  them were using the funds for their intended purposes. 
Nor would many of  the county judges furnish a list of destitute 
freedmen and refugees in their counties as requested by the 
bureau. '" 
In the opinion of  bureau officials, conditions deteriorated in 
the following year. The chief agent at  Owensboro in Ohio 
County complained that courts of  claims in his district applied 
tax funds exclusively for the benefit of former slave owners 
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who wished to retain former household slaves. In response to an 
inquiry from Colonel Benjamin P. Runkle, who believed that 
the counties should be forced to  apply funds for their intended 
- -  . 
purpose or stop collecting the tax, James Speed recommended 
that the bureau first seek legislative repeal of the statute and, if 
that failed, its judicial invalidation. The legislature did not 
repeal the statute until 1871, after the bureau ceased to  func- 
tion as an agency for poor blacks in the state. While the bureau 
continued to accuse counties of misapplying funds, it appar- 
ently never filed suit to stop the pernicious practice.16 
Entries in the order books of ten sample counties possessing 
slightly over one-fourth of the state's freedmen suggest that 
Freedmen's Bureau officials may have exaggerated the extent of 
county inequities in the creation and implementation of black 
pauper policy. In six counties, black paupers received aid from 
early 1866 through the period of the Freedmen's Bureau. In the 
remaining four, impoverished freedmen initially received only 
sporadic aid, but by 1868 benefited from more charitable 
distributions of the dole. Of course, the official records do not 
reveal whether county courts favored former masters as the 
bureau alleged. Naturally, too, even the most generous counties 
normally made relief payments to freedmen only from the 
special fund raised by the black head tax; and when those funds 
proved inadequate, payments had to be scaled down.'" 
Bureau intentions regarding black vagrants likewise initially 
seemed to coincide with state and county policy. Brigadier 
General Fisk's instructions of late 1865 specified that agents 
turn over to  county authorities all freedmen who "neglected to 
apply themselves to an honest calling, or sauntered about ne- 
glecting their business, or . . . maintained themselves by gaming 
or other dishonest means, or quartered themselves upon indus- 
trious and well-behaved persons." Fisk's language closely re- 
sembled that of Kentucky's vagrancy statute which required 
county officials to arrest and circuit courts to "sell into servi- 
tude" (or apprentice if the defendant was a minor) all "able- 
bodied persons . . . found loitering or rambling about, not 
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having the means to maintain himself, by some visible proper- 
ty" or who does not work or make an honest effort to find 
work. But the implementation of the state statute by county 
officers and circuit court judges and juries soon dispelled any 
hope for cooperation with the bureau. No longer concerned so 
much with the "credit and well-being of the industrious" and 
the "peace and good order of the community," bureau agents 
by 1868 contemplated action against county officials who were 
allegedly "taking up" many freedmen and selling them as al- 
leged vagrants into a type of neoslavery. As in its response to 
county policy regarding black paupers, bureau officers confined 
their reaction to the vagrancy problem by privately anguishing 
rather than bringing suit in the federal district court, or insti- 
gating some other effective action. 
On January 1 ,  1869, the Freedmen's Bureau terminated most 
of its business in Kentucky. During its brief sojourn within the 
Commonwealth, its activity amounted to an incomplete holding 
action due mainly to the stubborn refusal of the counties to 
accept the presence of federal involvement in local affairs. While 
not always able to govern their own special units effectively, 
county officials practiced resistance with precision and thereby 
largely frustrated the only major intervention into Kentucky's 
affairs by the federal government during peacetime in the nine- 
teenth century. Simultaneously the counties insured the con- 
tinuation of Kentucky's enduring constitutional parochialism, 
as well as the preservation of her social order. 
LAW AND ORDER 
Never a state committed to domestic tranquillity, Kentucky's 
lawlessness reached prodigious proportions during and after the 
Civil War. Summing up the course of criminality during the 
previous twenty years, the New York Times reported in 1883 
that "probably there is no state in which lawlessness and blood- 
shed prevail to  such an outrageous extent as in Kentucky, and 
there certainly is no  state in which the laws against crime are so 
feebly executed." Popular outcries against crime and the lack of 
law enforcement constituted a major impetus for the constitu- 
tional convention of 1890-1 891. Would-be reformers debated 
the issue "at almost every voting place" in the state, and 
delegates at the convention strove earnestly to cope with a 
problem that some equated with anarchy. Amid the complexity 
of the problem and the elusiveness of a solution, one reality 
emerged clearly: the responsibility for law enforcement was 
essentially a local one, and within the local constitution, coun- 
ties remained supreme.' 
Kentucky's predilection for vigdantism and organized lawless- 
ness originated early in statehood. The leading historian of the 
subject has estimated that by 1850 at least nine separate vigi- 
lante movements had manifested themselves in the Common- 
wealth. Civil War tensions heightened the problem as para- 
military types, primarily pro-southern in nature, began to ter- 
rorize the countryside. Ostensibly operating for the cause of 
high principle, many of the benighted gangs seemed more 
interested in common thievery than southern sovereignty, and 
most did not disguise their white racism. Following the war, 
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organized aggression directed itself principally against freedmen 
and their allies. Composed of former Confederates and rebel 
sympathizers, these bands of  regulators were generally identi- 
fied as Ku Klux Klan by 1868. According to  a leading historian 
of the subject, Kentucky constituted the only state outside the 
former Confederacy where the Klan found any significant devel- 
opment. Although apparently without central authority and 
direction, Kentucky's Klansmen reportedly inflicted as many 
outrages "in size, frequency, and brutality" as their counter- 
parts e l ~ e w h e r e . ~  
Timidity, ineffectiveness, and even connivance characterized 
government response to  activity of the Klan in Kentucky. 
Kentucky's governors claimed not t o  have responsibility for the 
suppression of the Klan and legislatures mostly studied the 
problem. Both rightfully placed the burden of law enforcement 
on county government. But so ineffectual was their response to  
the Klan, that the New York Times branded county officials as 
"particeps criminis." After Klansmen had preyed upon blacks in 
Franklin County, raping a young girl, ducking two men in a 
cold stream, and killing others, a special legislative committee 
investigated the incidents and, rather than recommending new 
legislation, urged county officials to  enforce the law more 
effectively, noting their disregard in this area. When the General 
Assembly finally did act in 1873, it not  only specifically penal- 
ized groups of  masked outlaws but  also provided punishments 
for delinquent county peace officers. Concentrated for the most 
part in the central and western parts of  the state, Klan activity 
dissipated by 1875, although isolated incidents were reported as 
late as 1 8 8 9 . ~  
The disorganized state of  Kentucky violence did not last 
long. Feuds soon replaced the Klan as a new, even more sinister 
form of  collective action. Pitting family against family, political 
faction against faction, they often produced carnages rivaling 
those of  the  Civil War. Occurring mostly in the eastern part of 
the Commonwealth, the feuds stemmed from a variety of 
causes, not the least of  which involved bitter family rivalries 
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dating from the war. Widespread ignorance and poverty and a 
general lack of such stabilizing institutions such as well-estab- 
lished churches hastened and intensified the drift toward anar- 
chy. The unwillingness or inability of county peace officers to 
keep the peace likewise aggravated the condition. And per- 
vading the entire process, in the opinion of some, was the 
condition of deep-seated parochialism caused by Kentucky's 
excessive number of c o u n t i e ~ . ~  
Conflict over county offices often precipitated feuds; failure 
of county officers to enforce laws often perpetuated them. 
Breathitt County's election for county judge in 1878, for ex- 
ample, sparked a heated conflict between factions which had 
originated during the Civil War. Four months after the election, 
county judge J. W. Burnett led one of the factions in a pitched 
battle against the other in the streets of the county seat. On the 
following day, an unknown assailant murdered Burnett as he 
and his gang of "toughs" attempted to lead a member of the 
opposition to jail. As the battle continued to rage, the sheriff 
eagerly joined the fray as a "partisan," all other county officers 
resigned or fled, the circuit judge took a leave of absence, and 
none of the justices of the peace would take the deceased 
county judge's place. Amid this state of anarchy, Governor 
James B. McCreary sent in state troops to restore order, how- 
ever temporarily. Breathitt County's subsequent exploits would 
earn it the nickname "Bloody Breathitt."' 
In many ways the most spectacular feud of nineteenth- 
century Kentucky began in much the same way as had that 
in Breathitt County. In 1884 Republicans and Democrats of 
Rowan County engaged in a bitter contest over the sheriffalty, 
with the Republican candidate, Cook Humphrey, winning 
narrowly. On election night a fight broke out between Republi- 
cans and Democrats in a tavern in Morehead, the county seat, 
resulting in the death of a Democrat, Soloman Bradley, and the 
wounding of John Martin, a prominent Republican. Later in 
December, Martin revenged this attack by killing his assailant, 
Floyd Tolliver, a member of the most prominent Democratic 
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family in the county; Martin then was placed in the Mont- 
gomery County jail to avoid retribution by the sizable Tolliver 
clan. Undaunted, the Tollivers falsified a court order for Mar- 
tin's release to  the Rowan County jail and spirited him away on 
a train to  Morehead, despite his allegations of a setup. Unfor- 
tunately for Martin, his predictions proved accurate, for he was 
removed from the train before it reached its destination and 
murdered by the Tollivers." 
The murder of John Martin inaugurated a two-and-one- 
half-year period of skirmishes and pitched battles between the 
Martin-led Republicans and the Tolliver-dominated Democrats. 
In early 1885 members of the Martin faction ambushed and 
wounded Taylor Young, son of Zachery Young, Democratic 
county attorney and prominent member of the Tolliver faction. 
Shortly thereafter the Tolliver gang declared open warfare on 
sheriff Humphrey and his deputies, accusing him of conspiring 
with John Martin to kill Floyd Tolliver and plotting to jail the 
Tollivers en masse in order to put them out of business. In April 
1885 a gunfight broke out between the two factions in the 
streets of Morehead, sending sheriff Humphrey into hiding and 
the remainder of the county officers, save the county clerk, into 
temporary retirement. In the summer, members of the Tolliver 
gang surrounded the home of John Martin's mother, flushed out 
Cook Humphrey (who fortunately escaped to  Kansas), killed 
one of his deputies, and arrested two of the Martin daughters on 
bogus charges. 
The Tollivers then arranged for Ed Pearce, a fugitive from 
justice, to swear falsely that Humphrey and the Martins had 
conspired to  assassinate county attorney Young, and thereupon 
surrendered themselves to  two justices of the peace, one of 
them a Tolliver partisan, for preliminary hearing, after swearing 
the Republican county judge off the bench. Young withdrew 
from the case, professing his obviously prejudicial interest in the 
case, and Governor J. Proctor Knott, a chagrined observer of 
Rowan County's anarchy, sent in the attorney general to  direct 
the preliminary prosecution. What followed compounded the 
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mockery. The prosecution forced Pearce to  admit that his 
accusations against Humphrey and the Martins were false. 
Young then entered the case, claiming that he, not the attorney 
general, should be the prosecutor and forced Pearce t o  reaffirm 
his original charges. After much bickering between "prose- 
cutors," the Republican magistrate voted to  bind the Tollivers 
over t o  the grand jury, but his Democratic colleague voted to  
release and the defendants went free. Shortly therafter, the 
g a n d  jury, packed with Tolliver allies, completed the farce by 
indicting Mrs. Martin for poisoning a turkey. 
Although some, such as the Louisville Courier-Journal, called 
for a crackdown on Rowan County and even its abolition, the 
state government continued to  maintain its generally hands-off 
posture, and the Tolliver faction continued the offensive on its 
beleaguered opposition. In the August elections of 1886 it 
secured control of county government, electing all officers save 
that of county judge, but that was filled by one James Stewart, 
whose semi-illiteracy was exceeded only by his cowardice. Early 
in 1887 Craig Tolliver, leader of his family's band of miscreants, 
was elected police judge of Morehead, thereby completing the 
tyranny. In June of that year, the Tollivers, pursuing their reign 
of terror which had driven half of Morehead and large numbers 
of rural residents out of the county, imprisoned Dr. Logan, a 
former ally, for supposedly conspiring to  murder Zachery 
Young, and then shot two of Logan's sons in the back after 
arresting them as accomplices. 
Boone Logan, brother of the victims, after fleeing the county 
in fear of his life, journeyed t o  Frankfort to  appeal to  Governor 
Knott for military assistance against the Tollivers. Rebuffed by 
Knott, who continued his ostrichlike claim that Rowan Coun- 
ty's murderous affair was the sole responsibility of its peace 
officers, all of whom were Tollivers or their allies, Logan 
formed a group of vigilantes who launched a surprise attack on 
the Tolliver encampment in Morehead on June 22. In the 
ensuing battle, the regulators killed Craig Tolliver and many of 
his henchmen and proclaimed an end to  the three-year war. 
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Undaunted by their defeat, the remnants of the Tolliver gang 
sent out for more men and materiel, prompting Governor Knott 
finally to  send in state troops, who intercepted several caseloads 
of rifles bound for the belligerents and at least temporarily 
maintained order. The county and commonwealth attorneys, 
still alive and allied with the Tollivers, prosecuted several of the 
regulators for murder, but the first unbiased jury in several 
decades of Rowan County history acquitted them all. So out- 
rageous had the affair become in the eyes of the legislature that 
it only narrowly defeated a bill which would have abolished the 
county. 
Although its origins differed from those in Rowan and 
Breathitt counties, Perry County's feud of 1887-1889 made the 
same impact on local peace officers, who refused to  act either 
out of fear or out of partisanship. While earlier disputes had 
arisen in the county over elections, the great feud erupted 
because of a business rivalry between the French and Eversole 
families, spiced by the intrigues of an Iago-like associate of the 
former. Fighting between factions rallying around the two fam- 
ilies began in the summer of 1887, and by autumn of 1888 the 
county was in a state of anarchy, half of the residents of the 
county seat, Hazard, having fled. The county officials mostly 
favored the Eversoles and did more to disrupt than to keep the 
peace. At the beginning of the feud, Joe Eversole's father-in-law 
was county judge, and after August 1888 his brother took over 
the office. Both refused consistently to issue arrest warrants. 
Sheriff James L. Howard, another Eversole ally, refused to 
arrest two noted desperadoes, also part of the Eversole faction, 
because they were his "friends." What prisoners there were in 
jail frequently escaped with the connivance of the sheriff and 
his deputies. Grand juries, either sympathizing with lawbreakers 
or intimidated by them, failed to return indictments. Unable to 
gain access to the offices and leverage of county government, 
the French faction in self-defense employed a special "posse" of 
Breathitt County thugs. Finally and reluctantly in the fall of 
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1888 Governor Knott sent the state p a r d  into the county to 
restore order, but as soon as the troops exited, fighting re- 
sumed. As the period of the third constitution ended, hostilities 
still ~ imrnered .~  
Similar feuds occurred, sometimes more than once, in some 
other counties, including c ell, Owen, Garrard, Letcher, Harlan, 
Knott, and, of course, Pike (the famed Hatfields and the 
McCoys). Feuds constituted only the most sensational form of 
lawlessness. Ordinary crime mushroomed also in the second half 
of the century drawing loud complaints from politicians and 
citizens alike that peace officers stood idly by while thugs 
robbed, maimed, and murdered. Appalled by the disorder and 
nonenforcement, the Courier-Journal concluded that in some 
counties there was "practically no  law . . . not even mob law; 
not even the law which in Italy and Spain relieves the vendetta 
of some of its most brutal features." The New York Times 
described Kentucky as the "Corsica of America." 
Many attributed the feuds and lawlessness in general to an 
- 
excessive number of counties and the inadequacies of their 
officers. "These little county organisms are storm centers from 
which feuds are created. . . .from which antagonisms radiate," 
- 
argued Bennett H. Young, delegate to the constitutional con- 
vention of 1890-1891. In Young's opinion, many of the feuds 
themselves began as the result of disputes over the spoils of 
county office and perpetuated themselves amid the natural 
hostilities of closely knit communities. Echoing these charges, 
the Courier-Journal submitted that once a "county brawl" 
began, it inevitably encompassed large segments of typically 
small counties and that widespread involvement made it im- 
possible to find an impartial jury. Others observed that county 
peace officers frequently became partisans themselves, noting 
that in one county the sheriff refused to arrest alleged criminals 
because he was allied with them, while the county judge only 
sought their imprisonment because he was their political enemy. 
Rare was the suggestion by W. H. Miller, delegate to  the consti- 
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tutional convention of 1890-1891, that more effective law 
enforcement required even smaller counties in order to  over- 
come problems of time, space, and p ~ p u l a t i o n . ~  
County officials would have found themselves at the storm 
center of the crime controversy regardless of the number of 
counties because traditionally they were the principal conser- 
vators of the peace. Together with town and city marshals and 
urban policemen, the sheriffs and their deputies, the county 
judges, the justices of the peace, the jailers, the coroners, and 
the constables constituted the corps of peace officers for the 
Commonwealth. Of these, the sheriff's position was foremost. 
He was the principal peace officer of the county, charged with 
the duty of apprehending all fugitives of justice, as well as with 
transporting them to and from jail and to the penitentiary or 
gallows if necessary. Additionally, sheriffs summoned jurors, 
served warrants, and attended to the numerous other duties of 
the chief executive officer of the county and circuit-criminal 
courts. Constitutionally defined as "conservators of the peace," 
county judges and justices of the peace acted primarily as 
adjudicators rather than enforcers. County judges served con- 
. - 
currently with justices of the peace as examining courts, having 
exclusive jurisdiction over homicides after 1885. The judges also 
shared jurisdiction with the justices over riots, routs, and 
breaches of the peace and after 1875 absorbed the surplus cases 
of misdemeanors which had been steadily building up on the 
dockets of circuit and criminal courts. Two justices of the peace 
(after 1885 only one) constituted examining courts and single 
justices could hear cases of minor misdemeanors. Justices were 
also charged with the suppression of routs, riots, and breaches 
of the peace and disorderly conduct, which included apprehen- 
sion as well as adjudication (with the aid of a jury) and had 
somewhat the same task regarding vagrancy. Both county judges 
and justices could issue arrest warrants. Occasionally county 
courts, either in the person of the county judge or the court of 
claims, offered rewards for the apprehension of fugitives from 
j ~ s t i c e . ~  
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Although his duties normally concerned only the daily care 
- 
of prisoners and the maintenance of the jail and other county 
buildings, the jailer on occasion apprehended fugitives from 
justice, especially escapees from jail. Coroners conducted in- 
quests by jury into suspicious deaths and housebreakings and 
either arrested the "culpable" persons personally or "caused it 
to  be done by [their] precepts." They also acted for the sheriff 
in cases of illness or other incapacity. Constables continued to  
serve the justices of the peace and sometimes assisted sheriffs 
and other peace officers in the apprehension of fugitives. In 
addition t o  these traditional duties, county officers were some- 
times given special assignments by the legislature, such as en- 
forcing statutes relating t o  game preservation, peddlers, the 
prohibition of prize fights, and the sale and storage of illumi- 
nating oils.'0 
Kentuckians, especially governors of the state, frequently 
complained of the inadequacies of law enforcement. Amid the 
epidemic of vigilante activity during Reconstruction, governors 
were quick t o  point out their limited powers of law enforce- 
ment and to  criticize those primarily responsible, the county 
officers. Governor Stevenson urged county officials t o  enforce 
criminal laws more forcefully, and his successor, P. H. Leslie, 
charged that the "difficulty lies not in the want of penal 
statutes, but in their enforcement." In 1872 a special House 
committee blamed Ku Klux Klan outrages in Franklin County 
on peace officers who did little in the way of interrogating, 
investigating, or arresting despite the fact that "the disturbers of 
the public peace are well known to  the public and the officers 
of the law." Rather than recommend new laws, the committee 
beseeched the sheriff and his colleagues to  attend t o  their 
existing duties. A Pendleton County journalist complained in 
1877 of "little effort" t o  apprehend the many killers that 
roamed the locality, and the New York Times ascribed Ken- 
tucky's mounting crime wave t o  "weak administration of law." 
On the eve of constitutional reform, Governor Simon B. Buck- 
ner announced that "nothing was more common than to  find 
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civil officers disregarding their plain duty, either by failure to 
issue proper process, or by neglecting, and even refusing, to 
serve process placed in their hands for execution."" 
A gadual evolution in the office of sheriff accounted for 
many of the deficiencies of law enforcement. The Frankfort 
Kentucky Yeoman explained this process well in 1872: 
The old common law idea of a sheriff's relation to  the 
people, and that which has prevailed until a comparatively 
recent period was that he was the peace officer of the 
county, and the special terror of offenders against the law. 
Gradually the civil branch of the sheriff's duties has been 
enlarged, and almost absorbs his whole time. As the col- 
lector of the revenue of the state and county he has a 
harassing and responsible position sufficient almost to  oc- 
cupy the time of one person, and is besides the executive 
officer of the circuit court, who executes its processes and 
enforces its judgment. The fees which go to  make his 
salary come almost exclusively from this branch of his 
business. So that, what from the poor pay and the absence 
of positive law requiring him to  act, the sheriff as known 
to  us now-a-days bears altogether different relations to 
crime from what he did a quarter of a century ago. 
Some sheriffs did their utmost to keep the peace, arresting 
gangs of desperadoes, apprehending "mobs of regulators," even 
occasionally dying in shoot-outs with fugitives. But the majority 
neglected their law enforcement duties even after the legislature 
made them more "positive" in 1873." 
Sheriffs were not the only county officers who failed to 
enforce the criminal laws effectively. Rockcastle County Demo- 
crats accused the Republican county judge of assisting an ac- 
cused murderer and fellow party member to escape after he 
purportedly murdered a Democrat shortly before the August 
1867 elections, a charge the judge hotly denied. In 1883 the 
Robertson county attorney attempted to have a homicide case 
transferred to two different justices of the peace, alleging that 
the two before whom the case had been filed had prejudged the 
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dispute in favor of the defendant, and similar such examples 
may have prompted the General Assembly t o  give county judges 
exclusive jurisdiction over preliminary hearings of homicide 
cases in 1886. Richard Stanton, foremost authority on the 
justice of the peace in the latter nineteenth century, accused the 
local magistrates of almost total failure to  enforce the statute 
prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, an allegation 
seconded by the Kentucky Yeoman. An Owensboro journalist 
found Kentucky justices very inconsistent in behavior, some 
"making the law a terror to  evil doers" while others erred so 
- 
often "on mercy's side" that they constituted "an accessory 
after the fact."13 
Not all the blame for inadequate law enforcement lay with 
those county officers charged with investigation and apprehen- 
sion. Critics accused county attorneys as well of incompetence. 
Too often, they argued, these officials were young and inexperi- 
enced and therefore usually bested in trials by defense counsel. 
Although for most of the period of the third constitution 
- 
county attorneys prosecuted only misdemeanors, in 1884 the 
legislature required them to  assist commonwealth attorneys in 
the prosecution of felonies. Defenders of the office cited this 
legislation as proof of the county attorney's worth. Common- 
wealth attorneys, they submitted, had too much territory to  
cover and too little time in which to  prepare for cases. Further- 
. . 
more, county attorneys understood local mores, knew wit- 
nesses, judges, and juries, and had more time t o  study the facts 
of the case. Criminal prosecution had become more effective 
since the local prosecutors came to  the assistance of the com- 
monwealth's attorneys. Critics countered this development by 
noting that families of victims of criminal defendants continued 
to  employ private counsel to  assist the prosecution, an indica- 
tion that the inadequacies of public prosecutors, whether oper- 
ating individually or jointly, persisted.14 
Other officials and institutions of the law-enforcement 
process encountered criticism. Circuit and criminal court judges 
could not keep their dockets current as the number of criminal 
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cases mounted. They were too lenient toward criminals and too 
fearful of their own safety, frequently refusing to hold court in 
counties torn by feuding. Observers also complained that judges 
too often granted continuances of major felony cases to  the 
point where material witnesses became unavailable, making 
trials impossible and allowing dangerous criminals to go free. 
Defenders of prosecutors and judges countered that Kentucky's 
criminal code made it difficult to secure convictions. They 
further charged that this condition had been deliberately 
created by the multitude of lawyers who dominated the legis- 
lature and who wished to facilitate their criminal defense prac- 
tices.'' 
The jury system likewise contained serious deficiencies. 
Sheriffs frequently ignored lists compiled by jury commission- 
ers and instead relied on "professional jurymen," noted for 
their menial status and leniency. A reporter for the Louisville 
Evening Post in 1879 determined that many men on the Jeffer- 
son County jury list were excused peremptorily or not even 
summoned. Two years earlier a Nicholas County murderer, 
convicted of stoning a man to death, thanked his jury for 
sentencing him to  only eleven years in prison, admitting that he 
believed "he deserved the extreme penalty of the law" and 
expressing "surprise at the light ~en tence . " '~  
Critics also charged governors with exercising too freely their 
pardoning power. The New York Times contended that the 
"reckless exercise of the pardoning power by the Governor has 
been a direct incitement t o  crime." Responding to such accusa- 
tions, Governor Blackburn argued in 1881 that he had pardoned 
many convicted criminals because of conditions in the state 
penitentiary. "When 1 came into the Executive Office there 
were 969 convicts in the Penitentiary, and only 780 cells, and 
these cells were but three feet nine inches wide, six feet three 
inches high, and six feet eight inches long," Blackburn stated. 
Noting that prisoners were "dying at  a fearful rate" and vowing 
that the penitentiary should not be "a charnel-house," Black- 
burn claimed he was only being humane in liberally implement- 
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ing his pardoning power. The governor also took the occasion to  
make a startling charge against county prosecuting attorneys, 
asserting that in order to inflate their own fee income, many 
- 
had obtained convictions of persons who had committed only 
trivial crimes. In short, Blackburn contended, the fault lay not 
with the governor, but with conditions a t  the penitentiary and 
pressures prompted by the fee system which caused prosecutors 
t o  "hunt out the small peccadilloes . . . that they may profit by 
their fines and forfeitures."" 
Kentucky's crime wave not only endangered life, limb, and 
property, but the state treasury as well. By statute the state 
absorbed most of the cost of criminal law enforcement, paying 
salaries and fees for commonwealth's attorneys and circuit and 
criminal court judges, as well as fees for witnesses, juries, and 
special guards and many of the fees for jailers, sheriffs, county 
court clerks, and county attorneys. Governor Leslie noted that 
in 1865 "the cost of prosecuting criminals, including jailers' 
fees, and rewards paid for apprehending and delivering persons 
charged with crime was $86,080.82, while in 1871 the amount 
had increased t o  $192,002.88. Two years later the figure had 
reached $234,966.46, and by 1889 the amount had soared t o  
nearly $600,000. A substantial part of these expenditures con- 
stituted jailers' fees which were geat ly  enhanced by the con- 
stant delays in bringing prisoners to  trial. State expenditures for 
county juries rose from $140,215.95 t o  $361,244.59 in a single 
three-year period (1886-1889).18 
State officials accused county peace officers of inflating 
expenses by submitting fraudulent claims. Not a few justices of 
the peace, sheriffs, and constables staged collusive "crimes" in 
order t o  manufacture claims against the state. They would 
usually engage several men to commence a friendly fight in 
which one would sustain a minor injury, and the other would 
"flee" t o  another county, leaving word where he could be 
found. The county peace officer "with a guard or two" would 
then apprehend the "fugitivev and submit a claim for trans- 
porting a prisoner from one county to  another, a trip which 
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usually took several days. Responding to a plea from Governor 
Buckner, the General Assembly cracked down on fraudulent 
claims in a series of three statutes passed in 1880. Five years 
later the state auditor reported that although the new legislation 
had served to  suppress the "more open and flagrant frauds," 
many county officers continued to  submit unnecessarily in- 
flated claims for the cost of apprehending and transporting 
fugitives. l g  
- 
In the opinion of some, the excessive number of counties 
added to  the financial burdens of the battle against crime. Not 
only did the smallness of counties multiply the conditions 
producing crime but it also increased the numbers of officials 
submitting claims whether fraudulent or legitimate. The 
demands of counties "on the state treasury are altogether out of 
proportion to  population or wealth," the Courier-Journal edi- 
torialized in 1885. In the following year, Governor Knott 
- .  
demanded unsuccessfully that the legislature transfer the princi- 
pal costs of law enforcement onto the counties which had 
become "systematic conspiracies t o  pillage the public trea- 
s~ry . "~O 
Kentucky's lawlessness and the counties' inability t o  cope 
with it naturally produced growing public outrage. Franklin 
countians employed the customary techniques of protestation 
when between 1871 and 1873 they petitioned the General 
. - 
Assembly "for such legislation as will suppress certain disorders 
in said county" and held a series of meetings condemning 
criminal activity and urging county officers to  make greater 
efforts t o  suppress it. The Pendleton County committee of 
safety of 1877-1879 concerned itself with both fiscal abuses of 
county government and its inattention t o  criminal law enforce- 
. - 
ment. Fayette countians held a series of meetings in the late 
1860s and throughout the 1870s in response t o  activities of the 
Ku Klux Klan, although the last recorded conclave, in February 
1878, adjourned sine die for want of a t t e n d a n ~ e . ~ '  
The absence of effective law enforcement prompted other 
citizens t o  opt for more violent expressions of outrage designed 
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to  reduce the crime rate. Vigilantism, whether in the form of 
the Ku Klux Klan or some other organization, represented a 
response of citizens unable to  obtain relief from the duly 
constituted organ of government. Although lamenting the exis- 
tence of extralegal law enforcement, observers such as the 
Lexington Kentucky Gazette and the Lexington Weekly I'rcss 
predicted a continuance of it as long as county and city peace 
officers were held in disrepute and citizens remained in fear of 
their lives. The Gazette even defended a mob lynching of an 
alleged murderer in March 1879, although the Kentucky Yeo- 
man a year later condemned citizens of Boyd, Lawrence, and 
Carter counties for taking the law into their own hands rather 
than relying on county peace officers to  preserve order. Organ- 
ized mobs did occasionally contribute to  domestic tranquillity, 
such as the Nicholas County regulators who drove from the 
county a band of outlaws and horse thieves in 1876-1877, but 
many behaved like the Ku Klux Klan which in the name of law 
and order fashioned its own brand of lawlessness.22 
While some citizens protested or regulated or both, others 
groped for more rational and effective ways to  subdue Ken- 
tucky's crime. Governor Preston H. Leslie called for greater 
penalties against peace officers who failed to  enforce the law, 
and the legislature responded in kind in 1873. But the statute 
accomplished little, and Governor Buckner renewed the call for 
stiffer penalties for official nonfeasance in 1889. Buckner even 
advocated creation of a state department of justice, under the 
control of the attorney general, which could compel local 
prosecuting officers t o  discharge their duty. He also suggested 
that the legislature impeach and remove all incompetent judges 
from office.23 
Some recommended that the General Assembly enhance the 
governor's authority to  quash local lawlessness by use of the 
state guard. County officers seemed to  favor such a course as 
they frequently and often unsuccessfully sought military assis- 
tance from the statehouse. But governors themselves rejected 
this proposal, arguing that the primary responsibility for law 
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enforcement should continue to  rest with local officials. Habitu- 
al reliance on state troops would cause Kentucky's citizenry to 
lose confidence in civil government and threaten the "principles 
of free government," Governor Buckner submitted. Sheriffs 
would neglect their law enforcement duties, rely unduly on the 
military, and the state would be forced to  maintain an army at 
considerable expense. If governors eschewed a greater role for 
themselves in law enforcement, they did recognize that the 
traditional weapons available to  local peace officers were inade- 
quate. Governor Leslie contended in 1872 that the posse comi- 
tutus, "the only reliance of the civil officer for aid in pursuing 
and arresting offenders," could not cope with well-drilled bands 
of criminals. "The posse are neither drilled nor armed, and 
hence not prepared to encounter the offenders." Even more 
cumbersome, he added, was the militia which could never be 
assembled in time to  confront the enemy. At best, bands of 
criminals simply went into hiding when the militia appeared, 
only to continue their pillaging as soon as the soldiers were 
withdrawn.24 
Faced with mounting crime, peace officers who could not 
keep the peace, regulators who did not regulate, and governors 
who seldom sent in state troops, some counties flirted with the 
concept of a professional county police force to  supplement if 
not supplant the sheriff, his deputies, and the posse. The first 
requests received by the General Assembly to create special 
county police systems involved simply authorizations to em- 
power "all persons" to  arrest alleged poachers and illegal berry- 
pickers. Civil War pillaging prompted the Lincoln and Hart 
county courts t o  secure legislation authorizing them to employ 
special police forces to p a r d  against outlaws and !guerrillas, but 
there is no evidence that either county implemented these 
 statute^.^' 
Following the war, several counties secured special legisla- 
tion permitting them to establish county police forces. At 
first approaching the problem in piecemeal fashion by allowing 
each precinct to  vote on the question of its own police force, 
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Jefferson County ultimately secured legislation in 1874 allow- 
ing the creation of a countywide organization. But the county 
court never implemented the law and secured its repeal in 1876. 
Throughout the remainder of the period of the third constitu- 
tion the county court occasionally appointed patrolmen, but 
usually only for special events, such as horse races, and always 
at the expense of those directly benefiting from the appoint- 
ment. The Jefferson County Court so acted under a statute 
permitting any county court t o  appoint patrolmen t o  assist in 
law enforcement (although originally counties used patrols to  
control slaves). An examination of the order books of twenty 
other counties reveals that none of them established permanent 
patrols during the period of the third constitution, and only a 
few appointed patrolmen for special events such as fairs and 
horse races.26 
Fayette County grappled with the concept of a county police 
force for over twenty years before finally deciding not to  
establish one. In 1867 the General Assembly authorized the 
county court to  appoint "one chief of police . . . and not more 
than three policemen for each election district . . . outside the 
city of Lexington." But the court did not implement the 
statute, and in May 1876 a group of county residents petitioned 
the county court for the creation of a "county detective force 
to  render their houses and property . . . more secure than they 
have been for a number of years." The petitioners even ex- 
pressed a willingness to  absorb a tax increase, believing that a 
fall in the crime rate would create savings in the long run. But 
the court of claims refused to  establish a detective force, ap- 
parently fearful that it would evolve into a band of "secret 
police." The clamor and lawlessness persisted, and in December 
1877 the Gazette editorialized in favor of a county police force. 
Claiming that the city of Lexington maintained an effective 
constabulary which secured the lives and property of its resi- 
dents, the newspaper contended that outlaws burglarized the 
houses of countians "with impunity." The newspaper urged its 
readers to  pressure the county court into action.27 
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Perhaps in response to this agitation, the legislature enacted 
in late February 1878 still another statute permitting the coun- 
ty judge to authorize the sheriff to appoint a detective force of 
no more than five men. Empowered to  hire, discipline, and 
control the force and to  keep "it constantly engaged in efforts 
to discover and bring t o  justice against the law of every grade," 
the sheriff had to  confer regularly with the county attorney and 
court of claims. Within fifteen days of the creation of s;ch a 
force, the county judge had to obtain approval of the court of 
claims, which had the power to set the rate of pay. Despite 
statutory authority, the county court refused once more to  
create a county police force, and Fayette County continued to 
rely on its traditional constabulary for protection against 
crime." 
In 1886 the legislature attempted yet again to provide bet- 
ter police protection for certain rural residents of Fayette, Ken- 
ton, and Campbell counties. It authorized specially created 
police districts of Lexington, Covington, and Newport to  pro- 
vide protection for designated suburban areas if taxpayers 
owning a majority of the assessed land so petitioned their 
county courts. If petitioned for police protection, the police 
districts could (and certainly would) require the county courts 
to  tax the suburban residents in order to  pay for their share of 
the policing. There is no evidence that any of the suburban 
areas filed such petitions with their county courts. When in 
1890 the General Assembly required the Fayette County Court 
to tax residents of the Woodlands suburb of Lexington so that 
they might have city police protection, the justices simply 
referred the question to  its committee on ways and means and 
filed its report without further action.29 
Fayette County's defiance and Kenton and Campbell coun- 
ties' unwillingness to use more sophisticated urban police pro- 
tection represent a curious paradox in the history of Kentucky's 
local constitution in the nineteenth century. Politicians, journal- 
ists, and citizens continuously complained about the inade- 
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quacies of county law enforcement, but refused to tax them- 
selves in order to provide better service. Such inconsistency 
characterized efforts to  reform county road administration and 
generally undermined other attempts to modernize the institu- 
tions of local government. 
6. 
COURT DAY 
County court day, one Monday a month devoted primarily to  
court business, by mid-century had evolved into an occasion 
with emphasis on activities of all kinds. By the end of the Civil 
War, the judicial-governmental nature of the event had so di- 
minished that in some cases it went practically unnoticed. Thus 
the day on which the county judgk and justices of the peace 
would come to  the seat of government to do the county's 
business had given way to  a day on which farmers and vendors 
sold their wares, politicians made speeches, and local citizens 
gossiped, imbibed, and sometimes brawled.' 
In the Bluegrass section of the Commonwealth, court day 
coincided with stock sale day. Apparently originating in Bour- 
bon County in 1829 and held there exclusively for several years, 
county livestock sales were major attractions at the postbellum 
central Kentucky court days. April was the "great cattle court" 
in most of the Bluegrass counties, with postwar sales flourishing 
in such counties as Scott, Woodford, Clark, Franklin, Fayette, 
and Bourbon. Winchester in Clark County prided itself as the 
"livest [sic] town in Kentucky" on stock day, Scott County 
claimed it was becoming "one of the best stock markets" in 
Kentucky, while Woodford County usually reported large atten- 
dances and sales. Famed Kentucky author James Lane Allen 
went so far as to  characterize central Kentucky's court-stock 
days as collectively the "great stockmarket of the W e ~ t . " ~  
Despite Allen's claims, not every county court livestock sale 
enjoyed booming sales. Observers cautioned Clark County 
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stockmen to  hold their stock back in the fall of 1879 rather 
than add t o  the severe market glut which already existed. In 
June 1880 the Lexington Kentucky Gazette reported that sales 
in Bourbon County, whose county seat once literally over- 
flowed with livestock on sale days, were declining because of 
steadily diminishing numbers of grazing animals. Five years later 
Fayette County's Chamber of Commerce stewed openly about 
the declining sales of its stock 
Fayette County's problems stemmed in part from a contro- 
versy which had been simmering for years over whether stock 
sales should be allowed in the public square or transferred to  
the suburbs, a question that plagued other counties in lesser 
degrees. Long boasting one of the most active court days in 
Kentucky, Fayette County's stock sales rivaled that of Bourbon 
County's in importance. In early 1853 a local newspaper re- 
ported that Lexington was "generally full of people on every 
county court day" and that one auctioneer alone at February 
court sold nearly $15,000 worth of property. Four years later 
another paper indicated that people continued to  throng into 
the Bluegrass capital and that the same auctioneer had sold 
more than three times as much livestock, slaves, and land as he 
had four years earlier. If anything, crowds of people and herds 
of livestock increased after the war, further filling the coffers of 
the vendors and barkers of the public square. By war's end, 
what had been a pleasant social and business occasion was 
becoming a nuisance. Crowds of people and livestock, "loads of 
shingles and clapboards and baskets and watermelons and lum- 
ber" converted the public square and its environs into a scene of 
animated chaos on court day. Normal traffic in town became 
impossible, and turnpikes stuffed with herds of livestock being 
driven t o  market afforded no more accessiblity. When it rained, 
streets became quagmires and the "nuisance," a calamity. The 
sounds of thousands of people and livestock, hundreds of 
wagons, and scores of auctioneers and other vendors amounted 
t o  almost a deafening roar. It amazed some that Fayette coun- 
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tians tolerated these spectacles, and one cynic speculated that 
court day remained essential to keep "people from thinking 
that Lexington is a little country town."4 
The livestock accounted for most of the growing complaints 
about Fayette County court day. They produced a stench that 
allegedly caused "a strong, well man" t o  vomit as he walked the 
streets, an odor that hung over Lexington throughout the 
summer and permeated "not only the stores but the dry goods 
on the shelves." Some argued that the presence of so many 
animals in so small a space constituted a threat t o  the commun. 
ty's health and certainly the residue of their visitation involvea 
expensive cleanup. A clamor soon arose for better regulation of 
the sales. Some urged livery stable keepers to  provide more 
ample accommodations for "country men." Others suggested 
that the city police regulate traffic "at the head of Cheapside," 
the principal avenue of livestock traffic. Still others proposed a 
designated route for incoming and outgoing herds rather than 
leaving it to  chance. And most observers demanded pens or 
pounds for the animals as a way to  curb their tendency to  roam 
free. The most extreme critics demanded that the sales be held 
on Saturdays or be moved entirely out of the central city into 
the suburbs.' 
Proposals t o  move the sales to  the outskirts of town created a 
classic dilemma for city merchants. While most detested the 
"peculiar and pungent ammonia of county court day," they 
disliked even more the prospect of declining sales which might 
result from the transfer of large crowds t o  places remote from 
their places of  business. Reluctantly in early 1870, they agreed 
t o  a temporary experiment of moving the auctions from Cheap- 
side in the public square to the edge of town, but almost 
immediately found the change undesirable and together with 
disgruntled stockmen, who boycotted the new location, success- 
fully petitioned the city fathers for a restoration of the old 
system. Nonetheless agitation for a permanent removal con- 
tinued throughout the 1870s as indignation against the "cattle 
plague" mounted. Some demanded that the streets be cleared of 
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cattle by early afternoon and that stockmen be taxed to  pay for 
cleaning of the streets. In April 1879 stockmen, merchants, and 
city officials met at the courtl~ouse t o  discuss the question of 
permanent removal of stock sales to the edge of town. The 
heated debate turned principally on the impact on the business 
of downtown merchants and the question of whether the ani- 
mals constituted a health hazard. Despite denials of unhealth- 
iness, predictions of economic disaster in the inner city, and 
suggestions that suburbanites would oppose stockyards in their 
neighborhoods, city officials ordained the move shortly after 
the April meeting6 
By ordinance the city fathers outlawed the selling "by public 
auction [of]  any loose animal on any street, alley, or public 
highway within the city of Lexington or [the exposing] for sale 
thereon any animals in droves, herds, or flocks." While this 
would seem to  have applied to horses and mules, Lexingtonians 
complained nearly ten years later that only cattle and hogs were 
affected by the law. Yet the problem abated as did 
Cheapside sales, and the merchants there periodically gumbled 
and petitioned the city council for a revocation of the stock 
sales ordinance. But the law remained on the books throughout 
the rest of the period of the third constitution; and while 
livestock sales in Fayette County declined in the 1880s, the 
Lexington Chamber of Commerce voted against recommending 
the repeal of the ordinance and attributed the losses t o  other 
factors.' 
Court day also attracted horsemen whether it be the simple 
farmer who wished to swap with a colleague or the Bluegrass 
aristocrat who wished to  race, exhibit, and perhaps buy and sell 
horses. Fayette and Bourbon counties boasted the largest horse 
shows featuring exhibitions of "fine blooded stallions," especi- 
- 
ally the world's greatest trotters. Held at April court, formal 
racing sometimes formed part of the festivities. From the begin- 
ning, organizers of Fayette County's horse show avoided con- 
gesting downtown Lexington by holding their event in the city's 
suburbs. At first attracting horsemen from only the Bluegrass 
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region, by the postwar period the event drew visitors from all 
parts of the United States. By that time also, the show featured 
mostly Standardbreds, the owners of Thoroughbreds preferring 
to display their stock at  private auctions and races. Owners, not 
riders, dominated the nineteenth-century shows, emphasizing 
the speed, shape, style, and action of their horses. At the show 
many breeders decided upon mates for their mares and observed 
exhibitions of the fastest trotters in trial heats. By the early 
twentieth century the horse shows of most counties had faded 
into oblivion, but Fayette County's survived and prospered for 
another two decades before it, too, expired (to be revived in 
1937 in a slightly different form).' 
Court day represented a g a n d  occasion for the barterer as 
well as the vendor, and horses constituted the basic object of 
the swap. In an age when man depended on the horse as his 
basic form of transportation and Kentucky prided herself on 
possessing the finest horses in the world, it was perhaps natural 
that court-day attendants would spend some time attempting to 
trade for a superior steed. Often swaps involved only the ani- 
mals themselves, but just as often added inducements were 
needed, ranging from only a few dollars or a plug of tobacco to 
several hundred dollars. If this month's swap proved disappoint- 
ing, there was always next month's court day at which to 
redeem oneself. Horses represented not the only items of barter. 
As the century matured, hand weapons, especially knives and 
guns, became increasingly popular items of exchange.9 
Stockmen and horse breeders were not the only ones con- 
ducting business on court day. Peddlers and drummers of all 
types, including patent medicine men, lightning rod salesmen, 
bookmen, and machine men, flourished amid the usually large 
crowds of the day. The auctioneer, who figured so prominently 
in livestock sales, also sold slaves (before 1865), rural acreages, 
town lots, and all types of personal property. Town merchants 
offered special discounts for the day, and local craftsmen of- 
fered to sell such products as baskets and copperware. Lumber- 
men did a lively business from their huge stacks of wood, 
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shingles, and clapboards, often piled in the routes of pedestri- 
ans. Local cooks proudly displayed a variety of prepared foods, 
including pies, cakes, corn dishes, and hot-brushes.I0 
While not all the month's business was conducted on  court 
day, certainly much of it was. The financial community used 
the day to  conclude a large portion of  its transactions. Finan- 
ciers bought and sold stocks, mostly in turnpike companies, 
railroads, and banks; money men bought and sold negotiable 
paper; and stockholders met and voted on major policy ques- 
tions. So ingrained was the dependence of  money men on court 
day that the Court o f  Appeals ruled that foreclosure sales were 
valid even though not held on the traditional Monday." 
In an era when most people lived on farms, worked long 
days, and were offered little in the way of organized, commer- 
cial leisure, court day also constituted a major social event. 
Nineteenth-century Kentuckians delighted in social gatherings- 
horse races, burgoos, barbecues, agricultural fairs, political 
meetings-and court day took on  an appearance similar to  all 
these affairs, even encompassing some of them. Even if they had 
nothing to  buy or sell, country folk normally came to the 
county seat t o  enjoy the  festivities a t  hand, as is evidenced by 
reports that crowded court days occasionally produced dis- 
appointing sales figures. It was essential for the well-being of  the 
average Kentuckian to  be able to press the flesh, exchange 
formal greetings, swap a few lies, learn the latest gossip, and 
banter over several glasses of punch. Such socializing became 
mostly a man's game as the teeming crowds of court day and 
the herds of livestock kept women away or drove them into 
stores. As with most of the other events, democracy character- 
ized court-day socializing, with aristocrat and commoner easily 
exchanging pleasantries. Perhaps the Kentuckian's love of titles 
encouraged the leveling process. It was commonplace for vir- 
tually all white adult males to  be addressed as "colonel7' or  
"squire." A bemused correspondent to  the New York Times 
following the Civil War marveled a t  his rapid advancement in 
military rank during court day; beginning as a lowly major, he 
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ended the day as a general. Titled gentlemen so abounded at the 
gathering that the correspondent concluded it would be far 
easier to find "John Smith in New York City" than "Squire or 
Judge Somebody in the crowd." He noted also that a man's 
social position increased with the amount of bourbon whiskey 
he consumed and that "copper lightning awakens 'the best 
blood' pride" in Kentuckians, but with northerners the "dead 
were dead.'"' 
Court day was not entirely dominated by men. Church ladies 
found court days especially suitable for public dinners designed 
to raise funds for the benefit of their respective parishes. In 
February 1873, for instance, the ladies of the First Presbyterian 
Church of Lexington announced in a local newspaper that they 
wished all their rural neighbors to  remember they could "get a 
good dinner without detention . . . in Mr. Long's building on 
the corner of Cheapside and Short Street," while the ladies of 
the Baptist Church of the same town sponsored "an elegant 
dinner" at the April court of the same year. Women and 
children could sometimes seek refuge from brawling, drunken 
men and smelly cows by attending a circus which occasionally 
enlivened the monthly meetings.13 
Court day also represented an occasion convenient for ath- 
letic competition and sporting events of all types. In addition to 
horse racing, athletic contests included sledgehammer throwing, 
bar heaving, foot racing, and cock fighting. Fighting constituted 
by far the most popular human sport. Although spontaneous 
fights occurred frequently, the most popular affairs were staged 
and involved "champions" from various parts of the county. 
Bystanders formed makeshift rings and the contestants fought 
until one of them could no longer resist. At first, these confron- 
tations encompassed all parts of the body, but eventually they 
resembled crude boxing matches. By statute, county officials 
could stop such events and arrest the participants, but they 
seldom did. Sometimes contests involved more than two contes- 
tants, taking the form of drunken brawls or even stabbings or 
shootings. Initially drinking was very public, with many store- 
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keepers maintaining supplies for their customers, but after the 
war sources of whiskey were usually confined to taverns, tip- 
pling houses, and personal flasks. Although some have asserted 
that consumption likewise receded after 1865, the evidence 
suggests otherwise, with some reports marveling at the absence 
- - 
of drunkenness and others noting it existed freely . I 4  
For politicians, county court day constituted a prime oppor- 
tunity for rallying, speechmaking, and buttonholing. Court day 
crowds expected and enjoyed the inevitable speechmaking, 
whose occurrences were so regular and regulated that they 
became almost like tournaments. Speechmaking took various 
forms, sometimes as debates, sometimes as straight stump 
speaking, and sometimes as round robins among various party 
favorites. Scldom was the event as spontaneous as it appeared, 
for the careful candidate had sent his agents into the field long 
before the occasion of his public pronouncements. Whether 
running for United States senator, assisting in a presidential 
campaign, or seeking a local office, the politically ambitious 
could find a ready audience among the teeming court day 
crowds. The planning of John Williams, candidate for United 
States Senate in 1876 was typical. Striving to  take advantage of 
. - 
a large crowd at the Gallatin County court day on Monday, 
October 16, 1876, Williams wrote Roderick Perry, local politi- 
cal leader and a Democratic presidential elector, t o  post him for 
a speech at the county seat and get him "as big a crowd as 
possible." Throughout the ~ e r i o d ,  ~ol i t ica l  leaders convoked 
party meetings, nominating conventions, rallies, and barbecues 
on court day, and during the Civil War they exchanged news 
about battles and strategy. All in all, court day inevitably 
- .  
promised t o  be a grand political o c ~ a s i o n . ' ~  
Court day was a special day for blacks as well as whites. In 
days of involuntary servitude most public slave auctions took 
place on court day, although the practice was not without its 
detractors. Some found the public sale of slaves t o  be obnox- 
ious, especially when families were divided, and many owners 
preferred to  sell their stock privately. Slavery itself prompted 
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court day meetings, some to protest the institution, but most to  
defend it. Emancipation did not end the presence of blacks at 
court day and only slightly elevated their station on these 
occasions. James Lane Allen alleged derisively that blacks 
flocked to court day only to mimic their white employers, since 
they had nothing to sell nor money to buy. Local observers 
castigated their supposed cockiness, but out-of-state visitors 
noted the ease with which they mingled with the crowds and 
applauded their humility.I6 
The intense competition between county court days further 
emphasizes intercounty economic rivalries and the essential 
parochialism of nineteenth-century Kentucky. Bluegrass coun- 
ties directed most of their envy at Bourbon County, whose local 
pride and boastfulness mad; many forget that Fayette's day 
constituted the most successful economic enterprise of the area. 
Fayette countians encouraged competition with Bourbon, 
whose citizens they too regarded as braggarts and chauvinists. 
Proclaiming that "the Bourbonites disparage everybody and 
everything outside of their own bounds, and are accepted for 
what they vaunt themselves more than for what they are really 
worth," the Kentucky Gazette urged Bourbon's "modest neigh- 
bors to assert the position to which they are entitled." Re- 
sponding to a piece of Bourbon County braggadocio printed in 
the Louisville Courier, the Cynthiana News asserted that the 
Paris people were actually jealous of Harrison County and that 
such envy was well founded as Cynthiana excelled in every way 
except for numbers of "long-eared animals . . . both of quad- 
rupeds and bipeds." Some years later the News urged Harrison 
countians to combat Bourbon's superiority in four-legged ani- 
mals by establishing their own court day livestock market. "It 
will be better for the merchant, tradesman, the people, and 
everybody to spend our money at home and have them spend 
theirs with us," the paper concluded. Harrison was not the only 
- - 
county to  found a livestock market in an effort to bolster her 
court day and economic niche. Jessamine County stockmen 
formed a County Stock Association in March 1869 with such a 
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purpose in mind, and by June 1870 the new market was 
flourishing, having drawn the largest crowd t o  Nicholasville in 
the town's history.17 
In areas of strong competition, scheduling of court days 
represented a vital element in preserving a strong county econo- 
my. The problem was especially acute in Harrison County, 
whose court day was on the same Monday as Fayette's, Grant's, 
and Nicholas's. Initially when the Cynthiana News suggested 
that the day be changed t o  another Monday to  avoid conflict, 
< '  many persons . . . hooted and shouted at the proposition," but 
ultimately the idea prevailed and the local representative ob- 
tained special legislation altering the meeting date. The News 
soon thereafter proudly reported that court day crowds were at 
an all-time high. Other counties adopted similar strategies. 
Woodford and Franklin changed their meeting days t o  avoid 
clashes with Scott and Fayette, but when Jessamine changed 
hers she began losing sales to Clark and Fayette counties.'' 
Although most of our emphasis has been upon Bluegrass 
counties and their neighbors because of the nature of the 
sources, court days constituted major events in most, if not all, 
of nineteenth-century Kentucky's counties. Whether or not 
court day was unique to  Kentucky as some claimed, it cannot 
be denied that thc meetings of the Commonwealth's most 
prosperous counties, such as Bourbon's, attracted visitors from 
all parts of the state. In most counties the allure of court day 
remained fairly constant throughout most of the period of the 
third constitution, with some variations in the size of the 
crowds over a year's time. Occasional flu epidemics, sporadic 
occurrences of the dreaded cholera, inclement weather, and the 
turmoil of the Civil War kept attendance down in certain 
counties, but usually people resumed their old habits when 
normalcy returned. Rare predictions that county court day was 
in danger of dying out proved ill founded as in Lincoln County 
where the local newspaper in December 1874 forecast its de- 
cline and demise but eleven years later reported record court 
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day crowds. Even during the war large numbers of residents 
appeared if some semblance of security prevailed.'g 
The advent of the automobile as the basic form of American 
transportation signaled the decline and fall of court day as a 
fundamental institution of Kentucky business and social life. 
Naturally this process developed more rapidly in some counties 
than in others. In the metropolitan centers of Louisville and 
Covington, court day began declining even before the introduc- 
tion of the automobile; in counties with sophisticated highway 
systems permitting easy access to county seats, the evolution 
began in the early twentieth century and was in full sway 
following World War I. By 1928 a columnist for the Courier- 
- 
Journal could report that "only in the more remote localities 
does county court day retain the semblance of its one-time 
prestige as an event in the community," although an historian 
of Fayette County wrote one year later that court day "was 
only recently abandoned in Lexington." Yet the tradition per- 
sisted in many mountain counties for at least a decade longer. 
In 1940 another columnist for the Courier-Journal described a 
rural county's court day in terms reminiscent of nineteenth-cen- 
tury portraits. A fat peddler used ventriloquism to  sell pocket 
knives; another in the guise of an Indian chief puffed the 
healing qualities of his liquid corn remover and finally persuad- 
ed an onlooking farmer to remove his shoes and socks for a free 
demonstration. Soon the chief sold dozens of bottles. On the 
other side of the courtyard, boys and men engaged in jumping 
and wrestling contests, and amid the competition a fistfight 
erupted. Nearby a blind pauper played the fiddle in return for 
loose change deposited in a tin cup. Annoyed by the noise, the 
spraying tobacco juice, and pushing crowds, wives urged their 
husbands into the courthouse to attend to their legal business or 
to the solitude of home. As late as 1950 Wolfe County court 
day survived, retaining its mule and horse swapping as well as 
peddling and politicking. Twenty years later only a few counties 
observed court day regularly, and then only once a year and 
without connection to  the meeting of the county court.20 
THE RAILROAD BINGE 
No subject more clearly demonstrates the ~arochialism of nine- 
teenth-century Kentucky and the unique position of her coun- 
ties than that of internal improvements during the period of the 
third state constitution. Before 1851 counties constituted only 
one of several principal sources of investment for turnpikes and 
other transportation ventures. After this date counties became 
the main impetus for such enterprises which by then included a 
far more exciting and expensive proposition-the railroad. Be- 
cause of the great risks involved, the private investor, at least in 
several early ventures, continued to be a secondary source of 
funds. (In early 1851, when Fayette countians proposed a 
$600,000 railroad subscription, only one private investor sub- 
scribed.) State government, which during the middle years of 
the second constitution had contributed nearly $5 million to 
internal improvements, bowed out almost entirely after 1851. 
Reflecting disenchantment over poor returns from state in- 
vestments in turnpike projects, the constitution framers of 1850 
required the legislature to secure popular approval of all indebt- 
edness over $500,000 and to liquidate debts within thirty years. 
The opposition of state lawmakers to  participation in transpor- 
tation ventures actually increased during the period of the third 
constitution. By 1870 most of the richer counties had invested 
heavily in their own pet schemes and wanted no part of state- 
wide endeavors. And in some of the most prosperous counties 
such as Fayette, railroad supporters from the outset favored 
county over state assistance because the latter would only 
benefit so-called pauper counties at the expense of self-sustain- 
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ing ones. Thus as time passed, there was an increasingly large 
bloc of legislative votes against state aid, despite frequent 
demands for assistance. So uninterested did legislators become 
in internal improvements that in 1871 they passed laws re- 
quiring the state to  sell its nearly $3 million worth of turnpike 
stock, although they repealed the statutes in the following 
year.' 
The nonexistence of state funds, the inadequacy of private 
funds, and the splendor of the iron horse stimulated the local 
units of the constitution to support railroad ventures with a 
devotion that outweighed any other expenditure. Although two 
railroads had been completed and two others authorized before 
the third constitution went into effect, railroading in Kentucky 
did not begin in earnest until the 1850s. At the beginning of the 
decade there was less than 100 miles of track; by 1890 over 
2,500 miles existed. Midway in the period, it was estimated that 
counties, cities, and towns had an outstanding railroad debt of 
nearly $14 m i l l i ~ n . ~  
But impressive as these figures are, progress was not made 
without much frustration and failure, litigation and confronta- 
tion. Early in the era, opponents sought court injunctions and 
judgments prohibiting public assistance to railroads and other 
. - 
internal improvements on the grounds that such aid was uncon- 
stitutional. The most famous and influential of these cases 
involved efforts of Mason County citizens to prevent county 
contributions to the Maysville & Lexington Railroad. In Feb- 
ruary 1851, pursuant to  legislation and county court author- 
ization, Mason County voters endorsed a $150,000 subscription 
to  the railroad stock. Shortly thereafter Jacob Slack and 150 
other citizens owning property of more than one-tenth of the 
entire taxable property of the county sought to prevent the 
subscription by a court ruling that county tax support of 
railroads was unconstitutional. The litigation worked its way to 
the Court of Appeals, which ruled early in 1852 that the 
taxation was valid. While basing its decision principally upon 
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the Constitution of 1799, the tribunal implied that the new 
frame of government likewise allowed such expenditures and no 
subsequent case ever reversed this precedent.3 
Undaunted by legal attacks, railroad promoters created 
during the period of the third state constitution an almost 
carnival atmosphere. Meetings and conventions, often called by 
officers and directors of railroad companies, enticed local citi- 
zens to learn the fantastic benefits of the new revolutionary 
form of transportation. Newspaper editorials and advertise- 
ments extolled its virtues. Court day orators echoed the calls for 
a network of tracks to join the state's principal communities 
with one another. Sometimes conclaves endorsed county sub- 
scriptions to  specific railroads; other times, they simply advo- 
cated aid to railroads as a general proposition. But never did 
oratory or railroad meetings legally bind counties to subscrip- 
tions; they simply promoted. Binding subscriptions (if subscrip- 
tions were ever binding) emanated from a more complex pro- 
~ e d u r e . ~  
Not even the most zealous of railroad promoters suggested 
that counties could subscribe to  railroad stocks without specific 
legislative approval. As with almost all its other "extraordinary" 
business, county courts inevitably secured specific legislative 
authorization before investing in railroads. Normally such stat- 
utes required county courts to  secure voter approval before 
subscriptions could be made. Sometimes railroads themselves 
were permitted to petition county courts to hold elections, and 
not infrequently courts were then required to  hold such elec- 
tions, although sometimes they were given a right of refusal. 
Statutes also varied on the question of who was to  endorse a 
proposed subscription. Some acts specified a majority of votes 
cast, while others called for a majority of qualified voters. 
Usually one did not have to  be a property holder or taxpayer to 
vote, although detractors of county railroad investment con- 
tended otherwise. If voters approved a subscription, the county 
court customarily bought the stock of the railroad, usually by 
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issuing its bonds to the company, which in turn sold the bonds 
to  investors. Occasionally only parts of counties voted on sub- 
scriptions, but this was a rarity.' 
The glamour of railroads, the vision of bonanza times, and 
the lack of central planning and control prompted some coun- 
ties and cities to combat one another over the location of 
prospective roads or t o  meddle in the subscription elections of 
neighbors. chief among these protagonists was Louisville, Ken- 
tucky's largest city and its most successful and important rail- 
road hub. ~ouisville sought not only to enhance her own 
position but also to  undercut that of her chief rival, Lexington. 
As early as 1851 Louisvillians were reportedly encouraging 
"disaffected persons" in Boyle County to oppose a possible 
route to Lexington and to  favor one to  Frankfort. Three years 
later critics accused the River City of harboring jealousies 
against the proposed Nashville & Cincinnati Railroad for fear 
that Lexington would become the southern focal point of a vast 
northern system of railroads. Shortly after the Civil War, agents 
of the Louisville & Nashville, the most successful railroad in 
Louisville and statewide, stalled legislative approval of the Cin- 
cinnati Southern, which threatened to enhance Fayette County 
at  its expense, and simultaneously worked to defeat Clark 
County's proposed subscription to t h e  Elizabcthtown, Lexing- 
ton & Big Sandy Railroad, another potential central Kentucky 
rival. Late in the period, the L & N continued its campaign of 
self-protection, actively opposing Woodford County's proposed 
subscription to the Versaillcs & Midway Railroad in 1885 and 
sending one of its agents with plenty of "boodle" to  scotch 
Mercer County's flirtation with the rival Louisville & Southern 
R a i l r ~ a d . ~  
Other cities, counties, and parts of counties engaged in simi- 
lar warfare. Lexington, while fighting Louisville on her western 
flank, reportedly undermined Bourbon County on her right by 
helping to secure defeat of its proposed subscription to the Paris 
& Maysvillc Railroad in 1870. Much of the other conflict 
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concerned prospective routes. In 1851 Danville opposed loca- 
tion of the Lexington & Danville through Harrodsburg because 
it would create the possibility of extending the road to Nash- 
ville and thus create a rivalry. In the same year, 
Franklin County sent a delegation to persuade Mercer County 
to build a railroad to Frankfort rather than Lexington, while in 
1872 Clark countians campaigned to  have the Frankfort, Paris 
& Big Sandy Railroad built through Mount Sterling rather than 
Owingsville. In 1869 a number of counties send their judges to 
Cincinnati to  lobby over the location of her planned railroad 
south, and in Fayette County certain property owners pledged 
money to the railroad to ensure location through Lexington. 
Residents of Fayette County's North Middleton Precinct were 
incensed when in 1851 backers of the Maysville & Lexington 
- 
Railroad, the most prominent of which was Fayette County 
itself, opted for a route through Paris instead of their own 
precinct. Rivalries also broke out between railroads over access 
to county investment funds. Conflict that began in 1851 be- 
tween the Lexington & Maysville Railroad and the Lexington & 
Covington Railroad over joint use of a Lexington terminal and 
track between Lexington and Paris eventually involved efforts 
by both to exclude the other from Fayette County funds. 
Compromise and insolvency eventually tempered the confronta- 
tion. Twenty years later the Lexington & Maysville Railroad 
and the Frankfort, Paris & Big Sandy Railroad unsuccessfully 
sought to  exclude each other from Bourbon County's sub- 
scription.' 
If counties and railroads fought among themselves over stock 
subscriptions, so did town and country. Usually urban areas 
favored, while rural areas generally opposed, public financing of 
railroad construction. Rare was the Lexingtonian who urged in 
November 1858 that his city government not invest in a local 
. - 
railroad project because it would benefit the county more than 
the city. City voters were remarkably enthusiastic about rail- 
roads considering that they were often taxed twice as residents 
of two separate local governments, city and county, each 
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making stock subscriptions. Sample votes in Fayette, Scott, and 
Bourbon counties indicate that city voters usually endorsed 
most railroad subscriptions by margins of from two to one to  
five to one, while county voters invariably opposed such 
schemes by ratios of from two to one to seven to one. The most 
sensational episode of city-county friction over railroad invest- 
ment occurred in Bourbon County following the Civil War. 
Emboldened by their county judge's intransigence, Bourbon 
County justices of the peace refused by a vote of eleven t o  three 
to submit to the voters a stock subscription proposition of the 
Frankfort, Paris & Big Sandy Railroad. Detractors of the county 
court were quick to  point out that the three justices who 
supported submission were all from Paris and represented more 
voters than the other eleven rural magistrates. After much 
- 
agitation, supporters of the railroad secured from the legislature 
an amendment to the railroad's charter requiring the county 
court to submit the question to  the voters. Although the urban 
vote narrowly carried the question, resentment was so great 
against the tactics of victory that the legislature required that a l l  
future Boubon County subscriptions have the separate endorse- 
ment of voters residing outside of the Paris city limits. Symbolic 
of the endless turmoil which surrounded most railroad ques- 
tions, Paris residents challenged the statute in the Court of 
Appeals, which upheld its validity. Toward the end of the 
period, separate voting also occurred in Fayette County- 
Lexington railroad subscription referenda.8 
Most county railroad subscription elections produced debate 
about the merits of public investment. Proponents of public aid 
were almost euphoric at times. "The locomotive . . . has become 
the universal bond of commerce and manufactures, and is the 
most powerful social, political, and moral agent the world has 
ever seen," claimed a correspondent to the Paris True Ken- 
tuckian, writing in support of the Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad. 
To the Frankfort Commonwealth the dawn of the railroad age 
presented to  Kentucky "a prospect of trade, wealth and general 
prosperity . . . such as it delights the heart to contemplate." 
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Fayette County newspapers predicted that their community 
would become the "focal point of railroads in Kentucky" 
complete with iron foundries and textile mills; its population 
would increase sevenfold within a short time. Railroad sup- 
porters in depressed eastern Kentucky argued that the new 
transportation would eradicate poverty and permit the exploita- 
tion of the area's rich timber and mineral supplies. "Build 
railroads through the counties of Kentucky and you will never 
hear of 'pauper counties' again," reported the Mt.  Sterling 
D e r n ~ c r a t . ~  
Other supporters emphasized more specific economic bene- 
fits such as cheaper fuel and transportation costs as well as an 
enlarged marketplace for agricultural products; and, at least 
early in the period, supporters envisioned railroad profits more 
than defraying interest costs. After the Civil War, faced with 
. - 
what many believed to be a monopoly, proponents foresaw 
proposed new lines offering needed competition and reduced 
rates." 
A strong strain of fatalism permeated much of the pro-rail- 
road debate. Supporters worried aloud about the consequences 
of not joining the railroad orgy. "We assume it as indispensable 
that we must adopt the railroads; for otherwise we must inevi- 
tably decline in prosperity and power, in a fruitless rivalry with 
enterprising neighbors on all sides of us, who are constructing 
them with an energy and comprehensiveness of policy challeng- 
ing the highest administration," lamented a pamphleteer in 
behalf of Mason County's proposed subscription to the Mays- 
ville & Lexington Railroad. Others reiterated this theme of 
keeping pace with the competition. The Lexington Kentucky  
Statesman declared in 1851 that Kentucky had lagged behind 
its railroad-building neighbors too long. The same paper seemed 
never to  be satisfied with the progress of Lexington and Fay- 
ette. In 1851 it predicted that Lexington would become "one 
of the first cities of the West," but in 1860 she had yet to "wake 
up from her Rip Van Winkle sleep." Matters had not improved 
by 1867 as Lexington was almost "a finished town."" 
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~nitially opponents of county financing of railroads based 
their reservations on gloomy glances into the future. In time, as 
some railroads burgeoned but many others collapsed, skeptics 
grounded their complaints on history. Early detractors forecast 
staggering taxes, ruinous competition with surrounding coun- 
ties, and incompetent railroad management. Post-Civil War 
critics decried the immunity of railroads from county taxation 
and pointed to the financial instability of most companies. 
Others denounced debt manipulation by railroad speculators, 
which allowed them to swallow up whole companies at the 
expense of the public investment and predicted like consc- 
quences for future endeavors. To some there were too many 
railroads already, and to others a few railroads were on the 
verge of monopolizing the nation's transportation. As the result 
of the relative success of a handful of companies, opponents of 
county subscription argued that private funds were adequate to 
finance future construction. For still others, economic condi- 
tions were never certain enough to  permit major commitments 
of funds.12 
Shortly after the Civil War, when the railroad binge revived, 
critics began revitalizing and expanding their objections to pub- 
lic financing which had been voiced by earlier detractors. It was 
wrong, they charged, for a majority to  compel a minority to  
invest through taxation in a private enterprise. Such submission 
struck "a fatal blow at the very foundation of social order and 
equitable government." As if monolithic, these majorities be- 
came "little better than individual despotisms." Enfranchise- 
ment of the freedmen, whose voting participation was inevi- 
tably characterized as pro-railroad in herdlike fashion, made 
public subscription even more obnoxious. Furthermore, vote- 
buying often tainted subscription referenda. Taxation should be 
. - 
restricted to public uses. ~f this was not valid constitutional 
doctrine then it should be made so by constitutional amend- 
ment. l 3  
For the most part, critics of railroads and their public financ- 
ing proved accurate in their forecasts of disaster. Few enter- 
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prises proved profitable. Many were never built, and those 
which were usually underwent at least one reorganization in 
bankruptcy. Regardless of the outcome, counties frequently 
lost their investment and were left with staggering debts. A few 
examples will illustrate the problem. 
In 1851 Fayette County and its neighbors attempted to 
launch four railroads, all of which either were not completed or 
resulted in financial failures for their original public investors. 
On March 26, 1851, after much debate for and against the 
proposition, Fayette County voted overwhelmingly to  subscribe 
$200,000 each to  the Lexington & Danville and t o  the Maysville 
& Lexington railroads. Shortly thereafter it subscribed another 
$200,000 to  the Covington & Lexington Railroad. Even though 
Jessamine and Boyle counties likewise endorsed subscriptions 
and the three public stockholders had paid in over $200,000, 
the Danville Railroad was on the verge of collapse in late 1854. 
Despite the initial lack of success, more funds were raised from 
the three counties and construction of the line began in earnest. 
Yet by mid-1858 the track had been laid only from Lexington 
to  Nicholasville with more funds needed for further construc- 
tion. Late that same year, the three counties refused t o  pur- 
chase the railroad at a foreclosure sale despite legislative autho- 
rization, and the company passed forever into the hands of 
private speculators. The line was not finally completed until 
after the period of the third c ~ n s t i t u t i o n . ' ~  
The Maysville and Covington lines suffered similar fates. Both 
were sold in foreclosure to  railroad speculator R. B. Bowler in 
1858 and 1859, thereby eliminating the interest of Fayette, 
Mason, and Bourbon counties, the principal shareholders. The 
investment in the Maysville road alone approached $1 million. 
Both roads became part of the Kentucky Central Railroad 
Company after the Civil War, the Maysville route having been 
completed only from Lexington to Paris. The skeleton of the 
original Lexington & Maysville company remained, and in 1869 
Bourbon County voted to  subscribe to  $200,000 in its stock to  
complete the line from Paris to  Maysville." 
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More drawn out but equally as frustrating were the relations 
of certain central Kentucky counties to the Lexington & Big 
Sandy Railroad (later known as the Elizabethtown, Lexington 
& Big Sandy Railroad Company). Designed to tie the Bluegrass 
and environs to  the rich mineral deposits of eastern Kentucky, 
the Big Sandy Railroad received by 1853 nearly $1  million in 
subscriptions from Fayette, Clark, Montgomery, Bath, Carter, 
and Greenup counties, and the city of Lexington. But despite 
this financial support and continuous prognostications of 
eternal riches once the line was built, only the link from 
Lexington to Mount Sterling was completed before the com- 
pany was sold in foreclosure shortly before the Civil War.16 
- .  
After several false starts, much~languishing, and at least one 
reorganization, the Big Sandy began soliciting county courts 
anew for another round of stock subscriptions in 1869. After 
much agitation and some initial rejection, voters in Fayette, 
Clark, and Montgomery counties approved new subscriptions, 
but those in the poorer eastern counties of Bath, Carter, and 
Rowan rejected such propositions. The optimism in central 
Kentucky which underlay the new subscriptions quickly dissi- 
pated when in 1873, as skeptics predicted, the Big Sandy was 
sold to  a group of New York speculators led by Collis P. Hunt- 
ington, president of the Chesapeake & Ohio. In the next six 
years, the three county subscribers sued to enjoin the sale and 
elected a rival slate of company directors pursuant to a special 
statute requiring that a majority of the company's directors be 
Kentucky residents and that only paid-up shareholders could vote 
(the New York speculators had allegedly paid in only 1 percent 
of their sale price). Seeking to  counteract the counties, the New 
York group sought unsuccessfully to buy up large blocs of 
county taxpayer tax certificates which entitled them to  shares 
of stock. The stalemate was not resolved until 1879 when 
Huntington persuaded the counties to  drop their litigation in 
return for his pledge to  complete the road to Huntington, West 
Virginia, within three years. Although the road was finished in 
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the autumn of 1881, it had failed to return any money to the 
county investors as of July 1890." 
The lure of eastern Kentucky also attracted Franklin, Scott, 
and Bourbon county promoters who sought local government 
investments in the Frankfort, Paris & Big Sandy Railroad, which 
would compete with the Elizabethtown, Lexington & Big Sandy 
and other proposed east-west ventures. Such requests produced 
sharp controversy in Bourbon County. Soon after obtaining 
their charter, organizers of the railroad petitioned the Bourbon 
County Court to place on the August 1871 ballot a $300,000 
stock subscription proposal. Seizing upon the fact that the 
charter allowed county courts the power to reject as well as 
accept railroad petitions, Bourbon County Court judge Richard 
Hawes refused to submit the proposition to the voters on the 
grounds that the proposed route would duplicate those already 
in existence or soon to  be in existence.'' 
Undaunted by Hawes's refusal, friends of the railroad organ- 
ized a committee to  rally support. On August 23 Scott coun- 
tians voted to subscribe, and a week later the Paris True Ken- 
tuckian added fuel to  the drive by endorsing the subscription. 
Buoyed by this fresh support, the railroad petitioned the coun- 
ty court anew in December, increasing the proposed subscrip- 
tion to $400,000. Hawes led opposition to the proposition 
before the court of claims, this time citing the influx of black 
voters in addition to  needless duplication of railroad lines. 
Blacks, who owned little property and paid few taxes, would 
support the proposition to  secure work, he argued. Apparently 
agreeing with Hawes, the Bourbon court voted against submit- 
ting the question to  voters.19 
Having exhausted its remedies before the county court, of- 
ficials of the railroad turned next to  the legislature, petitioning 
it to  alter the company's charter to  require the Bourbon justices 
to  place the subscription on the ballot. This latest ploy sparked 
a heated debate between proponents of the railroad and county 
court over the merits of the road and the proper place of the 
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tribunal within the state constitution. Defenders of the court 
denounced the railroad's attempt t o  thwart the decision of the 
duly constituted authority of Bourbon County. Supporters of 
the railroad in turn castigated the court for denying the right of 
the voters to  decide the subscription question for themselves. 
The people could not always be trusted t o  know what was best, 
countered court supporters, and besides, it was increasingly 
questionable whether a majority should ever be allowed to  
impose railroad taxation on a minority. Still others denied that 
the freedmen would overwhelmingly support the railroad and 
suggested the opposite might be true, while detractors of the 
project forecast a floating black laboring force foisting stock 
subscriptions off on counties across the entire nation.20 
In early April 1872 the General Assembly ended one phase of 
the argument by amending the company's charter t o  require 
that the court submit the question to  voters on April 27. 
Debate now shifted essentially to  the merits of the subscription. 
On the appointed day, voters endorsed the proposed subscrip- 
tion 1,672 to  1,384, and at its June term the county court 
voted to  subscribe to  the company's stock. But the failure of 
the railroad to obtain sufficient subscriptions from other 
sources prevented it from beginning construction, allowing the 
Bourbon County Court t o  cancel its subscription without ever 
having advanced a cent, and concluding a controversy that was 
far from settled by the close vote in April.*' 
Hardened by earlier financial disasters and faced with even 
greater numbers of proposed subscriptions, county voters 
tended t o  be more cautious concerning railroad ventures follow- 
ing the Civil War. County judges and justices of the peace too 
were more chary, sometimes demanding that railroads complete 
lines through their counties before issuing bonds and more 
frequently demanding that legislatures give them the right to  
refuse to  submit propositions to  voters and then exercising that 
right. County officials such as Judge Logan Cockerel1 of s still 
County personally took to  the stump on occasion to oppose 
railroad subscriptions. Certain groups of citizens sometimes 
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refused to abide by votes endorsing subscriptions. A mob in 
Washington County, for example, attacked a construction crew 
of the Cumberland & Ohio Railroad Company, burning tools 
and wagons, even though the voters had endorsed a subscription 
to  the road by a margin of four t o  one. By 1881 many agreed 
with the Mt.  Sterling Sentinel's declaration that taxpayers 
would n o  longer tolerate public financing of private transporta- 
tion schemes.22 
Opponents of public investment in railroads found many 
allies in their quest to  repudiate bond issues which resulted 
from fraud and which financed failures. Naturally most county 
courts sought to  avoid liability on bonds issued to  pay for 
railroads which were never started or if started, never com- 
pleted. Bondholders just as often contested repudiation in state 
and federal courts, and in almost every case judges held that the 
counties remained liable for their debts even though they were 
products of misrepresentation and failure of consideration. 
Some disputes reached the United States Supreme Court which 
likewise upheld the liability of counties. Despite these judicial 
pronouncements, county resistance to  payment continued; 
county courts, responding to  writs of mandamus, levied special 
taxes to  pay judgments on defaulted bonds and appointed tax 
collectors. Tax collectors either refused to  accept the job or 
could not collect taxes from angry taxpayers, whereupon 
chagrined bondholders petitioned federal or state courts to 
appoint special tax collectors; but the Supreme Court ruled that 
such relief was beyond the powers of the judiciary. Possessed 
with judgments that were unenforceable, bondholders either 
lost their investments entirely or were forced to  accept com- 
promise settlements authorized by special legislation. 
Muhlenberg County's railroad experience illustrates many of 
the frustrations of bonded indebtedness. In 1868 the county 
subscribed to  $400,000 of the stock of the Elizabethtown & 
Paducah Railroad Company and issued bonds in that amount to  
pay for the stock. In the midst of the depression of 1873 the 
railroad went bankrupt, and in the process of reorganization the 
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county's stock interest was wiped out. Since the railroad had 
never actually delivered the stock certificates to  the county and 
since only part of the track had been laid, residents of Muhlen- 
berg County believed that they had been the victims of a 
swindle. In 1874 outraged citizens organized the Independent 
Order of Taxpayers and elected a county judge committed to 
repudiation. In the same year the county court stopped paying 
interest on the bonds, thereby setting off a twenty-f i~e-~ear  
fight between the county and  bondholder^.'^ 
In March 1878 the Muhlenberg County Court secured special 
legislation from the General Assembly authorizing the election 
of a funding board empowered to compromise the railroad 
debt. The board met almost monthly between June 1878 and 
December 1880, but accomplished little in the way of compro- 
mise. What few bonds it did issue in settlement of outstanding 
indebtedness were themselves repudiated. By August 1882 the 
board had fallen into such disrepute that the voters refused to  
participate in the election of new members, and the county 
court had to appoint replacements. Confronted with an ineffec- 
tive funding board and a defiant county court, bondholders 
commenced suing in state and federal circuit courts to compel 
payment on the bonds. Between 1888 and 1896 aggrieved 
bondholders obtained at least $159,000 in judgments against 
the county, which was ordered by the courts to  levy and collect 
taxes at a rate amounting to  at least $11.55 per $100 of 
valuation. The county complied with court orders, levying spe- 
cial taxes to satisfy judgments and appointing tax collectors. 
But tax collectors refused to qualify or failed to  collect, and the 
courts refused to  appoint their own collectors on the grounds 
that tax collecting was exclusively a local function. One bond- 
holder would not be stymied by the judicial impasse and hired a 
private army to enforce his judgment, but other plaintiffs went 
unsatisfied. Taxpayers succeeded in evading most special taxes, 
but suffered a deepening recession as settlers, entrepreneurs, 
and potential consumers avoided a county whose indebtedness 
by 1890 encompassed half of the assessed valuation of its 
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property. Finally in 1898 Muhlenberg countians elected a coun- 
ty judge committed to  settlement of the debt. Shortly there- 
after, he secured a compromise of the outstanding bonds at  
twenty cents on the dollar, payable over a twenty-year period. 
By 1906 the county was paying off its new bonds in a timely 
fashion and residents were enjoying newfound prosperity.24 
Other counties suffered through experiences similar t o  Muh- 
lenberg's. The defunct Cumberland & Ohio Railroad brought 
grief to  several counties, including Marion. In 1873 residents 
organized into vigilante groups and forced the sheriff-elect to 
promise not to collect the railroad tax, a pledge that went 
unfulfilled as the county court somehow managed to  collect 
taxes to  pay off the railroad over the next twenty years. Green 
countians resisted more fiercely and effectively. Irate taxpayers 
plunged the county into "a frightful state of disorder and 
anarchy," burning down the barn of the railroad tax collector 
and threatening to  d o  the same t o  the house of his surety if he 
did not stop collecting taxes. Neighboring Taylor County, refus- 
ing to be taxed for payment of its railroad debt, offered its 
worthless stock in settlement of its obligations. Allen County 
justices escaped imprisonment for contempt o f  court when the 
Supreme Court ruled that the judiciary had n o  authority to  
appoint a receiver of county taxes which no countian would 
collect. Although some suggested that the state assume the 
counties' indebtedness, the General Assembly rejected such 
attempts. Most counties had compromised their indebtedness 
by 1900, although a few entered the twentieth century persist- 
ing in their devotion to  r e p ~ d i a t i o n . ~ ~  
A safe investment did not  immunize counties from disputes 
with railroad companies over shareholder rights, taxation, and 
rights of  way. Shareholder conflicts often involved complexities 
such as whether Hardin County was entitled to  stock dividends 
in an amount equal to  interest due on the county's total 
investment in the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company or 
whether the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company could sell an 
additional $500,000 without permission from its shareholders 
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including McCracken County. In contrast, county court suits 
against railroad companies for damage to  highways usually 
presented rather simple questions: for example, in 1889 Green- 
up County secured a decree in equity compelling the Maysville 
& Big Sandy Railroad to  restore a public highway to  its former 
condition, its having been altered by the company's construc- 
tion crew. Other taxation disputes concerning livelier questions 
sometimes excited citizens as well as county officials. Particu- 
larly galling t o  many was the Court of Appeals ruling in 1868, 
settling a question which had been seething for over a decade, 
that railroads were liable for only state and not county taxa- 
tion. Public outrage over this decision, and the deteriorating 
condition of its investments in railroads generally, prompted the 
General Assembly to  overrule this decision implicitly by statute 
in 1876, a fact confirmed by the Court of Appeals eleven years 
later. Such legislation did not deter railroads from continuing to  
resist county taxation wherever possible and from seeking statu- 
tory exemption from the taxation of particular c o ~ n t i e s . ' ~  
Amid the clamor for the railroad, internal improvement sup- 
porters did not reduce their enthusiasm for sophisticated sys- 
tems of turnpikes. At the very least, macadamized roads were 
necessary to  convert individual counties into commercial inte- 
grals and t o  keep them competitive with their neighbors. "The 
old system of dirt roads [was] one of the most expensive and 
most worthless nuisances extant." A few zealots even claimed 
that collective county wealth would as much as quadruple if 
county courts adopted ambitious turnpike programs. As a re- 
sult, investments in turnpike companies did not diminish during 
the period of the third constitution, although new sources of 
funds developed. As in the case of capital for railroad construc- 
tion, the counties furnished a major portion of funds for 
turnpikes.*" 
A general recognition of the need for good county roads did 
not signify automatic approval of turnpike taxes. For even in 
the most prosperous counties, voters and county courts some- 
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times opposed propositions proclaimed as indispensable. De- 
spite long-standing support from the Cynthiana News, in one 
case the voters of Harrison County resisted an ambitious pro- 
gram of tax support for turnpikes until November 1868 and 
supported it then by only a narrow margin. Many counties 
simply could not afford good roads, and often their geography 
made the construction of even simple paths difficult. As late as 
1886 the Frankfort Daily Capital estimated that only half of 
Kentucky's 119 counties had any turnpikes or gravel roads and 
that thirty of these had fewer than twenty-five miles of such 
roads.28 
Perhaps Harrison County's difficulties in enlisting voter sup- 
port of turnpike projects, as well as those of other local govern- 
ments, prompted the legislature in 1869 to enact a statute 
permitting county courts to  subscribe as much as $1,000 per 
mile for the stock of turnpike companies without voter approv- 
- - 
al. But even a liberal use of this provision did not prove wholly 
satisfactory. In Franklin County, for example, although the 
court of claims promised to  contribute to the building of nearly 
eighteen miles of new roads per year, the Frankfort Common- 
wealth argued that this would be insufficient to  keep Franklin 
competitive with surrounding counties. Only a very detailed 
defense of the county's road plan pointing out the already 
heavy tax burden and the necessity for careful rather than hasty 
engineering quelled the journalistic complaints.29 
More chagrined were the inhabitants of Benson Valley in the 
- 
same central Kentucky county, whose existing road was washed 
out most of the year and who had long complained about the 
discriminatory county turnpike policy which had left them as 
the lone district without a macadamized route to  Frankfort. 
The 1869 statute was of no benefit to  them as the county court 
shortly thereafter determined not to  contribute to turnpike 
projects not managed by private companies. Valley citizens 
brought on most of their problems themselves, long delaying 
the organization of a private company and then refusing to  fund 
it adequately so that it might be eligible for county investment. 
118 LITTLE KINGDOMS 
When at  last the company obtained sufficient capital, it began 
squabbling with the county court over the proper route of  the 
proposed turnpike. Even as work began in 1879 on the Pea 
Ridge route, dissidents in the valley submitted that the Buzzard 
Roost route was preferable.30 
Although counties frequently made the largest investments in 
turnpike companies, management of these concerns remained 
largely out of their hands. Whatever leverage county courts had 
as principal stockholders was sometimes lost when companies, 
often poorly operated, were sold in satisfaction of  mortgages. 
Reformers called for county courts to  exercise more control 
over turnpike companies, but  most turnpike legislation simply 
addressed itself t o  the protection of county investments. By the 
end of Reconstruction, many travelers complained that turn- 
pike companies specialized in high tolls and poor service. Regu- 
lation was needed, they claimed, to  force companies t o  repair 
roads and lower tolls. When county courts and taxpayer groups 
did become agitated about turnpike companies, it was usually 
over liabilities for stock subscriptions and taxation, not about 
the quality of  management. Occasionally the legislature would 
transfer all or  part of  the operation of companies over to  
county courts, but  this was ordinarily done because roads had 
not been completed or because the companies had become 
insolvent, and seldom, if ever, because they failed to maintain 
their systems or because they charged excessive  rate^.^' 
The absence of effective public control over privately oper- 
ated turnpikes, for many the most important form of transpor- 
tation available, produced increasingly loud cries for county 
courts t o  purchase the road companies and operate the systems 
toll-free. One of the earliest and, after a prolonged struggle, 
most successful movements for free turnpikes began in Fayette 
County following the Civil War. In October 1867 the Kentucky 
Gazette editorialized that the county court could purchase 
outstanding turnpike stock for twenty cents on the dollar and 
thereby eliminate the "female dragon" tollkeepers and the 
"deadhead" freeloaders who passed through the tollgates free of 
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charge. Four years later, the Gazette's recommendation seemed 
to  gain wider recognition when the legislature authorized the 
state to  sell its large turnpike holdings to  the counties and 
several papers advocated statewide conversion t o  free turnpikes. 
Despite complaints, especially from Fayette County, that high 
tolls rendered urban centers into medieval cities walled off from 
the rural population and impeded travel in general, the free 
turnpike movement languished. The legislature repealed its stat- 
ute authorizing sale o f  its turnpike stock and for a time county 
critics muffled their complaints.32 
Fayette countians renewed their demands for toll-free roads 
in 1878 and persisted until voters approved conversion in 1890. 
While admitting Fayette's roads were generally "magnificent," a 
correspondent to  the Lexington Weekly Press submitted that 
because of excessive tolls, farmers could afford t o  come t o  
Lexington only on Saturdays and court day, and the newspaper 
itself agreed, labeling the Cornmonwcalth's towns "quarantined 
areas." Dr. R.  J. O'Mahoney, after intensive study,  persuaded 
the Lexington Chamber of Commerce t o  advocate conversion 
and it,  in turn, convinced the Fayette County Court t o  deter- 
mine the feasibility of such a plan. Although critics of  free 
turnpikes denounced the plan as impractical, too  costly, and a 
violation of President Grover Cleveland's antipaternalism, pro- 
ponents finally secured legislative permission to  vote on the 
plan in August 1890. Fayette countians endorsed free turnpikes 
overwhelmingly, and the capital o f  the Bluegrass became one of 
the first to  abolish tollroads. As the period of the modern 
constitution burgeoned in the 1890s, surrounding counties, 
including Scott, Bourbon, and Harrison, debated the ques- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  
In most counties variations of the original road law of Ken- 
tucky, inherited from colonial Virginia and England, prevailed 
throughout the period o f  the third constitution. Basically it 
provided that the county courts should divide the counties into 
districts and appoint a surveyor for each, with powers t o  com- 
pel all male residents between the ages of sixteen and fifty to  
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work as many days as necessary to maintain the roads of the 
district. The statute specifically exempted ministers of the gos- 
pel from service and the courts could excuse the infirm. Al- 
though the legislature sometimes attempted sweeping reforms 
and often changed the laws of individual counties, the old 
system remained so much intact by 1890 that a delegate to  the 
constitutional convention of that year could proclaim that 
Kentucky was one of only two or three states still retaining the 
forced labor system of road m a i n t e n a n ~ e . ~ ~  
Few openly defended the forced labor system. One who did 
was L. W. Lassing, delegate to the convention of 1890, who 
found the practice of forcing people to  work on the roads an 
excellent way to extract contributions to government from 
people who otherwise would make none. Even poor people, he 
argued, used roads and should pay in some way for this usage. If 
Lassing was not bothered by the fact that in most counties (all 
after 1880) wealthier citizens could escape road work by paying 
a certain sum, others were, especially since the wealthy often 
owned lands whose value was enhanced by the work of the 
poor. Some went so far as to brand the practice as a "species of 
monarchial oppression" and a "most odious and unequal poll 
tax," while others saw it as a "sort of slavery in a land that 
boasts of its liberty." Most people simply regarded the system 
as "an utter failure."35 
Critics described the typical road surveyor as dedicated above 
all to the evasion of his official duties. Although they allegedly 
possessed more power over their road hands than the governor, 
few bothered to do more work on their roads than it took to 
avoid g a n d  jury indictment. Correspondents to newspapers 
often reported their travels over county roads filled with holes 
or almost completely washed out and often connected by 
unsafe bridges. The Court of Appeals once took notice that the 
"overseer of Gill Road [in Gallatin County] had failed for 
several years to have the same kept in good repair." But survey- 
ors were not the only deficiencies in the system. Road hands 
were increasingly scarce either because they were exempted 
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or because they fled to  avoid service of work notices from the 
local road surveyor. And grand juries seldom indicted delin- 
quent surveyors.36 
The movement to  reform the road law which began in the 
antebellum period gained momentum as the nineteenth-century 
matured, but never fully succeeded. As before, certain counties 
in the period of the third constitution gained legislative permis- 
sion to poll their citizens on the question of adopting new 
systems, but these were often defeated; and the systems that 
were adopted were often incomplete. Some reform plans simply 
reduced the number of days of  forced labor and provided for a 
payment of  a tax in lieu of service. Others were more elaborate, 
calling for the appointment of  a salaried road commissioner 
who would hire workers from funds provided by a special road 
tax ad valorem or  poll or  both. A correspondent from Union 
County in 1890 boasted that his county's reformed road law 
had produced an excellent system of roads for over twenty 
years even though none of them was macadamized. But such 
- 
programs were not widespread; and while complaints about 
poor road maintenance reached a crescendo by the constitu- 
tional convention of  1890, that assembly decisively defeated 
two attempts to abolish the forced labor system.37 
Counties had difficulty maintaining their buildings as well as 
their roads. The county judge and the justices of the peace as 
members of the court of-claims were custodians of the county 
buildings, the most important of which were the courthouse 
and the jail. As such, they were charged with maintenance of 
these structures and the !general upkeep of  the public square, 
although the specific responsibility for day-to-day duties usually 
fell t o  the jailer and his deputies. The dilapidated condition of 
many of the county courthouses and jails of  Kentucky created 
pressures upon the county governors to  upgrade them by exten- 
sive repairs or entirely new construction. Their occasional re- 
fusals to  d o  so sometimes nearly led them to  incarceration in 
the very jails for which they were responsiblc. 
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Especially troublesome to  the county courts were those jails. 
While critics often cited the deplorable conditions of many 
county jails, labeling them unsanitary and overcrowded, judges 
and justices were frequently reluctant to  increase taxes to  build 
new structures, or even t o  repair existing buildings. For their 
recalcitrance they were sometimes indicted by grand juries and 
even threatened with imprisonment for contempt of court. Yet, 
as in the case of Franklin County magistrates who were indicted 
nearly in every year between 1875 and 1886 for failing to  build 
a new jail, almost n o  good was accomplished by these extreme 
measures. A postwar movement in some counties to supplement 
jails with workhouses as more satisfactory abodes in which to 
rehabilitate criminals only complicated the financial pressures 
upon the county governors.38 
Observers often charged that courthouses were little better 
- 
than the jails. The newspapers of Lexington variously described 
the Fayette County courthouse as the "Black Hole of Cal- 
cutta," "that hideous monster," "a miserable structure," and "a 
nuisance and a disgrace to  the city and the county." The editor 
of the Kentucky Gazette went so far as to  engage in an argu- 
ment with the county judge about whether the steeple and 
weathercock of the ancient building were crooked. This agita- 
tion finally paid off in 1882 when the Fayette countians voted 
to  build a new courthouse, which was completed in 1885. 
Occasionally criticism of  county court custodianship extended 
to  its supervision of  the entire public square, as in Laurel 
County where the newspaper alleged that the conditions therein 
had "much to  d o  with the spread of  fever in the county seat." 
Similar problems occurred in many other counties, including 
Barren, Daviess, Whitley, Leslie, Trimble, Fulton, and Jack- 
son.3g 
For all their unprofitability and periodic failures, county 
turnpike and railroad investments did produce some macad- 
amized roads and railroad lines. The one major county-oriented 
river improvement project produced nothing but  litigation and 
insolvency. Chartered shortly after the Civil War, the Kentucky 
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River Navigation Company mostly sought funds from counties 
bordering on the river of  its name, the most important water- 
way of north-central Kentucky. The improvement of the river 
would supposedly assist in the exploitation of central Ken- 
tucky's great wealth, including large supplies of  lead ore. De- 
spite the optimism and puffing of its founders, the company 
obtained fewer county stock subscriptions than anticipated and 
suffered a crippling blow when the Court of Appeals ruled in 
the summer of 1871 that purported subscriptions of the Mcrccr 
and Garrard county courts in the amount of $1 75.000 had only 
been nonbinding proposals t o  subscribe. 'Tllcrcattcr otlier coun- 
ty courts refused t o  turn over taxes collected t o  pay for binding 
stock subscriptions and the company soon went into insol- 
vency. While county courts worried about what to  d o  with the 
unexpended taxes, creditors of the company unsuccessfully 
attempted to  attach 
Frustrations produced by massive county railroad indebted- 
ness helped push the Commonwealth t o  constitutional revision 
in 1890-1891. The revisers considered county debt limitation a 
principal object of  their endeavors. After considerable debate, 
the delegates approved a series o f  restrictions on the ability of 
counties and cities to  borrow money for internal improvements. 
Counties could not impose taxes a t  a rate exceeding fifty cents 
on the hundred dollars unless "it should be necessary . . . for 
the extinction of indebtedness contracted before the adoption 
of this Constitution." No county could become indebted "to an 
amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided 
for such year without the assent of  two-thirds of the voters 
thereof." No county could incur indebtedness in excess of 2 
percent of the amount of its assessed taxable property unless to  
liquidate an existing debt. With these provisions the framers of 
Kentucky's fourth constitution hoped to  avoid a recurrence of 
the internal i~nprovenlctits binge which plunged many of their 
local governments into conditions of virtual bankruptcy during 
the pcriod of the third c o n s t i t ~ ~ t i o n . ~ '  
8. 
FISCAL CHAOS 
Along with most Americans, nineteenth-century Kentuckians 
paid the bulk o f  their taxes to  state and local governments. The 
county was the principal agent of assessment and collection 
while locally the court of claims set the county levy. The 
county assessor established property valuations for ad valorem 
taxes, both county and state. Primarily the sheriff collected 
taxes, although special collectors were sometimes appointed. 
Yet what was on  paper a logical system was often in practice 
chaotic. 
Although the framers of  the third constitution provided for 
two associate judges to assist the county judge in fiscal matters, 
the legislature of  1850-1851 exercised the option of abolishing 
the associates and affiliating the justices of the peace with the 
county judge to  form the court of claims. Its statutory duties 
were to  lay the county levy, make all appropriations individ- 
ually of $50 or  over or collectively of  $100 or over, transact the 
"other financial business of  the county," and "erect and . . . 
keep a sufficient county jail." This system of  county appropria- 
tions also left much to  be desired.' 
As with modern practice, the nineteenth-century tax assess- 
ment was essentially a self-regulated process. The county asses- 
sor distributed tax lists t o  taxpayers, who filled them out and 
returned them t o  the assessor after swearing to  their accuracy. 
A county board of supervisors at first consisting of the county 
judge and county court clerk and eventually of one discrete 
taxpayer from each voting precinct, appointed by the county 
court, annually audited the assessor's tax book, noting delin- 
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quencies and correcting misvaluations. Valuations were used as 
the basis of assessing state taxes, which were entirely ad valorem 
on realty and selected personalty, and of special county taxes 
increasingly used to supplement the traditional poll tax. The 
assessor also distributed and received lists of tithables for the 
poll tax.' 
The basic county tax continued to be the poll tax. At the 
beginning of the period its maximum was $1.50 per tithe, but 
this amount was eventually raised to  $3.00, although the legis- 
lature not infrequently authorized some counties to  exceed 
these limits. In other cases, counties authorized to  impose ad 
valorem taxation had to  contend with a lower maximum. Be- 
fore emancipation all white male persons over the age of twen- 
ty-one and all slaves over the age of sixteen were liable for the 
tax, while after the Civil War the liability simply rested on all 
male persons over the age of twenty-one. Courts of claims were 
permitted to issue excuses from liability to  persons "on account 
of age, infirmity, or other charitable  reason^."^ 
Politicians continued to  debate the merits of the poll tax, its 
critics labeling it "oppressive" and a "relic o f .  . . a barbarous 
age." They argued that the tax was hardest on common laborers 
who were usually paid no more than fifty cents a day. A former 
county judge noted that he had "had the poor of-my county 
coming to  me . . . time and time again, and begging me to  spare 
them the humiliation and degradation of being returned delin- 
quent, regarding it second only t o  the brand of infamy placed 
upon the felon for some crime." Others cited Richard T. Ely's 
observation that "poll-taxes are unworthy of a civilized nation 
in the nineteenth century" and pointed out that most northern 
states had abolished them. Those few who public!y defended 
the exaction argued that the tax was necessary to  fund poor 
relief which enabled those who could not afford the tax to  
receive much more because of it. As in the case of the road tax, 
the poll tax forced the propertyless to  contribute something to  
their government.4 
Some of the poor may have complained about the tax, but 
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most apparently did not pay it; delinquency rates in many 
counties were high. In Pulaski County, for example, observers 
estimated that of 5,100 tithables, 1,100 were annually returned 
as delinquent, while in Washington County a local official re- 
ported that of approximately 3,500 tithables, 700 were delin- 
quent. Many tithables secured relief under a provision which 
permitted the court of claims to excuse the aged and infirm. In 
one unidentified "mountain county," a courtroom visitor re- 
ported that "the entire time of the court during the first day of 
its session was taken up in relieving persons from the poll-tax," 
while in Laurel County the local newspaper lambasted the court 
of claims for exempting all old men regardless of wealth. But 
despite the constant objections, efforts to  abolish the tax both 
during the period of the third constitution and the constitution- 
al convention of 1890-1891 failed.' 
As expenses such as railroad and turnpike subscriptions and 
building repair and construction became more ordinary, legisla- 
tively authorized county ad valorem taxation became fairly 
commonplace. While thk legislature limited most county ad 
valorem taxation to a period of years, it did permit some that 
were open-ended, such as that for Bracken County, which 
authorized the county court to  levy its tax "from year to year 
until the whole debt due by the county is fully liquidated." Nor 
did the legislature always establish a maximum tax rate. Legisla- 
tion was passed in 1868 allowing county courts to  levy an ad 
valorem tax "as may be required" to  pay claims, indebtedness, 
and complete or repair public bui ldinp6 
Opposition to  county enforcement of local and state taxation 
ranged from the chronic complaints which invariably accom- 
pany taxation to  profound outrage from officials and taxpayers 
alike over gross inequities, inconsistencies, and inadequacies. 
Tax increases were almost certain to  produce some outcry. The 
situation in Fulton County in southwestern Kentucky was typi- 
cal. Critics charged in 1877 that the county court had doubled 
the poll tax from $1.50 t o  $3.00 in order to  build a bridge for 
an isolated part of the county with only six inhabitants; the 
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court of claims denied wrongdoing, asserting that the high rate 
was due solely to an underestimation of delinquencies. Similar- 
ly, a Whitley County resident demanded a full accounting of his 
county's finances after his county court had doubled the poll 
tax in the spring of 1876, and Robertson County citizens 
petitioned the General Assembly for a refund of all county 
levies paid for the year 1867. Similar complaints emerged from 
Harrison and Laurel counties, where people decried steadily 
increasing taxation with no relief from indebtedness. In the 
latter community, taxation became a partisan issue with Repub- 
licans accusing Democrats of raising taxes by almost 100 per- 
cent during their f ~ u r - ~ e a r  dministration, and the Republican 
candidate for county judge promising to resign if he failed to 
lower taxes in the event he won ~ f f i c e . ~  
Complaints about deficiencies in tax assessment and collec- 
tion were more justified. For years the legislature and state 
officials groped for a solution to what amounted to widespread 
tax evasion by substantial numbers of would-be taxpayers. The 
representation that "many persons in this Commonwealth have 
for several years failed to list their property either with the 
assessor for their counties or with the county court" prompted 
the General ~ s s e m b l y  in 1862 to require that the state auditor 
appoint sixteen revenue agents to look into the problem of tax 
collection in general. While this legislation apparently helped 
remedy the problem of tax collection, the attendant problems 
of evasion and underevaluation did not abate. In 1873 Governor 
P. H. Leslie complained that thousands of taxpayers concealed 
taxable property while assessors practiced gross inconsistencies 
in their evaluations. A decade later, Governor J .  Proctor Knott 
reported that while sheriffs were collecting taxes with unprece- 
dented success, assessments remained inconsistent and under- 
valued. Knott asserted that urban property was never assessed 
more than 60 percent of true value, while rural property seldom 
reached 40 percent. Inconsistencies in evaluations prevailed 
between classes of taxpayers and localities with wealthier citi- 
. . 
zens and regions the most seriously underassessed. With deri- 
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sion, the governor noted that Boyd County horses were assessed 
at  a greater value than those in Bourbon County, although the 
latter were of  much higher quality. Knott's complaints prompt- 
ed the legislature to establish a state board of  equalization, 
which in turn produced more equality but not higher assess- 
ments. Two years later, Governor Knott alleged that even 
though Indiana had fewer acres of taxable realty, its assessed 
value was twice that of Kentucky's.' 
County officials so defectively executed the tax laws that in 
the late 1870s taxpayer revolts broke out  in many counties, 
including Kenton, Campbell, Bracken, Owen, Grant, Harrison, 
and Pendleton, and in the Commonwealth generally taxpayer 
unrest was reported to  be widespread. Of these the Pendleton 
County affair is most completely documented and revealing9 
Pendleton County's taxpayer revolt was embodied in a com- 
mittee of safety appointed by a mass meeting of  citizens in 
early 1877. Shortly after its creation and pursuant t o  instruc- 
tions from the "mass of  citizens," the committee laid before the 
Pendleton court o f  claims "some of the grievances of which our 
people complain." Submitting that there were four sets of tax 
collectors "at work in our midst," the committee charged that 
heavy taxation was burdening "the productive portion of  our 
population" and "retarding the development of  the resources of 
our county." In some cases, the committee further noted, in 
order to  satisfy delinquencies the tax-gatherers had taken from 
poor families their last horse or cow "or the very bed upon 
which they sleep." Arguing that the "distress" was so common 
that it was undoubtedly well known to  the magistrates, the 
committee explained that Pendletonians had heretofore borne 
the hardship in the belief that it was necessary t o  liquidate a 
large county debt. The absence of  visible public improvements 
and the failure of  the county court to issue annual financial 
statements prompted them to  abandon their patient stance and 
issue a series of  demands." 
The committee requested that the court suspend the extra- 
ordinary levy made at  the November 1876 term of a four-dollar 
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poll tax and a relatively high ad valorem tax until the magis- 
trates had audited and published the county's financial ac- 
counts. It urged the justices to  obtain delinquent taxes and 
other receivables from the county officers and ex-officers who 
should have collected them and to  shorten the period in which 
such officials had to  settle their accounts. I t  asserted that 
ex-sheriffs and other tax collectors were given too much time in 
- 
which t o  complete their unfinished business and that the latter 
should be turned over t o  their successors. Finally, it submitted 
that much property in the county was unassessed and de- 
manded that it be assessed." 
Although tabling the committee's address, the county court 
of claims did respond to it in part by appointing a special 
committee to  study the problem of  delinquent taxes. When the 
special committee reported that over $25,000 was owed the 
county in delinquent taxes over a fourteen-year period, the 
court of claims elected James T. Clark back tax collector. 
Meanwhile the Falmouth Independent advocated the appoint- 
ment of a county auditor "to keep the finances of  the county in 
an intelligent and correct shape," and the committee of  safety 
urged those taxpayers listed as delinquent, but who in fact had 
paid their taxes, to seek assistance from the committee and 
accused the sheriffalty of  a faulty tax receipt system. The 
committee also charged its county tax officialdom of  conspiring 
to  wrest valuable land from innocent owners by forced tax sales 
after deliberately failing to collect taxes.'' 
In March 1877 the Pendleton County grand jury commenced 
investigating allegations of  corrupt and incompetent county tax 
policies and practices. Its decision to  issue no indictments and 
pass the inquiry back to  the county court produced an accusa- 
tion from the Covington County Ticket that the criminal court 
judge and commonwealth's attorney had packed the jury with 
ex-county officers and their relatives, a charge denied by the 
Falmouth Independent. The committee of safety was apparent- 
ly content with the jury's inaction as it recommended that any 
prosecution of county officers for fraudulent tax practices be 
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postponed until the county court had looked into the matter. 
But the committee did not relax its vigilance as it accused the 
incumbent sheriff of owing $16,000 in delinquent taxes and 
resolved to expose the absurdities of a hastily issued county 
court financial statement. Perhaps cowed by the environment of 
suspicion and investigation, ex-sheriff B. B. Mullins issued a 
claim that he had collected and accounted for all delinquent 
taxes during his term of office, but that the county court clerk 
had failed to  record the transactions and the back tax collector 
was attempting to collect taxes from those who had already 
paid them.13 
The committee of safety further expanded its lists of griev- 
ances and proposed reforms at another mass meeting of citizens 
held on court day in May 1877. It branded the county court's 
financial statement as inaccurate and accused officials of col- 
lecting taxes but not recording the payments, of borrowing 
money for public purposes and then appropriating it for their 
own use, of failing to account for taxes collected on unassessed 
- 
property, and of neglecting to assess the property of nonresi- 
dents. The committee urged the abolition of these evils and the 
elimination of consecutive terms for sheriffs. Undaunted by the 
aura of crisis and scandal, the Pendleton County Court refused to 
consider the committee of safety's expose of the county finan- 
cial statement on the grounds that the committee's members 
had not signed it and adjourned without considering the grand 
jury's request for an investigation of county finances. But it did 
go on record in opposition to  legislative extensions of time for 
sheriffs to collect taxes and in support of tougher laws against 
speculation in county claims.14 
Charges and countercharges, denials and rebuttals continued 
to dominate county governmental news throughout the remain- 
der of 1877. County court clerk Jonathan B. Applegate admit- 
ted that he had not kept a record of tax collections, but argued 
that he had no legal responsibility to  do  so, an assertion denied 
by J. W. Woodhead, chairman of the committee of safety. 
Several correspondents to  the Falmouth Independent accused 
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James T. Clark, collector of  back taxes, of attempting to  collect 
from those who had already paid and, in addition, of favoritism 
and inconsistency in the execution of his official responsibili- 
ties. Clark vehemently denied these charges. Finally the grand 
jury, spurred on by the continuous blasts of  the committee of 
safety and the biting editorials of  the Independent, censured 
county officials for negligent tax collecting and reporting, and 
indicted the court of claims for failing to  publish a statement of 
the debts and assets of the county.'" 
As the 1878 campaign for county offices approached, the 
committee of safety sought to broaden its crusade into general 
governmental reform. Its chairman, J. W. Woodhead, pro- 
claimed that the committee would work through local "county 
reform clubs" of  from fifty to  a hundred members each t o  rid 
local government of  the professional officeholders, office seek- 
ers, and "their hangers-on" who constituted nearly half of  the 
adult population of the county. Officials must make govern- 
ment more responsive to the needs of the people, Woodhead 
declared, and his committee would seek t o  keep partisan pol- 
itics out  of  county government. Several neighborhoods organ- 
ized reform clubs, and a mass meeting at  the Lick Creek 
Precinct defended Woodhead against unspecified charges of 
immorality. At year's end the committee sponsored still another 
mass county meeting and there called for more efficient collec- 
tion and disbursement of  revenues and pledged that its people 
would not support any candidate for county office, regardless 
of his party affiliation, if he had "heretofore proved himself 
either unwilling or  incompetent to  perform his duties."16 
The new year saw the committee of safety intensify its 
political activities. It issued specific interrogatories for James T. 
Clark, collector of  back tzxes, and when his answers were 
judged unresponsive, it appointed a special committee to  pursue 
the questioning further. It promulgated more general queries for 
all candidates for county office, seeking their views on  tax reform 
and fiscal responsibility. It requested that the county's legisla- 
tive representatives publish all bills affecting the county so that 
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the committee and citizens in general could comment upon 
them, and it sponsored ~ u b l i c  discussions of county govcrn- 
mental problems and 
Despite the flurry of committee activity between early 1877 
and mid-1879, it is doubtful that it had a lasting impact on the 
quality of Pendleton County government. The committee en- 
. - 
joyed more success in revelation than in reform. It demon- 
strated that past and present county tax officials had failed to  
account for taxes collected, t o  collect large amounts of  taxes 
- 
due, and t o  assess still other large amounts of taxable property. 
Despite renewed committee agitation and claims of jury-pack- 
ing, grand juries called in 1878 and 1879 continued t o  avoid a 
thorough investigation into county court affairs, and previous 
indictments came to  naught. Some tax reduction was secured, 
- 
as well as a general commitment of the court of  claims and 
county officials to  keep and publish more complete records, but  
there is no  evidence of marked improvement in assessment and 
collection practices. Significantly, one of the last reported ac- 
tions of the committee was its plea to  aggrieved taxpayers to  
initiate themselves individual civil suits and criminal charges, a 
confession that its call for governmental action had largely 
failed.18 
Tax assessment and collection were only part of the fiscal 
. - 
problem for the counties and their governors. Taxpayers, jour- 
nalists, and even county officials also criticized county appro- 
priations and expenditures, as well as tax assessments and col- 
lections. Complainants cited both general and specific deficicn- 
cies in the fiscal planning of courts of claims. Most of the 
reported challenges concerned specific appropriations, and not a 
few originated from county officials themselves. In 1869 Fay- 
ette County's Judge Graves disputed the right of his court of 
claims t o  appropriate $1,500 for the Orphan Society of Lexing- 
ton on  the grounds that it was unconstitutional and illegal for a 
county t o  spend taxpayers' money for a private institution not 
under the control of  the government. At first refusing to  sign 
the minutes containing the expenditure, Judge Graves ulti- 
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m a d y  decided to challenge it before the courts. While the 
Fayette County Circuit Court ruled in his favor, the Court of 
Appeals sustained the court of claims on the grounds that the 
statutory provision requiring county courts t o  provide for the 
poor was broad enough to permit the appropriation. Twenty 
years later the Fayette County Court became embroiled in a 
similar dispute. Some on the court wished for it to  appropriate 
$200 for the privately controlled Home of the Friendless, but 
justice of the peace Henry Payne and several others protested 
on the grounds that certain of the inmates were immoral. 
Payne's accusations provoked a fistfight between himself and 
"Squire Jewell," and a spirited defense of the home from 
certain female members of its board of directors. In the end, 
Justice Payne apologized and the court approved the expendi- 
ture.19 
Most of the challenges to  proposed county expenditures 
came from individual taxpayers. Although the Court of Appeals 
severely restricted the ability of private citizens to  thwart court 
of claims' appropriations through litigation, ruling, for example, 
that an aggrieved taxpayer could not enjoin the Pendleton 
County Court from purchasing a site for a poor farm, it could 
not put a stop to continuous complaints from the general 
public. In an episode similar to Fayette County's, the Cyntkliana 
News denounced the Harrison County Court in 1868 for appro- 
- - 
priating county tax funds for Harrison Academy and assuming 
part of its debt even though the school was privately owned and 
operated and the county judge was one of the trustees. One of 
the academy's trustees, M. L. Broadwell, put to  rest some public 
resentment over the expenditure, when he pointed out that a 
statute authorized the county court appropriation and that the 
academy had been a public school for the past two and one-half 
years. But three years later, a correspondent to  the News 
delivered an unanswered blast against the Harrison County 
Court for giving poor relief to  nonpaupers. In other examples, a 
Robertson County resident questioned the legality of an 1875 
appropriation of his county's court of claims for a railing 
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around the courthouse rostrum, while ten years later a member 
of the Franklin County Court denied reports that his tribunal 
had made an excessive appropriation to a superintendent of a 
local bridge project.20 
If the ordinary citizen did not have standing to question 
court of claims financial policy in general, he clearly could 
dispute decisions which affected claims for services he had 
rendered the county, and such controversies were so frequent as 
to be routine. Although many of the disputes were never liti- 
gated, a number of those which were concerned claims of doc- 
- 
tors who had performed services for the county. In a series of 
cases the Court of Appeals ruled that despite the existence of an 
emergency, doctors could not be reimbursed for services to  the 
county unless they secured approval from the court of claims, 
and perhaps even the local board of health, and not simply the 
county judge." 
Bickering over appropriations and claims constituted an inevi- 
table problem of government; trafficking in those claims repre- 
sented a far more serious difficulty. Even after the so-called age 
of democratic reform, governments in nineteenth-century 
America still retained some of the personal qualities of their 
neo-medieval predecessors. While offices and perquisites were 
no longer formally bought, sold, and transferred like personalty 
to relatives and friends, informally such was often the case. This 
was especially true in the area of claims against the county 
government for goods sold and services performed. Although a 
state statute made it a crime for "any county judge, justice of 
the peace, sheriff, county clerk, or county attorney to  traffic 
for, purchase, or speculate in any claim or claims, to  be allowed 
by the court of claims of the county of which he or they may 
be said judge," this prohibition was not effectively enforced and 
did not apply either to other county officers or to the public at 
large.22 
Claims brokers flourished in nineteenth-century Kentucky in 
part because of the awkwardness of claims processing and 
funding. County creditors had to wait until their services were 
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performed before presenting their claims t o  the county court, 
which sat as a court of claims no more than twice a year and 
usually only once. After the court approved the claim, the 
creditor had to  wait at least six months for the sheriff to  collect 
enough taxes to  pay off the county's debts. For those creditors 
without ample cash reserves or who were on the county payroll, 
the only recourse was to sell their claims to  a broker at a 
substantial discount. The broker would eventually turn a hand- 
some profit when the tax collector finally paid off. Although 
critics periodically denounced such institutional usury, little 
was done in the way of effective reform during the period of 
the third constitution. Statutes such as the one which required 
the Marshall County Court t o  hold two claims courts per year 
and t o  pay off all claims within two to  four months of each 
term offered as their only penalty recourse against the tax 
collector. As late as 1885 the Frankfort Capital urged sheriffs to  
collect and pay their taxes expeditiously and fully so that 
schoolteachers would not have to  "pass through the ruthless 
hands of 'claims brokers.' " Not only did sheriffs seldom heed 
such demands, but there is evidence that they and their deputies 
were among the most active of the brokewZ3 
Most legislative reform efforts centered not on the problem 
of slow claims liquidation but on the question of ascertaining 
the validity and size of claims and their amounts. Critics cited 
the "cumbersome" machinery of claims processing which led to  
"confusion . . . irregularity [and] conflicting opinions." Some 
courts either summarily accepted all claims and thereby sent tax 
rates soaring or arbitrarily halved all claims, which cheated 
honest creditors and rewarded the dishonest ones who, in antici- 
pation of such practices, doubled or trebled the amount of their 
claims. Statutory reforms generally required claims to  be pre- 
sented t o  the county clerk's office at least ten days before the 
convening of claims courts so that the county attorney, who 
was charged with screening all claims, could adequately pass 
upon them before presenting them to  the full court. Some 
counties were authorized to appoint special claims commis- 
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sioners, but  these experiments were usually short-lived. The 
legislature sometimes attempted to  redress the hastiness of 
claims approval in some counties by permitting only half o f  the 
justices of the  peace to  act with the county judge as the court 
of claims, but this reform proved to be as ineffectual as the 
others.24 
Reformers tried other ways to  combat increasingly scandal- 
ous and chaotic county fiscal management. In 1860, after a 
stream of  complaints about government by secrecy, the legisla- 
ture enacted a statute requiring all county clerks t o  publish 
annually a statement of  "the debts and assets of  the county, the 
allowances by the court, to whom, and for what purpose 
made." Yet this statute was not uniformly observed, and when 
it was enforced, it often did nothing but reveal a county's 
"muddled" accounts. For this reason, some counties obtained 
legislative authority to  appoint a county auditor whose task it 
was to  keep a full account of all county funds, receipts, and 
disbursements, to insure that collections were received and 
expenditures properly expended, and, presumably, t o  bring 
some semblance of order out of  confusion. But there is n o  
evidence that the few counties which appointed auditors found 
them to be a panacea for their fiscal turmoil.'" 
Eleven counties, or  fewer than one-tenth, adopted the most 
radical and successful reform of  fiscal control: they abandoned 
their courts of  claims entirely and secured legislative authoriza- 
tion to  elect three-man boards of commissioners, who were 
empowered to perform all the duties of  the traditional fiscal 
courts. Normally the commissioners were elected for three 
years, although in Magoffin County the circuit court judge 
appointed three commissioners annually. Oddly enough no one 
appears to  have questioned the constitutionality of the commis- 
sion system under the third constitution even though section 29 
of that document offers some support for the notion that the 
General Assembly could choose between only two alternative 
fiscal courts: one consisting of "a presiding judge and two 
associate judges" or  a presiding judge and "any or  all of the 
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justices of the peace" of the county. And certainly the Magoffin 
County plan of circuit court-appointed commissioners seems 
even more constitutionally suspect, although i t ,  too, apparently 
was never challenged."j 
Proponents of  the commission system argued that it was 
more efficient and less expensive than the traditional court of 
claims. Senator Charles D. Foote, sponsor of the bill establish- 
ing the Kenton County Commission, contended that his plan 
would attract businessmen t o  county government, while the old 
system repelled them because they did not wish to assume the 
judicial responsibilities of justices of  the peace. He submitted 
further that three skilled businessmen could accomplish more 
than greater numbers of  justices of the peace for less pay. All in 
all the new commissioners would work more efficiently and 
effectively at  a savings to the taxpayers. Others supported 
Foote's reasoning, submitting that many justices of the peace 
were ignorant of  business procedures and that unless the county 
judge and county attorney were "intelligent and painstaking," 
claims courts often deteriorated into "very exasperating specta- 
cles" for those there on business while providing "entertain- 
ment" for spectators. Though many praised the success of  the 
new fiscal courts, delegates to the 1890-1891 constitutional 
- 
convention refused t o  make them mandatory and simply codi- 
fied the status quo by giving counties the option of adopting 
them.27 
Counties were able to transfer some local expenses to  the 
state. Traditionally the Commonwealth paid most of the costs 
of criminal law enforcement and the entire cost of maintaining 
pauper idiots and purchasing county record books. The state 
auditor accused many counties of passing off large numbers of 
their poor as idiots so that the state would underwrite their 
poorhouses. In an effort t o  curtail this abuse, the legislature in 
1882 transferred the jurisdiction in cases of idiocy from county 
and police courts to  circuit courts, but  the remedy proved very 
temporary. In 1885 the auditor complained that circuit courts 
were no more vigilant than their predecessors in jurisdiction and 
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that the numbers of alleged pauper idiots continued to multiply 
each year. Five years later the General Assembly partially con- 
fronted the problem by requiring the counties to pay twenty 
dollars of the annual maximum allowance per idiot of seventy- 
five dollars. State officials never did convince the legislature of 
- 
the wisdom of requiring counties to pay for their own record 
books.28 
The method of paying county officials constituted another 
neo-feudalistic characteristic of the local constitution. Fees and 
not salaries constituted the primary source of income for most 
county officials. Only the county judge and county court attor- 
ney received a formal salary, and each of them received addi- 
tional income, the former from a limited number of fees and 
the latter from a percentage of all fines and forfeitures for 
successful misdemeanor prosecutions. The remaining officers 
depended entirely upon fees for their official income.29 
The amount of fee income received by a county official 
depended directly on the amount of legal business transacted in 
his county. Officers of poorer, less sophisticated, and more 
sparsely populated counties naturally drew less money from 
fees than those of richer and more heavily populated counties. 
While county offices of pauper counties sometimes went abeg- 
ging because of inadequate income, those of the wealthiest 
sometimes commanded immense incomes and attracted hordes 
of aspirants. In Jefferson County, the most heavily populated of 
the state, the jailer earned from $30,000 to  $40,000 per year, 
while the sheriff and county clerk earned a minimum of 
$10,000. Naturally, these lucrative offices attracted highly or- 
ganized and well-financed candidacies. Critics charged that in- 
cumbents created "corruption funds" from portions of their 
profits with which to  wage reelection campaigns by vote-buying 
and other illegal methods. Yet an intensive investigation by a 
legislative committee in 1879-1880 turned up no illegal fee- 
charging by Jefferson County officers. However, an observer did 
uncover widespread fee-gouging elsewhere, especially in the 
pauper counties of the east, where sheriffs and other law en- 
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forcement officers reportedly conspired with others to create 
fraudulent arrests, enjailments, and even trials in order to col- 
lect fees from the C o m m ~ n w e a l t h . ~ ~  
Not surprisingly, the fee system produced criticism and calls 
for its abolition. The Louisville Evening Iost ,  a leading oppo- 
nent of the system, branded it "a tax upon justice," which 
enabled county officers, especially those from wealthier coun- 
ties, "to get better pay and d o  less work than any class of 
citizens in the commonwealth." If the system was not corrupt, 
it was at least oppressive. "Fees! Fees! Fees! Wherever you go 
there stands an officer, surrounded by henchmen and flatterers, 
who will work for him, vote for him, fight for him, and buy 
others t o  d o  the same," the Post lamented. But defenders of the 
system, reflecting an almost medieval perception of public of- 
fice, maintained that an officer's fees were his personal property 
and that it was even beyond the power of a constitutional 
convention to  take them away from him. The Post did, how- 
ever, accurately observe that n o  reform group could topple the 
system during the  period of the third constitution, this in part 
because of the great power of the fze collectors and their 
t ~ a d i e s . ~ '  
As with the odious fees, county salaries produced public 
uproar. The original statutes implementing the constitutional 
establishment of  the office of county judge did not expressly 
provide for a salary, but  most county courts had done so by the 
Civil War. While these early provisions for a guaranteed annual 
wage prompted some outcries, they paled in comparison t o  the 
protests which greeted salary increases after the war. The great- 
est turmoil occurred in the mid-1870s following the legislature's 
granting of  misdemeanor jurisdiction to  county judges, an ex- 
pansion of responsibility which caused some courts of claims to 
increase the judges' salaries. Opponents lashed at  such increases 
in Mason, Hickman, and Fayette counties, and despite resis- 
tance from those who charged that these attacks were moti- 
vated solely by narrow partisan political considerations, anti- 
increase forces in Fayette County succeeded in having incre- 
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ments rolled back. Fayette's struggle also involved allegations 
that the justices of the peace had for at  least seven years 
overpaid themselves for their daily attendance at  courts of 
claims. After they had been indicted for same by a g a n d  jury, 
they reduced their own fees also. County judge salaries and 
those of the county attorney also sparked public debate in 
Grant, Harrison, Pendleton, and L,incoln counties, among 
others.32 
County officers who might not be the objects of public 
derision were nearly always the victims of evasion and flight to  
avoid payment of  fees. Apparently officials did not always 
collect fees upon performance of  services, and fees receivable 
were sometimes difficult to collect. The statute books are full 
of special legislation extending the period in which county 
officers could lawfully collect their fee bills. Judges and court 
attorneys, especially those from pauper counties, occasionally 
had difficulty collecting their full salary allotments, and some 
even had to  resort t o  litigation, but  these grievances were more 
infrequent than those arising over fees.33 
During the period of the third constitution, the counties 
continued to  be the core of Kentucky's taxation system and as 
such were hardly models of efficiency and stability. Major 
problems of assessment and collection consistently plagued 
county officials and produced widespread popular unrest, in 
some places bordering on outright rebellion. Nor did the coun- 
ties enjoy any more success as agencies of appropriation and 
expenditure. Cumbersome claims procedures placed large 
chunks of the counties' accounts payable in the hands of private 
brokers. The fee system also underlined the private, neo-feudalis- 
tic nature of county government and sometimes provoked public 
dismay and official corruption. Reformers attempted to  cope 
with these problems, but not with much success, and their 
failure t o  centralize the state's fiscal operations served to  high- 
light the parochial nature of  the Commonwealth's constitution. 
CONCLUSION AND 
POSTSCRIPT 
The Civil War settled the question of the ultimate sovereignty of 
the federal government, and the industrial and urban revolu- 
- 
tions which followed it did much to  draw Americans closer 
together in a physical, economic, and social sense. Yet during 
the remainder of the nineteenth century, the nation remained 
primarily rural in nature and local government continued to 
play a significant role in the lives of most citizens. This was 
especially true in Kentucky, where on the eve of constitutional 
reform in 1890 only 19.2 percent of the people lived in cities. If 
anything, county government came to  affect Kentuckians even 
more intimately during the period of the third constitution. 
Counties invested the most %overnmental funds in internal im- 
provements, built and maintained most of the roads, and con- 
tinued to  act as the primary enforcer of laws for most of the 
Commonwealth's residents. They also retained their responsi- 
bilities as the principal tax collectors and dispensers of poor 
relief. Competition for county offices in the newly inaugurated 
elective system constituted a significant phase of Kentucky's 
intense political life, and the official day on which the county 
courts met continued to be the foremost social and economic 
day of the month for most Kentuckians. At least in Kentucky, 
nineteenth-century state government largely confined itself t o  a 
few specialized services such as assistance t o  the physically and 
mentally handicapped, minimal regulation of a few industries 
and professions, aid to education, the operation of several small 
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colleges, maintenance of a state guard, and operation of a 
judicial and penal system. Americans continued to  look to local 
government for resolution of most of their public problems. 
The welfare state had not yet evolved. When the federal govern- 
ment attempted to  intervene in state and local affairs for a brief 
period following the Civil War, it was the county governments 
which largely frustrated that endeavor. 
Despite the good intentions of the reformers of 1849-1850, 
Kentucky's counties also maintained the tradition of parochi- 
alism, corruption, and inefficiency. Democracy cured few of the 
basic deficiencies of the local constitution. Fee-gouging persist- 
ed, vote-buying replaced office-auctioning, and the quality of 
public service remained low. Although the legislature created 
fewer new counties, its mounting preoccupation with local and 
special legislation rendered it almost a rubber stamp for the 
needs of counties and their citizens. Ostensibly an invasion of 
local autonomy, Kentucky's system of local legislation in reality 
constituted a crude form of county home rule. Besieged with 
requests for local statutes, legislators normally adhered to  the 
desires of counties seeking special statutes and sometimes even 
allowed their officers to draft the legislation. In effect, the 
seekers of these special statutes became a third house of the 
legislature. Contrary to assumption, restrictions on local legisla- 
tion in the fourth constitution represented limitations on coun- 
ty government, not a liberation of it. 
Although theoretically a province of the state, counties con- 
stituted in many respects semi-autonomous entities. Their par- 
ticipation in the railroad binge encompassed a rivalry not unlike 
that between the city-states of fourteenth-century Italy. With- 
out a chief executive officer, county officials themselves repre- 
sented semi-autonomous constitutional creatures without direc- 
tion either at home or from Frankfort. Despite the injection of 
democratic politics, the persistence of the fee system prompted 
most county officials to  maintain a proprietary attitude toward 
their offices. In many ways, nineteenth-century Kentucky re- 
sembled medieval Europe. 
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A prevailing lawlessness compounded the semi-anarchical 
condition of many of Kentucky's counties. Crime, whether in 
the shape of feuds and vigilantism or in less organized forms, 
rendered the lives of many countians progressively insecure as 
the century matured. If county leaders failed to  enforce the 
criminal law, they also often refused to  honor their civil com- 
mitments, especially if they involved railroad indebtedness. 
Nineteenth-century Kentucky left n o  legacy of law and order. 
The Constitution of 1891 largely retained Kentucky's county 
government. The new frame of government limited indebted- 
ness, abolished the fee system in Jefferson County, and g a n t e d  
the legislature the option of abolishing the office of common- 
wealth's attorney and merging it into the county attorney's 
office, of merging the jailership with the sheriffalty, and abol- 
ishing the office of  assessor. It also gave the legislature the right 
to abolish counties. Counties were given the option of adopting 
the commission form of government. The reformers changed 
little else. 
In part because of the failure of the Constitution of 1891 to 
reform effectively, many of the nineteenth-century deficiencies 
of county government persisted into the twentieth. The fee 
system continued to debilitate the county officialdom, causing 
it t o  treat public office as a private concession. Writing in 1923 
for the Efficiency Commission of Kentucky, H. S. Gilbertson, 
executive secretary of the National Short Ballot Organization 
and a pioneer in the study of  county government, called for the 
abolition of  the fee system, labeling it "unsound in principle, 
ineffective, and often grossly inequitable in practice." Ken- 
tucky's adherence t o  this antiquated system of compensation 
caused it t o  "occupy an exceedingly backward position in this 
respect among the states." Other students of the local constitu- 
tion echoed this plea with n o  effect. Faced with vigorous 
opposition from scores of county officials, the legislature refused 
to  take most county officials off the fee system and place them 
on salaries. ~ l t h o u g h  the legislature did require fiscal courts to  
place limitations on the compensation of county officers, with 
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surplus fees going to the fiscal courts, as recently as 1975 some 
officers reportedly continued to  retain fees in violation of the 
statute.' 
Some believed that justices of the peace remained mired in 
mediocrity and that the majority of county judges had deterio- 
rated in quality by 1923. In the opinion of some, the majority 
of justices of the peace outside of eastern Kentucky had almost 
ceased t o  perform judicial functions except in Jefferson Coun- 
ty, where they allegedly operated a network of speed traps. 
H. S. Gilbertson estimated that a majority of county judges 
lacked sufficient knowledge of the law to  perform their judicial 
duties and that some rated as generally illiterate. Others argued 
that county judges often prevented greedy lawyers from con- 
verting the probate process into an assault on defenseless es- 
tates. In 1975, voters sided with critics of the system of local 
justice and approved a constitutional amendment stripping the 
justices of the peace and county judges of their judicial func- 
tions and transferring these duties to  newly created district 
judges trained in the law.* 
Some sheriffs continued to  neglect the enforcement of crim- 
inal laws whether because of negligence or lack of funds (others 
performed remarkably well, although short of manpower and 
money). An appraisal of the Ohio County sheriff written in 
1923 could easily have been written sixty years earlier: "the 
sheriff is not interested in serving warrants of any kind, either 
civil or criminal . . . [his] chief interest is in collecting taxes." 
The same commentator noted that similar conditions existed in 
other counties and that sheriffs especially refused to enforce 
prohibition laws. Making almost the identical summary in 1938, 
an observer reported that some counties attempted to bolster 
their inadequate systems of law enforcement by establishing 
county patrols but that these also proved ineffective. Advocat- 
ing the abolition of the office of constable, the writer also 
proposed the establishment of a state police force. Ten years 
later, the legislature created a state police department, and 
following World War II, a number of urban counties founded 
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county police forces, a proposition sometimes advanced in the 
nineteenth century but seldom implemented. Most counties 
continued to depend on their sheriffs for law enforcement and 
not a few found the task increasingly difficult because of a 
shortage of funds. In 1975 the sheriff of Edmonson County 
donated the bulk of his personal fees to  provide his county with 
twenty-four hour policing. Despite the sheriff's plight and his 
unselfish response to  it, voters overwhelmingly rejected a special 
tax to  provide better county law enforcement. Kentucky sher- 
iffs argued that more compensation and the right to  successive 
terms would enhance law enforcement, but  the legislature and 
voters refused to  approve these  reform^.^ 
Gilbertson also downgraded most of the other county of- 
ficers. County attorneys lacked courage and independence, 
some even breaching professional ethics. In one county, the 
school superintendent hired the county attorney to  represent 
him in his settlement of  accounts with the fiscal court and the 
Commonwealth so that the very same county attorney would 
not prosecute him for improper dispersal and accounting of 
funds. Another county attorney reportedly refused to  prosecute 
local banks for charging the county excessive rates of interest 
because "he did not like to  proceed against his neighbors." In 
1923 the attorney general alleged that many county attorneys 
had n o  knowledge of even the fundamentals of law and could 
not perform the most rudimentary of their statutory duties. In 
the same year, Gilbertson for the Efficiency Commission 
echoed the plea of some at  the constitutional convention of 
1890-1 89 1 that the office of  commonwealth's attorney be 
merged into the office of county attorney in order to  simplify 
prosecutorial duties and upgrade the latter office. He also pro- 
posed ( to  no avail) that seven assistant attorneys general be 
. - 
created to  supervise the activities of the county attorneys.4 
Jailers continued, because of  negligence or  because of  anti- 
quated jails, t o  suffer prison escapes, a condition reminiscent of 
the nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century some 
county clerks records to be falsified, stolen; or  de- 
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strayed by fire. One clerk left his office open at  all hours of the 
day and night for the convenience of attorneys, a practice 
permitting one unscrupulous citizen to  attempt unsuccessfully 
to  alter a public document. The perversity of county politicians 
in regard t o  the county treasuryship knew n o  bounds. After the 
legislature finally recognized common practice and required 
county courts to  elect the county treasurer on the basis of 
competitive bidding, the  tribunals began to  award the position 
to  cronies or t o  the sheriff in defiance of the law and former 
c ~ s t o m . ~  
Although claims processing continued t o  be slipshod, with 
justices of the peace continuing to  halve unfamiliar claims and 
unquestioningly approve those favored by a colleague, some 
progress occurred in the area of county budgeting. By a 1934 
statute, the legislature required all counties to  secure approval 
of their budgets by the state Department of  Finance, which in 
practice required all counties t o  produce balanced budgets. 
Nonetheless, at  least one commentator criticized the Common- 
wealth for imposing too much rigidity on county financial 
planning.6 
Tax assessment and collecting continued t o  be a problem well 
into the new century. Although the state tightened its control 
over assessment and collection b y  virtue of  the supervision of 
the State Tax Commission, the Auditor of Public Accounts, and 
the State Inspector and Examiner, and while the legislature 
replaced the office of county assessor with that of county tax 
commissioner, underassessment and nonassessment of  taxable 
property persisted. John W. Manning, professor of political 
science at  the University of Kentucky, attributed this to  lack of 
good maps, cronyism, reliance on outdated evaluations, and 
uncooperative taxpayers. Manning also pronounced as a "farce" 
an examination administered by the Commonwealth t o  all pro- 
spective county tax commissioners. As of 1938 many sheriffs 
experienced difficulty in the collection of taxes, encountering 
the same problems as had their nineteenth-century counter- 
p a r t ~ . ~  
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During the early period of the fourth constitution, some 
counties evaded restrictions on indebtedness, illegally incurring 
debts without securing voter approval. By 1936 most counties 
possessed indebtedness, and some repudiated their debts in the 
wake of depression. After World War 11 the state began exercis- 
ing greater control over county debts and, in the opinion of one 
expert, steered the local units of government to  more responsi- 
ble debt management. Still the same scholar faulted the consti- 
tution's restrictions on indebtedness as in theory unduly restric- 
tive and unrealistic, and in practice easily evaded and called for 
basic revisions8 
Counties remained the principal overseer of roads until after 
World War II ,  although throughout the twentieth century the 
Commonwealth and federal government absorbed an increasing 
share of road construction and maintenance. By 1923 a major- 
ity of counties had established either a county road engineer or 
road commission, but in at  least fifty-three counties roads 
remained in a "deplorable" condition. Early in the century 
those counties retaining the traditional labor tax and overseer 
system continued to  be bogged down in corruption, ineffi- 
ciency, and mud. One county judge lamented that while his 
county had good roads in the summer, most people stayed at 
home in the   inter.^ 
The framers of  the fourth constitution perpetuated still 
another deficiency of county government, its nineteenth- 
century condition of headlessness. The delegates did not even 
debate the issue of whether to give a single county officer, 
presumably the county judge, supervisory power over other 
county officials and county business generally, and observers of 
county government seemed not to  worry about the question 
either. Twentieth-century commentators began t o  illuminate 
the problem, conceding that in some counties there might 
occasionally be a de facto leader of government whose author- 
ity was measured by his political influence (usually the county 
judge, county attorney, or sheriff). But such authority, they 
contended, usually proved to be temporary and incomplete, and 
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offered no substitute for constitutional power. Each county 
officer controlled the expenses of his office and made cost- 
cutting difficult, if not  impossible. Increasingly, they called for 
creation of a central authority t o  provide more direction and 
coordination to  county affairs.'' 
Twentieth-century critics of Kentucky's county system pro- 
~ o s e d  other reforms, the most drastic of which involved elim- 
ination of large numbers of the counties themselves. Although 
proposals for county consolidation were advanced before the 
Great Depression, they grew more numerous during the period 
of economic holocaust, probably because of the tax savings that 
consolidation would arguably accomplish. In 1931 John Man- 
ning branded counties as obsolete in an age of  sophisticated 
transportation and communications and called for the reduction 
of their number in Kentucky from 120  to  twenty. Submitting 
that counties were afflicted with "misfit uniformityu because 
they were applied to  rural and urban sections alike without 
regard to  their special needs, Manning estimated that merger 
would save taxpayers over $2.5 million. The Courier-Journal 
- .  
quickly endorsed Manning's proposal, contending that consoli- 
dation would eliminate 4,000 useless jobs and wasteful duplica- 
tion of numerous local governmental services. In  a subsequent 
editorial, the newspaper charged that consolidation would cur- 
tail the "subversive" influence of Kentucky's "120 county 
political machines" which accounted for "practically every evil 
in [state] government from inequality of representation to  
inequality of taxation."" 
Manning's proposal attracted support from other newspapers, 
several politicians (including, amazingly, some county officials), 
and the public at  large. The state official most acquainted with 
the realities of county finances, state inspector and examiner 
Nat B. Sewell, endorsed consolidation in early 1933. Almost 
simultaneously, a reader of the Courier-Journal argued that 
elimination of  many of  Kentucky's counties would be a way to  
reduce the number of politicians whom he characterized as 
"parasites that are largely the cause of  our mental distress and 
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our financial decay." The Bowling Green Times-Journal and the 
Carlisle County News supported consolidation in the fall of 
1935 largely because of hoped-for tax savings.12 
But even its most ardent supporters realized the tremendous 
odds against the success of county consolidation. Aligned 
against such a change stood perhaps the most powerful collec- 
tive political force in the Commonwealth, "120 entrenched 
courthouse cliques, and their families and friends." Often the 
product of these cliques or  dependent upon them for reelection 
and necessary support, administrators and legislators in Frank- 
fort feared political disaster if they tampered with the sanctity 
of county boundaries. Bolstering this opposition were hundreds 
of thousands of  Kentuckians who derived special pride from 
their fierce county loyalties. Likewise most county newspapers 
opposed consolidation, allegedly because of their lucrative 
printing contracts with county governments. These detractors 
of county merger predicted the economic collapse of county 
seats destroyed by consolidation and attendant unemployment 
and loss of tax revenue. They argued that any tax savings 
derived from consolidation would be more than offset by  the 
added expense of transportation to  more remote county seats 
and by the cost of  new courthouses needed to accommodate 
larger counties. Some even argued that  it would be more diffi- 
cult t o  enforce criminal laws if fewer counties existed.13 
Concrete proposals t o  consolidate Kentucky's counties or to  
alter county government in substantial ways died quickly. In 
1937 the legislature, faced with intense lobbying from county 
officers and their allies, defeated a proposed constitutional 
amendment permitting city-county merger. In 1954 a proposed 
joint resolution directing the Legislative Research Commission 
to study the feasibility of county merger languished in com- 
mittee. Twelve years later the Constitution Revision Assembly 
in its proposed fifth constitution for the Commonwealth actual- 
ly made it more difficult t o  consolidate counties by providing 
that voters had to  approve such plans; nevertheless fears that 
the new charter somehow threatened the sanctity of  Kentucky's 
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counties helped produce its overwhelming defeat. Representing 
a rare glimmer of hope for reform of local government, Fayette 
County culminated several decades of cooperation with the city 
of Lexington by formally merging with that government in 
1974 after voters overwhelmingly endorsed the legislatively 
sanctioned joinder.14 
Kentucky's general failure to  reform county government is 
not unique. In recent decades policymakers in more than a few 
states have stewed openly about the need to  amalgamate coun- 
ties or merge them with cities, but few have accomplished these 
objectives. The nation as a whole seems to  delight more in the 
proliferation of local governmental units than in their abolition. 
In 1966 the Committee for Improvement of Management in 
Government reported that there were more than 80,000 such 
units, including over 3,000 counties and more than twenty 
times as many special districts (in Jefferson County alone there 
were 142 units). Of all local government, the county remains 
the most unreconstructed, constituting in the words of Gilbert- 
son, the "dark continent of American politics." Although not 
alone in their refusal to tamper with their counties, Kentuckians 
arguably attach more significance to  these constitutional crea- 
tures than any other Americans. For many the county seat 
remains the center of civilization commercially and socially; the 
county high school athletic teams inspire loyalty approaching 
patriotic fervor; the county courthouse constitutes a symbolic 
meetinghouse for both rich and poor; and the county continues 
to serve as the basis of the state's political machinery. In 
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AN ESSAY O N  SOURCES 
Basic to  any study of the local Kentucky constitution are the 
county court order books and minute books and court of claims 
books (only a few counties ~ossessed the latter), which contain 
summaries of the business of  the principal institutions of local 
government. King ~ i b r a r ~  Special Collections, University of 
Kentucky, houses microfilm of most of the relevant documents. 
Originals of these documents may be found either in the rele- 
vant county courthouse or in the Kentucky Division of Archives 
and Records, Frankfort. The published reports of the Court of 
Appeals are found in the Kentucky Reports, the Kentucky Law 
Reporter, and Kentucky Opinions. Cases concerning counties 
are digested in J. Barbour's Kentucky Digest . . . , 4  vols. (Louis- 
ville, 1878-1897). ~ e d e r a l  court decisions about county prob- 
lems may be found in Federal Cases, United States Reports and 
the Federal Circuit Court Order Books in the Federal Archives 
and Records Center in Chicago. 
Legislative Acts, House and Senate Journals, and Legislative 
Documents possess a wealth of information about the opera- 
tions, duties, and problems of county government and counties 
in general. Indispensable also are the Constitutions of 1850 and 
1891. In conjunction with these compilations, one should con- 
sult statutory digests and commentaries, including Richard H. 
Stanton, ed., The Revised Statutes of Kentucky . . . , 2 vols. 
(Cincinnati, 1860); Harvey Myers, ed., A Digest of the General 
Laws of Kentucky . . . (Frankfort, 1866);  Joshua F. Bullitt and 
John Feland, eds., The General Statutes of Kentucky (Frank- 
fort, 1877); Bullitt and Feland, eds., The General Statutes of 
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Kentucky (Louisville, 1888); William B. Allen's Kentucky Of- 
ficer's Guide and Legal Hand-Rook . . . (~ouisville, 1860) and 
Richard H. Stanton's A Practical Treatise on the . . . Powers and 
Duties of justices of the Peace (etc.) . . . (Cincinnati, 1875). 
Also informative about the realities of the local constitution is 
Lewis N. Dembitz's Kentucky Jurisprudence (Louisville, 1890). 
Robert M. Bradley's satirical Sketch of Granny Short's Bar- 
becue and the General Statutes o f  Kentucky (Louisville, 1879) 
exposes the absurdities of the nineteenth-century Kentucky 
legislative process. 
Especially revealing is the Official Report o f  the Proceedings 
and Debates in the Convention Assembled . . . September, 1890 
to . . . Change the Constitution of Kentucky, 4 vols. (Frankfort, 
1890). Delegates to this convention spoke candidly about the 
place of the county in nineteenth-century Kentucky constitu- 
tionalism, politics, and society. Freedmen's Bureau Records, 
Record Group 105 in the National Archives and Records Ser- 
vice contain information essential for an understanding of the 
confrontation between county and federal government over the 
black apprenticeship, pauper, and vagrant problems during Re- 
construction. Information about the counties in the Civil War 
can be gleaned from the War of the Rebellion: Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Armies, four series, 128 vols. 
(Washington, D.C., 1880-1901), and the Governors Papers, Ken- 
tucky Historical Society, Frankfort. The latter collection con- 
tains other information about the counties, but far less than for 
the period of the first and second constitutions during which 
the governor possessed far greater powers over county govern- 
ment. 
One can gain insights into the counties and internal improve- 
ments by reading Basil W. Duke's The Commercial and Railroad 
Development o f  Kentucky (Frankfort, 1887); L. L. Robinson's 
Railroad Statistics: . . . to the Voters of Mason County 
(Maysville, 1850); and William C. Ireland's Elizabethtown, Lex- 
ington G Big Sandy R.R. . . . In  Opposition to the Proposed 
Subscription (Ashland, Ky., 1871). James Lane Allen's "County 
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Court Day in Kentucky," Harper's Magazine 79  (August 1889):  
383-97, is a colorful, if somewhat romanticized, account of 
nineteenth-century Kentucky's most festive day of the month. 
W. C. McChord's Report on  the Financial Condition of Washing- 
ton County (Lebanon, 1879) is helpful in understanding the 
chaos of county finances. 
Of special significance is the wealth of information contained 
in nineteenth-century Kentucky newspapers, the most useful of 
which are the Lexington Daily Press, Lexington Weekly Press, 
Lexington Kentucky Gazette, Lexington Kentucky Statesman, 
Lexington Observer and Reporter, Lexington Leader, Lexington 
Transcript, Louisville Journal, Louisville Evening Post, Louis- 
ville Courier-Journal, Louisville Courier, Louisvi~~e Daily Demo- 
crat, Louisville Daily Commercial, Frankfort Commonwealth, 
Frankfort Kentucky Yeoman, Frankfort Capital, Frankfort 
Roundabout, Covington Commonwealth, Barbourville Moun- 
tain Echo, London Mountain Echo, Mt. Olivet Robertson Coun- 
ty Tribune, Stanford Interior Journal, Hickman Courier, Fal- 
mouth Independent, Paris True Kentuckian, Paris Western Citi- 
zen, Cynthiana News, Georgetown Weekly Times, Winchester 
Sun, Danville Kentucky Tribune, Maysville Bulletin, Maysville 
Republican, and Bardstown Herald. The New York Times con- 
tains incisive commentary on  postbellum Kentucky politics and 
society. 
Collections of  personal papers providing glimpses into various 
aspects of  the county include the Martin Cox Papers, the Brutus 
Clay Papers, the Perry Family Papers, and the John Whyte 
Stevenson Papers, all located in King Library Special Collec- 
tions, University o f  Kentucky, the former two on microfilm. 
My earlier study deals with the antebellum antecedents of 
nineteenth-century Kentucky county government in The Coun- 
ty Courts in Antebellum Kentucky (Lexington, 1972). Two of 
the best county histories are B. 0. Gaines's History o f  Scott 
County, 2 vols (Georgetown, Ky., 1906),  and Ot to  A. Rothert's 
A History of Muhlenbcrg County (Louisville, 1913),  the latter 
containing a useful summary of the Muhlenberg County railroad 
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debt war. Other studies relating to specific problems of nine- 
teenth-century Kentucky counties are Charles Chauncy Binney, 
"Restrictions on Special and Local Legislation," American Law 
Register, n.s. 32 (1894): 613-32, 721-45, 816-57, 922-43, 
1019-33, 1109-61; Lyman H. Cloe and Sumner Marcus, "Spe- 
cial and Local Legislation," Kentucky Law Journal 24 (May 
1936): 349-86; E. Merton Coulter, Civil War and Readjustment 
in Kentucky (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1926);  Allen W. Trelease, White 
Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Recon- 
struction (New York, 1971);  Harold Wilson Coates, Stories of 
Kentucky Feuds (Knoxville, 1923);  and Carl B. Boyd, Jr., 
"Local Aid t o  Railroads in Central Kentucky, 1850-1891" 
(master's thesis, University of Kentucky, 1963). 
Illuminating some of the problems and realities of twentieth- 
century Kentucky counties are H. S. Gilbertson, County Gov- 
ernment in Kentucky: A Report by the Efficiency Commission 
of Kentucky (Frankfort, 1923);  John W. Manning, The Govern- 
ment of Kentucky (Lexington, 1938) ; Kenneth E. Vanlanding- 
ham, The Constitution and Local Government, Kentucky Legis- 
lative Research Commission Informational Bulletin No. 36 
(1964). Gilbertson's County Government (New York, 19  17) is 
an important study of early twentieth-century county govern- 
ment in America. 
Thomas D. Clark's Kentucky: Land o f  Contrasts (New York, 
1968) is the finest treatment of twentiethcentury Kentucky 
and contains incisive comments on previous centuries as well. 
Published too late for use in this book was Ralph A. Wooster's 
Politicians, Planters, and Plain Folk: Courthouse and Statehouse 
in the Upper South, 1850-1860 (Knoxville, 1975).  
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collecting duties, 25; authorizes 
special tax collectors, 27; and 
the number of justices of the 
peace, 29; increases jurisdiction 
of the justices of the peace, 
29-30; and the county clerk, 34; 
and the county treasurer, 40; 
and popular primaries, 58-59; 
and disloyal county officers, 60; 
and county problems of the Civil 
War, 61-63; and black appren- 
tices, 64-65; passes poor tax on 
blacks, 68, 69; almost abolishes 
Rowan County, 76; and crime 
control, 81; legislates against 
fraudulent claims, 84;  legislates 
against lax law enforcement, 85; 
and proposals to fight county 
crime, 85-89; temporarily autho- 
rizes sale of state turnpike stock, 
102, 119; and Muhlenberg 
County railroad bond controver- 
sy, 114; resists assumption of 
county railroad debts, 115; and 
railroads' county tax liability, 
116: passes turnpike statutes, 
117-18; and problems of tax 
collection, 127; and claims pro- 
cessing, 135-36; creates county 
commissions, 136-37; and ex- 
penses of pauper idiots, 138; re- 
forms county finances, 146 
Georgetown Weekly Times, 32-33 
Gilbertson, H. S., 143-45, 150 
governor of Kentucky, 79-80, 
82-83, 85-86. See also individual 
governors 
Granger party, 46 
Grant County: and proposed 
boundary change, 5 ;  county 
election in 1862, 44;  and court 
day rivalries, 99;  taxpayers' re- 
volt in, 128; and dispute over 
county salaries, 140 
Graves, Benjamin F., judge (Fayette 
County), 21 ,23,  132-33 
Grayson County, 17, 51 
Greenback party (National Green- 
back Labor party), 47 
Grecn County, 52, 115 
Greenup County, 110,116 
Hancock County Circuit Court, 17 
Hardin County, 11  5 
Harlan County, 62 
Harrison County: county judge and 
tavern licenses of, 21; exploits of 
a constable in, 39;  Democratic 
popular primary in, 54, 56, 58; 
and court day rivalries, 98-99; 
and turnpikes, 117, 119; opposi- 
tion to  taxation in, 127-28; and 
dispute over county salaries, 140 
Harrodsburg, Ky., 105 
Hart County: and party activity in 
1858, 43; and county elections 
of 1878, 47;  and authorization 
to  fight Civil War crime, 86 
Hawes, Richard, judge (Bourbon 
County), 66, 111 
Hazard, Ky., 76 
Henrietta County (proposed), 2 
Hickman County, 139 
Hickman Courier, 54 
Hopkins County, 48, 66 
horse sales (court day), 93-94 
horse shows (court day), 93-94 
Howard, 0. O., major general, 64 
Humphrey, Cook (Rowan County 
sheriff), 73-74 
Huntington, Collis P., 110 
Jackson County, 122 
jailer, 36-37; elections for, 46-47, 
49; and crime control, 78-79; 
and jail, 121; and fees in Jeffer- 
son County, 138; and Constitu- 
tion of 1891, 143; in the twenti- 
eth century, 145 
jails, 121-22 
Jefferson County: net state revenue 
of, 3 ;  relations of, with Louis- 
ville, 14-16; alleged failures of 
justices of the peace in, 33; lu- 
crativeness of county clerkship 
in, 34; contested election of 
jailer in, 37; exploits of a con- 
stable in, 39; Democratic popu- 
lar primary of, 58-59; and spe- 
cial police force, 86-87; fees of 
county officers of, 138; and 
local units of government, 150 
Jessamine County, 98-99, 109 
judicial amendment of 1975, 144 
juries, 82 
justice of the peace, 28-33; and 
crime control, 78, 80-81; and 
fraudulent claims, 83; and public 
buildings, 121; and claims 
brokering, 134; compared to 
county commissioners, 137; in 
the twentieth century, 144 
Kenton County: net state revenue 
of, 3 ;  relations of, with Coving- 
ton, 16;  performance of a justice 
of the peace in, 32; humane con- 
duct ofjailer in, 37; county elec- 
tion of 1870, 45;  and special 
police force, 88;  taxpayers' re- 
volt in, 128;  county commission 
of, 137 
Kentucky River Navigation Com- 
pany, 122-23 
Knott, J .  Proctor, governor: and 
Rowan County feud, 74-76; and 
Perry County feud, 76-77; urges 
transfer of crime costs t o  coun- 
ties, 84;  complains about tax as- 
sessments, 127-28 
Knox County, 51-52 
Knoxville, Ky., 5 
Ku Klux Klan, 72 
Larue Countv. 12 
Laurel County: caliber of county 
judges of, 23; conduct of jailer 
in, 37; and dilapidated court- 
house, 122; and taxation, 126- 
27 
Lawrence County, 8 5  
Lee County, 4-5 
Leslie, Preston H., governor: and 
crime problem, 79, 83, 85-86; 
complains about tax evasion, 
127 
Leslie County, 122 
Letcher County, 61-62 
levy (county). See poll tax 
Lexington, Ky.: and county-city 
Democratic split, 13-14; and 
crime, 87-88; and court day, 
91-93, 96; and railroads, 104-6, 
110 
Lexington & Big Sandy Railroad, 
110. See also Elizabethtown, 
Lexington & Big Sandy Railroad 
Lexington 81 Covington Railroad, 
105, 109 
Lexington & Danville Railroad, 
105,109 
Lexington Kentucky Gazette: pro- 
poses county consolidation, 7 ;  
Lexington Kentucky Gazette: 
praises Fayette County judge, 
23; criticizes "mad scramble for 
office," 48-49; defends vigilan- 
tism, 85; supports county police 
force, 87;  on Fayette County 
livestock sales, 91;  and Bourbon 
County court day boastfulness, 
98; supports free turnpikes, 
118-19; and construction of new 
courthouse. 122 
Lexington Kentucky Statesman, 
107 
Lexington Leader: reports need for 
city annexation, 16;  praises Fay- 
ette county judge, 23; reports on 
voter intimidation in Montgom- 
ery County, 5 1 
Lexington Weekly Press: and city- 
county Democratic split, 14;  
predicts continuance of vigilan- 
tism, 85; endorses free turn- 
pikes, 11 9 
Lincoln County: and elections of 
1874, 46; and Civil War crime, 
86;  and court day attendance, 
99; and salary disputes, 140 
livestock sales (court day), 90-93 
Livingston County, 12 
local and special legislation, 8-13, 
17 ,142  
Louisville, Ky., 14-16, 104 
Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 
104,115 
Louisville Courier-Journal: reports 
on county elections of  1870,45;  
on vote-buying in county elec- 
tions, 50-51; and Rowan County 
feud, 75; condemns county law- 
lessness, 77; on number of coun- 
ties and state costs, 84;  and de- 
cline of court day, 100; supports 
county consolidation, 148 
Louisville Democrat, 4 3  
Louisville Evening Post, 82, 139 
Louisville Journal, 42 
McCracken County: and Civil War 
disruptions, 61-63; and dispute 
with railroad, 115-16 
McCreary, James B., governor: 
vetoes bill exempting certain 
sheriffs, 25; and Breathitt 
County feud, 7 3  
Madison County, 63  
Magoffin, Beriah, governor, 62 
Magoffin County, 136-37 
Manning, John W., 146,148 
Marion County, 65, 115 
Marshall County: attempt to form 
new county from part of, 2;  land 
awarded to, 3; probate dispute 
with Hancock County, 17 ;  and 
claims processing, 135 
Mason Countv: net state revenue 
of, 3 ;  caliber of county judges 
of, 23; and county elections of 
1874, 46; origin of Democratic 
popular primary in, 54, 56-58; 
and railroads, 102-3, 109; and 
dispute over county judge's sala- 
ry, 139 
Maysville & Big Sandy Railroad, 
116 
Maysville & Lexington Railroad, 
102 ,105 ,107 ,109  
Maysville Bulletin: proposes county 
consolidation, 6-7; condemns 
local legislation, 9 ;  praises Mason 
county judges, 23; opposes 
Democratic popular primary in 
Mason County, 56-58 
Maysville Republican, 56 
Meade County, 4 3 , 4 5  
Menifee County, 3 
Mercer County: and local legisla- 
tion, 12;  and intercounty rail- 
road rivalry, 105; and river im- 
provement subscription, 123 
Mobile & Ohio Railroad, 115-16 
Monroe County, 66 
Montgomery County: attempt to 
form new county from part of, 
2; railroad debt of, 3 ;  election of 
jailer in 1878, 47; voter intimi- 
dation in, 51; and railroad in- 
vestments, 110 
Morehead, Ky., 74 
Morgan County, 1-2 
Mount Sterling, Ky., 105, 110 
Mt. Sterling Democrat, 107 
Mt. Sterling Sentinel, 113 
Muhlenberg County, 43, 11 3-15 
Nashville & Cincinnati Railroad, 
104 
Nelson County, 29 
Newport, Ky., 16, 88 
New York Times: on Kentucky's 
lawlessness, 71-72, 77, 79; criti- 
cizes gubernatorial pardons, 82; 
and court day socializing, 95-96 
Nicholas County: attempt to form 
new county from part of, 2;  
murderer from, sentenced le- 
niently, 82; vigilantism in, 85; 
and court day rivalries, 99 
Nicholasville, Ky., 99 
officers (county), 18-41. See also 
name of  specific officer 
Ohio County: election day fighting 
in, 52; and poor blacks, 68-69; 
and sheriff, 144 
Oldham County, 6 
Owen County, 128 
Owensboro, Ky., 68  
Owingsville, Ky ., 105 
Paris, Ky.: political influence of, 
55;  and court day, 98; and rail- 
roads, 105-6 
Paris & Maysville Railroad, 104 
Paris True Kentuckian, 11  1 
Paris Western Citizen, 31 
Pendleton County: and proposed 
boundary change, 5; perfor- 
mance of a justice of the peace 
in, 32; and elections of 1874, 
46: failure of Democratic popu- 
lar ~ r i m a r y  in, 57; crime p rob- 
lem in, 79; criminal law enforce- 
ment in, 84;  taxpayers' revolt in, 
128-32; and poor farm site, 133; 
dispute over salary of county 
judge and county attorney in, 
140 
Perry County: length of service of 
county clerk in, 34;  and Civil 
War disruptions, 62; and feud of, 
76-77 
police (county), 86-89 
police courts, 19, 137 
political parties and county elec- 
tions, 42-49, 53-59; extent of 
partisanship, 42-47; intraparty 
competition, 4 7 4 9 ;  origins of 
party primaries, 53-59 
poll tax, 125-27 
poor blacks (and counties), 68-69 
poor laws (and counties), 68-69 
posse comitatus, 86 
Powell County, 5-6 
primary elections, 53-59 
Proctor, Ky., 4-5 
Prohibitionist party, 47, 49, 52 
Pulaski County, 126 
quarterly courts. See county judge 
railroad bonds (county), 113-15 
railroads (and counties), 101-1 6, 
142 
Reconstruction (and counties), 63- 
7 0 
Republican party, 44-48 
Richland County (proposed), 2 
river improvement projects, 122-23 
road law, 119-21, 147 
Robertson County: special tax of, 
3; homicide case in, 80-81; op- 
position to taxation in, 127; and 
claims dispute, 133-34 
Rockcastle County, 22, 80 
Rowan County: creation of, 1-2; 
Rowan County (continued): 
proposed abolition of, 6 ;  vote- 
buying in, 51; feud in, 73-76: 
and railroads, 11  0 
Russell County, 65 
salaries (county), 138-40 
sale of county offices, 50 
Scott County: net state revenue of, 
3 ;  alleged illegality of two jus- 
tices of the peace in, 32-33; and 
court day, 90; and railroads, 106, 
1 i 1; and free turnpikes, 119 
Shelby County, 3, 6 
sheriff, 24-28; and Fayette County 
elections of 1872 and 1874, 
45-46; Civil War difficulties of, 
61-62; and feuds, 73-77; and 
crime control, 77-80; and jury 
selection, 82;  and fraudulent 
claims, 83-84; and attempted re- 
pudiation of Marion County rail- 
road debt, 115; as tax collector, 
124, 127, 129-32; and claims 
brokering, 134-35; fees of, in Jef- 
ferson County, 138;  and Consti- 
tution of 1891, 143, 154 n.18; 
in the twentieth century, 144- 
47; proposals t o  remove law en- 
forcement duties of, 171 n.3 
Special Advisory Commission on 
County Government, 171 nn. 2 
& 3 
Speed, James, 67, 69 
Stanford Interior Journal, 22 
Stanton, Richard, 81  
state police, 144 
Stevenson, John Whyte, governor, 
taxation (state and county), 
124-32, 146. See also poll tax 
tax commissioner (county). See 
county tax commissioner 
Taylor County, 115 
Tolliver,Martin feud, 73-76. See 
also Rowan County 
treasurer (county), 40, 146 
Trigg County, 2 
Trimble County, 122 
turnpikes, 116-19 
Union County, 121 
Union party, 44 
vagrants, black (and counties), 69- 
70 
Versailles & Midway Railroad, 104 
vigilantism, 71-72, 84-85. See also 
Ku Klux Klan 
votc-buying, 50-5 1 
Warren County, 44 
Washington County, 113, 126 
Wayne County, 65 
Whig party, 42 
Whitley County, 122, 127 
Wickliffe, Ky., 5 
Williamstown, Ky., 5 
Wolfe County, 61, 100 
women in county government posi- 
tions, 40 
Woodford County: net state reve- 
nue of, 3 ;  alleged discrimination 
by two justices of the peace in, 
33; and court day, 90. 99;  and 
railroads, 104 
12-13 
Supreme Court, U.S., 113, 115 Young, Zachery (Rowan county at- 
surveyor (county), 40  torney), 74-75 
